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3D

## MARINE DIVISION

FMF (-) (REIN)

*BOOT LEG*OPERATION PLAN  
7-69

(CASEY GROVE)

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 3d **Marine Division** (-) (Rein)  
 Dong Ha, Vietnam  
 Ser: 003A07669  
 17 March 1969  
 DH: 112

## Operation Plan 7-69 (CASEY GROVE)

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Ref: (a) **Maps:** vietnam: 1:50,000; Series **L7014**; Sheets  
 6341 I and IV; 6342 I, II, III, and IV; 6441  
 I, II, III, and IV.

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization. No Change.

## 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Current **INTSUS** and **PERINTREPS**.
- b. **Friendly** Forces.

(1) XXIV Corps destroys NVA/VC forces in AO and prevents enemy capture, destruction or domination of Hue, **Quang Tri** and other populated areas.

(2) **1st ARVN** Div continues missions in zone to include defense of Dong Ha and **Quang Tri** cities.

(3) 101st Abn Div (**AM**) destroys NVA/VC forces in zone, assists in defense of **Hue**, prepares to support 3d MarDiv **counterattack** and/or counterattacks to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base areas.

## (4) Artillery.

(a) 108th Arty GP **G/S** XXIV Corps conducts counterbattery fire and maintains maximum suppression of **NVA** AA weapons and supporting installations.

(b) **1st** Bn, 44th Arty (-) **G/S** 3d **MarDiv**.

(5) **1st MAW** and 7th **AF** provides **air** support to 3d MarDiv.

(6) 7th Fleet provides tactical air and **NGF** support to 3d MarDiv (3 **NGF** Ships).

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(7) TF Clearwater maintains access to the Cua Viet River.

(8) 11th Engr Bn G/S 3d MarDiv.

(9) FLSG-B provides supply and maintenance support 3d MarDiv.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) Option #1.

(a) Two ARG/SLF's on order.

(b) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv (2 Bns), on order.

(2) Option #2.

(a) Two ARG/SLF's, on order.

(b) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv (2 Bns), on order.

(3) Option #3.

(a) Two ARG/SLF's, on order.

(b) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv (2 Bns), on order.

(c) 173rd Abn Bde, on order.

d. Assumptions.

(1) Option #1..

(a) Enemy attacks across DMZ with up to four divisions supported by artillery, armor, and air.

(b) Enemy attack detected as forces cross the DMZ.

(c) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv available by D+6.

(2) Option #2. Enemy reinforces MRTTH forces with one Division through Laos and attacks east on the axis of advance A Shnu Valley Route 547 toward Hue.

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## (3) Option #3.

(a) Enemy attacks south with multi-divisions across the DMZ on an axis of advance toward Quang Tri City.

(b) Enemy reinforces MRTTH forces with one Division through Laos and attacks east on an axis A Shau Valley - Route 547 toward Hue.

(c) Enemy attacks with multi-divisions from Cambodia toward Saigon.

(d) Enemy attack detected as forces cross the DMZ.

(e) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv (2 Ens) available by D+6.

## 2. MISSION

Third Marine Division (-) (Rein), in coordination and cooperation with ARVN forces, repels and destroys enemy attack north of Cam Lo and Cua Viet Rivers and west of 98 N-S grid lines; assists GVN in the defense of Dong Ha and Quang Tri Cities, and conducts counterattacks to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base areas.

## 3. EXECUTION

## a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Annex A (Concept of Operations).

(2) Annex B (Fire Support).

## b. Task Force Hotel.

(1) Conduct mobile defense in A0 to prevent enemy penetration east of 98 N-S grid line and defend CB, Ca Lu, and FSB Cates.

(2) Options #1 and #3. Be prepared to conduct regimental helicopterborne counterattacks into southern half of DMZ west of A-4 and attack to the east, on order.

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(3) Option #2. Be prepared to conduct regimental helicopterborne counterattack in accordance with Annex C (Counterattack Plan), on order.

(4) Be prepared to provide area for establishment of Project Delta FOB at VCB, on order.

(5) Be prepared to execute Op Plan 5-69, on order.

c. 9th Marines (Rein).

(1) Conduct mobile defense in AO to prevent enemy penetration south of Cam Lo River and defend ECB, Khe Gio Bridge, and FSB Fuller.

(2) Assist GVN forces in the defense of Lai Loc.

(3) Be prepared to execute 3d MarDiv OPlans 1-69, 4-69, and/or 9-69, on order.

(4) Be prepared to conduct counterattack in AO, on order.

d. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Meeh).

(1) Maintain strong point defense of A-4 and O-2.

(2) Conduct mobile defense in AO to prevent enemy penetration south of the Cua Viet and Cam Lo Rivers.

(3) Assume Opcon SLF "B" which lands at or north of Cua Viet.

(4) Be prepared to assist ARVN forces in defense of populated coastal plain area in AO.

(5) Be prepared to conduct mechanized counter-attack to northeast or north of Cam Lo, on order.

(6) Be prepared to open and secure Wunder Beach, on order.

e. Regt (-) (Rein), 1st MarDiv.

(1) Prepare plans for Amphibious counterattack between C-4 and ~~and~~ Hai River.

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- (2) Assume Opcon SLF "A", on order.
- (3) Options #1 and #3.
  - (a) Conduct Amphibious counterattack on order.
  - (b) Assault west across southern half of DMZ.
  - (c) Be prepared to link-up with 1st Bde and/or 2d ARVN forces north of A-2.
- (4) Option #2.
  - (a) Conduct airlift to Quang Tri airfield.
  - (b) Conduct mobile defense in AO.
- f. SLF "A".
  - (1) Chop to Regt (-) (Rein), 1st MarDiv, on order.
  - (2) Be prepared to conduct amphibious landing, on order.
- g. SLF "B".
  - (1) Conduct amphibious landing north of or at Cua Viet.
  - (2) Chop to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), on landing.
- h. 12th Marines.
  - (1) Provide direct and general artillery support to 3d MarDiv.
  - (2) Be prepared to support counterattacks into southern DMZ and/or Da Krong Valley.
- i. 3d Tank Bn.
  - (1) G/S 3d MarDiv.
  - (2) Be prepared to provide one company D/3 TF Hotel on order.

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(3) Be prepared to support 1st Bde counterattack on order.

J. 3d Recon Bn.

(1) G/S 3d MarDiv.

(2) Maintain maximum surveillance of DMZ and western portion of Division AO to locate enemy forces.

k. 3d Engr Bn. Continue present D/S and G/S missions.

1. Base Coordinator, DHCB.

(1) Take all measures to insure maximum preparedness for defense of Dong Ha Combat Base.

(2) Coordinate with 2d ARVN Regiment to insure mutual support in defense of Dong Ha City.

m. Base Coordinator, QTCB.

(1) Take all measures to insure maximum preparedness for defense of Quang Tri Combat Base.

(2) Option #3. Be prepared to provide for reception and billeting of 173rd Abn Bde, upon arrival Quang Tri airfield.

n. Reserve. 173rd Abn Bde. (Option #3 only).

(1) Conduct airlift to Quang Tri airfield.

(2) Be prepared to assist ARVN in defense of Quang Tri and/or Dong Ha Cities.

(3) Be prepared to conduct heliborne counter-attack into Da Krong Valley in coordination with 101st Abn counterattack.

o. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Codenames.

(a) Option #1 - CASEY GROVE I

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SE~~CRET~~/NOFORN(b) Option #2 - ~~CASEY~~ GROVE II(c) Option #3 - CASEY GROVE ~~II~~ III(2) Maximum employment of RCA, ~~smoke~~, and non-explosive ~~ordnance~~ in built-up areas.(3) ~~Intensify reconnaissance~~ and surveillance along known ~~infiltration~~ routes.(4) Be prepared, on order, to execute OPlan ~~4-68~~ (Anti-Mechanized Plan).(5) On order increase security for key ~~bridges~~, ~~ports~~, and airfields.

(6) Review and rehearse air and armor alert plans.

(7) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(8) Psychological operations Annex D. (~~Psy-~~chological ~~Operations~~).(9) ~~Continue~~ support of ~~Pacification-Development~~ Program within capability.

(10) Maintain security of LOC's in cooperation with GVN forces.

(11) This plan effective for planning on receipt; execution on order.

Del ta), ~~(12)~~ Project Delta ~~employment~~. Annex ~~E~~ (Project4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS. Annex F (~~Administrative~~ and Logistics).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Signal. Annex G (~~Communications~~).b. Command. ~~CP~~ locations - No change.

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BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL DAVIS



J. R. MOTELEWSKI  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

## ANNEXES:

- A Concept of Operations
- B **Fire** Support
- C - Counterattack Plan (PASEP)
- D - Psychological Operations  
Project Delta
- F Administrative and Logistics
- G - Communications
- H - Distribution

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Annex A (Concept of Operations) to O Plan 7-69 (CASEY GROVE).

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam: 1:100,000; Series L607; Sheets  
 6341, 6342, 6442, and 6441

Time Zone: Hotel

## 1. MISSION

Third MarDiv (-) (Rtin), in coordination and cooperation with ARVN troops, repels and destroys enemy attack north of Cam Lo and Cua Viet Rivers and west of 98 N-S grid lines; assists GVN in defense of Dong Ha and Quang Tri Cities, and conducts counterattacks to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base camps.

## 2. CONCEPT

a. 3d MarDiv conducts defense in three phases.

(1) Phase 1: Preparatory phase. Enemy build-up north of DIZ and preparation for attack. 3d MarDiv continues current operations with increased emphasis on prudent intelligence watch, intensified reconnaissance and surveillance (including patrols, sensors, NCD, radar, aerial surveillance and employment of Delta Force); conducts preemption operations throughout AO; plans for increased artillery fires, NGF, and air support; increases security for key bridges, ports, and airfields; prepares for rapid repair or replacement of bridges, bypasses, and approaches and expansion and maintenance of logistics support as required.

(2) Phase 2. Defense. Employ additional forces provided by XXIV Corps, conduct aggressive mobile defense to disrupt and halt the enemy before he is able to reach the Cua Viet - Cam Lo Rivers. In coordination and cooperation with GVN forces, prevent the enemy from capturing, destroying or dominating populated areas.

A-1



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(3) Phase **3.** Counteroffensive.

(a) Enemy **attack** has been slowed or **stopped**. Combined **armor, helicopterborne** and amphibious assaults are **conducted** to destroy enemy **forces**, supplies, and base **camps**, and prevent enemy survivors **from** withdrawing. into NVN/Laos.

(b) Appendix 1 (**Option** # 1 Operations Overlay).

(c) Appendix 2 (Option#2 Operations Overlay).

(d) Appendix 3 (Option #3 Operations **Overlay**).

b. Fire Support. Annex B (Fire Support).

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Annex B (Fire Support Plan) to Op Plan 7-69 (CASEY GROVE).

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000; Series L7014; Sheets  
 6431 I and IV; 6342 I, II, III, and IV; 6441  
 IV; 6442 I, II, III, and IV.  
 (b) 3d MarDiv ltr of Inst (LOI) 1-67 (S)  
 (c) Div 0 P3120.6A

Time Zone: Hotel

## 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Air and Naval Gunfire Support.

(a) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provides fixed and rotary wing aircraft support and air control facilities.

(b) 7th Air Force provides direct and close air support.

(c) Naval Fire Support Group (TG 70.8.9) provides naval gunfire support.

(2) Artillery Support.

(a) 108th FA Gp (-) (Rein).

(b) 12th Marines (-) (Rein).

c. Attachments and Detachments. Current Artillery Task Organization Order,

## 2. MISSION

Supporting arms (artillery, air, and naval gunfire) support 3d MarDiv operations with conventional artillery,

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**SECRET/NOFORN****air,<sup>#</sup> and naval gunfire.****3. EXECUTION****a. Concept of Operations.** Annex A (Concept of Operations).**b. ~~Air support.~~** Annex F (**Air** Support) to reference (b).**c. Artillery support.**(1) Annex G (**Artillery**) to reference (b).(2) **Current 12th Marines Task Organization Order.**

(3) In order to support 3d MarDiv's mobile defensive operations throughout the Division AO, organic artillery units will be prepared to displace rapidly from currently occupied positions. Upon displacement to new positions, development and improvement of positions will be continuous.

(4) Artillery units will be prepared to support counterattacks into the southern DMZ and/or Da Krong Valley. Maximum use will be made of existing MSR's, fire support bases, and fire bases.

**d. Naval Gunfire Support.** Annex H (Naval Gunfire Support) to reference (b).**e. Coordinating Instructions,**

(1) Rules of Engagement. Annex F (Rules of Engagement) to reference (b).

(2) Fire Support Coordination. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to reference (b), and reference (c).

(3) Target Information. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to reference (b).

(4) Aircraft Safety.

(a) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to reference (b).

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(b) Reference **(c)**, pars 205 and **206.3**.

**(c)** Coordination responsibilities in the area controlled by the **AWCC**.

1 All fires **originating** from or impacting in that portion **of** the Quang Tri-Dong Ha control area within the **1st** Bde, 5th **Inf** Div (**Mech**) area of operations will be reported to Quang Tri Approach Control by **1st** Bde, 5th **Inf** Div (**Mech**).

2 All other fires originating from and/or impacting in the Quang Tri-Dong Ha control area will be reported to Quang Tri Approach Control by the 3d **MarDiv** **FSCC**.

a All fires reported to either 3d MarDiv FSCC or **1st Bde**, 5th **Inf** Div (**Mech**) FSCE by ARVN units will be reported to Quang Tri Approach Control.

b Quang Tri Combat Base will report all 4.2" mortar **fires** originating within Quang Tri Combat Base to the 3d Marine Division FSCC.

c Dong Ha Combat Base COC will report all mortar fires **originating** within Dong Ha Combat Base to the 3d Marine Division FSCC.

3 Quang Tri Approach Control will request check fires from the 3d Marine Division **FSCC** and/or **1st** Bde, 5th **Inf** Div (**Mech**) FSCE as required according to the following priorities.

a Priority 1. Troops in contact and **counter-mortar/mortar/artillery** missions against active batteries.

b Priority 2. Aircraft in distress that can not be **diverted**. Medevac aircraft-emergency **mission**.

c Priority 3. Artillery fires on fleeting targets of **opportunity**.

d Priority 4. Air traffic operations under instrument conditions.

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e Priority 5. Normal air traffic.

f Priority 6. All other artillery fire.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE and LOGISTICS. Annex F (Administrative and Logistics).

5. ~~COMMAND~~ and SIGNAL. Annex D (Communications) to reference (b).

by ~~COMMAND~~ OF MAJOR ~~GENERAL~~ DAVIS

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Annex D (Psychological **Operation** ) to Op Plan 7-69 (**CASEY GROVE**).

# 1. SITUATION

## a. Enemy **Forcea.** Current **INTSUMS** and PERINTREPS.

(1) Option **#1.** The forces encountered will be primarily NVA units, relatively fresh, well trained and politically indoctrinated. The NVA defect or surrender for five motivating reasons: fear, hardship, nostalgia, loss of faith in final victory and disillusionment **with** the communist cause. Until the enemy advance is slowed or stopped, these motivating reasons will not become effective factors. Once the advance is stopped, the individual soldier becomes susceptible, **particularly** to appeals **based on fear, hardship and , disillusionment with** the communist cause. Vulnerability of the NVA soldier to appeals to Chieu Hoi will have only limited effectiveness because of his political indoctrination, unit esprit and North Vietnamese origin. Appeals to become a POW will have a stronger effect since that appeal does not have the connotation of deserting his country (NVN) to support another (SVN). Appeals based on nostalgia and loss of faith in the communist cause will probably not be effective. Heavy losses, once inflicted, increase the enemy's vulnerability to appeals based on fear and hardship. Because of the **cellular** organization within the military structure, appeals to surrender or desert should be aimed at the individual soldier or his cell. Calls for surrender or desertion of larger units can be expected to be ineffective. Isolated individuals or units are most susceptible to all forms of propaganda. Dissemination of propaganda is most effective during periods of contact or during bombardment since the individual is less carefully scrutinized by the other members of his cell or his officers and can thus retrieve leaflets to read at his leisure or listen to broadcasts without interruption. Appeals based on a "hardline" (**i.e.** "Surrender or Die") will generally be counter productive in all

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phases except during the final mop-up in the consolidation phase.

(2) Option #2. The forces encountered will be a mix of NVA/VC units. One Division of NVA will have essentially the same vulnerabilities as enumerated in Option #1, above, except that appeals based on hardship should be of greater effectiveness since ~~their~~ approach march is longer and probably more arduous than ~~that~~ of the forces in Option #1, above. The **MRTTH** forces are predominately NVA units that have been operating in **SVN** and/or Laos since **TET 1968**. The NVA **portions** of the **MRTTH** forces will have the same vulnerabilities as enumerated in Option #1, above, except that appeals based on hardship and nostalgia will have greater impact since they were hard hit during their 1968 TET offensive and have been away from NVA for an extended period. The **incidence** of malaria has created a peculiar vulnerability that can be used alone or coupled to appeals based on hardship. The VC units that may be a part of the **MRTTH** forces are susceptible to the same five motivating reasons listed in Option #1, above. All five reasons can be expected to have effect. As their offense slows, and the tempo of friendly military operations increases, the majority of these motivations are present, and there is usually a corresponding increase in susceptibility to Chieu Hoi appeals.

(3) Option #3. Same as Option #1, above, and Option #2, above.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 7th **PSYOP** Battalion, U.S. Army, will provide quick reaction leaflets and broadcast tape recordings.

(2) Flight "A", 9th Special Operations Squadron, U.S. Air Force, provides aerial support for leaflet dissemination and aerial broadcasts.

2. **MISSION**. Utilizing all **PSYOP** means available, produce the maximum number of NVA/VC defections and to erode the morale and combat effectiveness of NVA/VC units and personnel. In addition, conduct **PSYOP** to counter NVA/VC propaganda efforts.

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**SECRET/NOFORN****3. EXECUTION**

a. Concept of Operations. For purposes of PSYOP, the operation **will** be considered to be in three phases; **def-**ense against NVA/VC attack, counter offensive against NVA/VC **units**, and consolidation. During the initial defense phase, Division PSYOP, using **organic and assigned** supporting means, will conduct such **PSYOP as required** in the populated areas to offset the **NVA/VC propaganda** effort and to assist in refugee control. **D** in the counter offensive **hase, Regimental** and Battalion **SYOP**, as augmented from **Division PSYOP** will continue to counter **NVA/VC** propaganda and assist in refugee control. Division PSYOP will further provide assistance to unit PSYOP to achieve rapid response (leaflets, tape broadcasts, live broadcasts from rallies, etc.) to exploit **..** situations. The objective of all PSYOP effort will be directed at:

(1) Reduction of the morale and combat effectiveness of NVA/VC units and personnel.

(2) Reduction of the effectiveness of NVA/VC propaganda efforts.

(3) Maintaining and strengthening of a Pro-GVN attitude by the local populace.

b. Division PSYOP. Provide assistance and advice on PSYOP matters as requested by subordinate **units**.

c. Detachment 2, **7th PSYOP** Bn, U.S. Army. Provide two HE and three **HB** teams. HB teams must be prepared for heli-borne operations, aerial broadcasts from helicopter and vehicular broadcasts.

d. Coordination and Control.

(1) Requests for assistance will be forwarded via the normal chain of command to Division PSYOP by the most expeditious means.

(2) Division PSYOP will schedule leaflet **distributions** and **aerial** broadcasts for the entire Division AO.

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(3) Avoid "hardline" (i.e. "Surrender or Die") themes except during the final mop-up in the consolidation phase. Deviation from this ~~guidance~~ remains at the discretion of Regimental Commanders.

(4) Themes to be stressed to NVA/VC units.

(a) Strength of **ARVN/US firepower.**

(b) That the NVA is an aggressive invader of South Vietnam determined to **impose** foreign domination upon the **people** of South **Vietnam.**

(c) That NVA soldiers and Viet Cong who voluntarily surrender or return under the Chieu Hoi Program will be well treated by the **GVN.**

(5) Themes to be stressed to civil populace.

(a) That the GVN is the **legitimate** and right-ful government of South Vietnam.

(b) That the NVA is an aggressive invader of South Vietnam determined to **impece** foreign domination upon the people of South Vietnam.


4. ADMINISTRATIVE and LOGISTICS. Annex F (Administrative and Logistics).

5. COMAAND and SIGNAL. Annex G (Communications).

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 17 March 1969  
 DH: 112

## Annex E (Project Delta) to Op Plan 7-69

Time Zone: Hotel

## 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS and PERINTREP3.
- b. Friendly Forces. 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69.
- c. Attachments and Detachments.
  - (1) 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69.
  - (2) Project Delta Opcon 3d MarDiv.

## 2. MISSION

Third Marine Division (-) (Rein), in coordination and cooperation with ARVN forces, repels and destroys enemy attack north of Cam Lo and Cua Viet Rivers and west of 78 N-S grid lines; assists GVN in the defense of Dong Ha and Quang Tri Cities, and conducts counterattacks to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base areas.

## 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations.

(1) 3d Mar Div Op Plan 7-69.

(2) 3d Mar Div deploys Project Delta in western portion of A0 to conduct surveillance and long range, covert reconnaissance effort to interdict the enemy's major routes of infiltration from Laos along route 7, route 926, and his new road network in the northwest portion of the A0.

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b. **Regt's/Bde's.** 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69

c. Project Delta.

(1) **Establish** FOB in 3d MarDiv AO.

(2) Conduct **reconnaissance** patrols in AO (Annex A (Concept of Operations)) to Op Plan 7-69) to detect enemy infiltration **from** Laos into **Division** Area of Operations.

(3) Be prepared to **provide** guidance to reaction forces employed to exploit **reconnaissance** activities.

d. Coordinating **Instructions.**

(1) Task Force Hotel prepared to provide **Bn** reaction force to exploit Project Delta operations on six hour notice.

(2) **DIRLAUTH CO**, B-52 Det, 5th **SFG** and CG TF Hotel.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE and LOGISTICS. 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69.

5. **COMMAND** and SIGNAL. 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69.

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DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to OP Plan 7-69.

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Annex **G** (Communications) to Operation Plan 7-69 (**CASEY GROVE**)

**Ref:** (a) 3d ~~MarDiv~~ **P02000.2** (NOTAL)  
 (b) 3d ~~MarDiv~~ **P2000.4** (NOTAL)

Time **Zone:** H

## 1. SITUATION

a. **Enemy** Forces

- (1) Current **INTSUMS** and PERINTREPS.
- (2) The **enemy** has the capability to:
  - (a) Conduct electronics countermeasures.
  - (b) Conduct extensive wire tapping.
  - (c) Intercept **HF**, VHF, **UHF**, and microwave multi-channel radio and telephone signals.
  - (d) Insert deceptive traffic on uncovered wire or radio channels.
  - (e) Booby trap **communications-electronics** equipment prior to abandoning same.

## b. Friendly Forces

## (1) OPLAN 7-69 (CASEY GROVE) Command Posts.

## (a) Locations

CG Third Marine Division (Rein)	Dong Ha
<b>CG</b> Task Force Hotel	Vandegri ft
9th Marine Regiment	Vandegri ft
<b>1st</b> Bde, <b>5th</b> Inf Div (Mech)	Quang Tri
Regiment (-) (Rein), <b>1st</b> Marine Division	Danang
SLF "A"	Afloat
SIF "B"	Afloat
12th Marine Regiment	Dong Ha
3d Tank Battalion	Quang Tri
3d Recon Battalion	Quang Tri

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3d Engineer Battalion

Quang Tri

Base Coordinator Dong Ha Combat Base

Dong Ha

Base Coordinator Quang Tri Combat Base

Quang Tri

173rd Airborne Brigade

LZ English (BS 878007)

- (b) Movement. Organizations report location of new Command Posts installations when established.

## 2. MISSION

**Communications-Electronics** elements provide communication and electronics support for Third Marine Division (Rein) and attached and supporting **units**.

## 3. EXECUTION

- a. **Communication Company**. Maintain and operate communication facilities to support the Third Marine Division Command Post and the Third Marine Division Command Post (Rear).
- b. Task Force Hotel. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.
- c. **9th Marines**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.
- d. **1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.
- e. Regiment (-) **(Rein)**, **1st Marine Division**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.
- f. **SLF "A"**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.
- g. **SLF "B"**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.
- h. **12th Marines**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.
- i. **3d Tank Battalion**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.
- j. **3d Engineer Battalion**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned A0 and as directed.

SECRET **NOFORN**

- k. **Base** Coordinator **DHCB**. Maintain and operate **communication facilities** in support of operations in assigned **A0** and as directed.
- l. Base Coordinator **QTCB**. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned **A0** and as directed.
- m. 173rd Airborne Brigade. Maintain and operate **communication facilities** in support of operations in assigned **A0** and as **directed**.
- n. Artillery communications. Annex B (Fire Support) and reference (a) also Appendix 1.
- o. Naval Gunfire communications. Annex B (Fire Support), reference (a) and Appendix 1.
- p. Air Support communications. Annex B (Fire Support), reference (a) and Appendix 1.
- q. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Communication Center

- (a) **Communication** and crypto guard for units adcon/opcon to 3d Marine Division provided by 3d Marine Division Communication Center Dong Ha.
- (b) Cryptographic Instructions reference (a) and Appendix 1.
- (c) Authentication in accordance with reference (a) and Appendix 1.
- (2) Messenger Service. All units be prepared to employ fixed wing, helicopter, vehicle and foot messengers as required to insure expeditious passing of all traffic.
- (3) Radio. Radio plan in reference (a) and Appendix 1. **This plan** is modified at various times according to changing frequency requirements and relocation of units. These changes are officially promulgated by message as the need arises. At all times, reference (a), as modified by message changes, is the appropriate radio plan source.
- (4) Wire. Reference (b).
- (5) Wire-Radio **Relay**. Reference (b). Disposition of Wire-Radio Relay resources will vary according to tactical situation of units, availability of equipment, and changing command arrangements. The disposition of resources will be directed by the

SECRET ~~NOFO~~

Headquarters to meet requirements **as** they arise.

(6) Visual. Reference **(a)**.

**4. ADMINISTRATIVE** AND LOGISTICS

See Annex F (Administrative and Logistics)

BY COMMAND OF **MAJOR** GENERAL R. **G.** DAVIS

**APPENDIXES:**

1. Call Signs and Radio Frequency Plan. (To be issued)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to Operation Plan 7-69

OFFICIAL:

A. M. DE E  
LtCol **USMC**  
Acting Communications-Electronics Officer



UNCLASSIFIED

Copy        of 71 Copies  
 3d ~~Marine~~ Division (-) (Rein On  
 Dong Ha, Vietnam  
 Ser: 003A07669  
 17 March 1969  
 DH: 112

Annex H (Distribution) to Op Plan 7-69

Time Zone: Hotel

Command/Agency	No of Copies	Copy Numbers
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CG, XXIV Corps	5	6,7,8,9,10
CG, 1st MarDiv	2	11,12
CG, 1st MAW	2	13,14
CG, FLC	1	15
CG, 9th MAB	3	16,17,18
MAG 39	2	19,20
TF Clearwater	1	21
11th Engr Bn	1	22
CG, 173rd Abn Bde	1	2
FLSG-Bravo	1	
B-52 Det, 5th SFG	1	
CG, TF Hotel	5	26,27,28,29,30
9th Marines	2	31,32
1st Bde, 5th Div (Mech)	3	33,34,35
12th Marines	3	36,37,38
3d Tank Bn	1	39
3d Engr Bn	1	40
3d Recon Bn	1	41
3d Shore Party	1	42
3d MT Bn	1	43
9th MT Bn	1	44
d Med Bn	1	45
HCB Coordinator	1	46
QTCB Coordinator	1	47
3d MarDiv		
Chief of Staff	1	48
AC/S, G-1	1	49
AC/S, G-2	2	50,51
AC/S, G-3	5	52,53,54,55,56
AC/S, G-4	3	57,58
AC/S, G-5	1	59

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H-1

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CEO	1	60
AirO	1	61
Div Engr 0	1	62
Div Arty 0	1	63
FSC	1	64
NGF 0	1	65
Emb 0	1	66
File	5	67,68,69, 70,71

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL DAVIS

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to Op Plan 7-69

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F. R. KRAINCE  
Colonel USMC  
G-3

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H-2

**SECRET**

DRAFTED BY: TCG/RAA  
 SEC 7 CTT PH 290  
 CWO - *PKS*

*046* PRIORITY *170312* MAR69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: COMUSMACV

INFO: CG III MAF  
 CG XXIV CORPS

SECRET/NOFORN/LINDIS

MACV ATTN: JARC

BRIGHTLIGHT (U)

- A. CG III MAF/AREA COORD ICTZ MSG 131402Z APR68
- B. 15TH IFT INTER RPT 17-69, CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 160553Z/MAR69

1. LAW REF A THE FOLLOWING RPT IS SUBMITTED:

A. REF B REPORTED THE SIGHTING OF AMERICAN PWS IN NVN, AND IS AMPLIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) SOURCE, DANG XUAN PHU (DANG XUAN FUS), PW FR SIXTH NVA REGT, STATED THAT HE OBSERVED TWO AMERICAN PILOTS APPROX TWENTY KM NW OF SAN (H) (COORD

UNK), NAM TRUNG (V), NAM DAN (D), NGHE AN (P), NVN IN JUNE OR JULY 1967. BOTH PWS WERE DRESSED IN RED FLIGHT SUITS. SOURCE SAW THEM ONLY BRIEFLY,

AND THE ONLY CHARACTERISTIC HE REMEMBERED WAS THAT ONE PW WAS AN UNUSUALLY TALL CAUCASIAN.

(2) IN NOV68, NEAR A DIRT RD NORTH OF THANH HOA CITY, THANH HOA (P), NVN, SOURCE STATED THAT HE OBSERVED TEN AMERICAN PWS THROUGH THE OPEN DOOR OF A

PW COMPOUND WHICH WAS APPROX FIFTY METERS OFF THE RD. ALL PWS DRESSED IN GREEN INJANA-TYPE CLOTHING. SOURCE STATED COMPOUND WAS APPROX THIRTY METERS

BY TEN METERS, SURROUNDED BY A CONCRETE WALL FIVE METERS HIGH. TWO GUARDS WERE OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.

2. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE SIGHTING INFO CONTAINED IN REF B DIFFERS SLIGHTLY FROM THE SIGHTING INFO CONTAINED IN THIS MSG. SOURCE WAS UNDER

HEAVY SEDATION DURING THIS INTERROGATION, WHICH PROBABLY EXPLAINS THIS VARIANCE. FOR THE SAME REASON, SOURCE WAS NOT SHOWN 525 HIGP PHOTO ALBUM.

SOURCE ENVC TO NSA DANANG AT 161130H MAR69.

GP-4

CCN *1611* RELEASED BY

TIME

*2A* MAR69

*7 cir*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## G-3 PLANS ROUTING

Plans Off (1)  
 (2) *wy*  
 (3) *6*  
 (4)

*P*

OO RUMV.

ZNY SSSSS

OFTSZYUW RUMLEBFA2317 0700015-SSSS--RUMV P.

ZNY SSSSS

O 170500Z MAR 69

FM CG XXIV CORPS PWD

TO RUMMATA/CG III MAF DAG

INFO RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH

BT

SECRET AVII-600 31132

III MAF FOR 2.

SUBJECT OPERATION MAJOR CRAGE (U)

REF: A. AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE MSG DTG 150621Z MAR 69 (S), SUBJECT AS ABOVE.

3. CG III MAF MSG, DTG 161430Z MAR 69 UNCLAS EFTO, SUBJECT AS ABOVE.

1. (U) 100 REF B, THIS MESSAGE CONFIRMS INFORMATION PASSED BY SECURE PHONE IN ANSWER TO REF A.

2. (U) OPERATIONS SUCH AS THOSE DESCRIBED IN PARAG 2, REF A, ARE BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF THIS HEADQUARTERS. THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS NO PLANS FOR SUCH OPERATIONS.

3. (U) REF PARA 5, REF A, ALL COMMANDERS WILL BE ENJOINED TO COMPLY WITH COMUSMACV MSG, DTG 120724Z FEB 69 (S) SUBJECT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - LAOS (U), WHICH IS EXPLICITLY CLEAR WITH RESPECT TO UNCLASING THE LAOS BORDER.

END

BT

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

J NB

LINKQD -I- MAG THREE NINE

ZNY SSSSS

O 171030Z MAR 69

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES

ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

ZEN/NINTH MARINES

ZEN/70VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR ((88))

TASK FORCE REMAGEN (1ST BN 77TH ARMOR)

INFO CG THE MARDIV

OF FIRST MAW

TWELFTH MARINES

MAG ONE SIX

MAG THREE SIX

MAG THREE NINE

FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES

SECOND DD TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES

THIRD RECON BN

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG ORDER 75-69

A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 161540Z MAR 69

PAGE TWO RUMHVP03485 E C R E T

1. THIRD MARINES

A. CONTINUE OPERATION MAINE CRAG.

B. PREPARE TO ASSUME OPCON OF TF  
REMAGEN ON ORDER.

2. FOURTH MARINES. NO CHANGE FROM REF A.

3. NINTH MARINES. CONTINUE WITHDRAWAL FROM  
DEWEY CANYON AO.4. VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR(VIC)  
CONTINUE SECURITY MISSION FOR KHE GIO BRIDGE,  
ECB, SIGNAL, VCB AND CALU.5. TASK FORCE REMAGEN. NO CHANGE FROM  
REF A.6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. HELO MOVEMENTS  
SCHEDULED FOR 17 HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING  
FORCES FOR 18 MAR 69 WILL BE PASEP.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CC  
 OO UUMSK UUMSO  
 DE UUMSO 1043 0771730  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 171730Z MAR 69  
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC  
 INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 G. SMALL UNITS CONTACTS.

FINAL SEC OF TWO

PROVINCE	DATE	ACTION	FR UNIT	EN UNIT	INIT BY
COORD	TIME	SIZE/TYPE	LOSSES	LOSSES	REMARKS
XD 947624	152023H	CO DEF	M/3/4	UNK	VC
		REC'D 2 CHICOMS	NONE	NONE	
YD 156678	161600H	TVEC MOVMENT	B/3/5 UNK	UNK	VC
		HIT AT MINE	3 WIA(E)	NONE	
YD 238039	161800H	SOD COMBAT	A/1/9	UNK	US
			NONE	4 NVA KIA	
XD 829615	170900H	PLT COMBAT	G/2/4	UNK	US
			NONE	2 NVA KIA	
XD 827616	171125 H	CO DEF	G/2/4	UNK	VC
		12-60MM	NONE	NONE	
XD 827616	171220H	CO DEF	G/2/4	UNK	VC
		3-60MM	NONE	NONE	

PAGE TWO UUMSO 1043 C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. PACIFICATION SUPPORT

1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.

A. 4/3/3 CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS WITH RF/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOC TOAR.

B. 1/3/3 CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS IN CAM LO DISTRICT.

C. TWP SOD OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.

D. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST & 2ND ARVN REGT'S THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL ARE.

2. DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PIOCC) BY 3/3 DNCH, PTOB, AND 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)

3. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/HAMLET CAS DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OPERATION DEWEY CANYON  
22 JANUARY 69-18 MARCH 69

CONFIDENTIAL

	ITEM	PHYSICALLY CAPTURED	EVACUATED	DESTROYED BUT NOT CAPT	CAPT AND DESTROYED
KIA	1,617				
POW	5				
Detainees	8				
Chu Hoi	2				
Bunkers	1,000				
Structures	373				
IWC0	1,223	1,223	958	0	265
	243	231	43	12	188
S/A Ammo	607,874	607,874	0	0	607,874
.50 Cal	17,598	17,598	0	0	17,598
12 7	65,126	65,126	0	0	65,126
	920	920	0	0	920
23mm AA	3,636	3,636	0	0	3,636
37mm AA	23,730	23,730	2	0	23,728
75 Pack How	10	10	0	0	10
60mm Mortar	34,383	34,383	0	0	34,383
82mm Mortar	23,281	23,281	0	0	23,281
120mm Mortar	4,983	4,983	0	0	4,983
Unk Rds	65	65	0	0	65
85mm Arty	556	556	1	0	555
57mm RR	2,004	2,004	0	0	2,004
75mm RR	994	994	0	0	994
122mm Arty	7,287	7,287	0	0	7,287
122mm Rkt	770	770	0	0	770
140mm Rkt	257	257	0	0	257
PG Rds	14,808	14,808	0	0	14,808
AT Mines	1,621	1,621	0	0	1,621
AP Mines	885	885	0	0	885
Claymores	444	444	0	0	
Explosives	1,910 1/2 lbs	1,910 lbs	0	0	1,910 lbs
Blasting Caps	476	476	0	0	476
Fuses	1,212	1,212	0	0	1,212
Det Cord	1,950 Ft	1,950 Ft	0	0	1,950 Ft
Grenades	50,203	50,203	0	0	50,203
R/Grenades	10,226	10,226	0	0	10,226
Satchel	36	36	0	0	36
Rice	220,800 lbs	220,800 lbs	0	0	220,800 lbs
Wheat	705 lbs	705 lbs	0	0	705 lbs
Herbs	200 lbs	200 lbs	0	0	200 lbs
Lard	34 lbs	34 lbs	0	0	34 lbs
Sugar	12 lbs	12 lbs	0	0	12 lbs
Corn	863 lbs	863 lbs	0	0	863 lbs
Tobacco	210 lbs	210 lbs	0	0	210 lbs
Flour	50 lbs	50 lbs	0	0	50 lbs
Potatoes	6,690 lbs	6,690 lbs	0	0	6,690 lbs
Salt	4,045 lbs	4,045 lbs	0	0	4,045 lbs
Mix Vegetables	46 lbs	46 lbs	0	0	46 lbs

101/11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	ITEM	PHYSICALLY CAPTURED	EVACUATED	DESTROYED BUT <b>NOT</b> CAPT	CAPT AND DESTROYED
Soy Bean Oil	8 gal	8 gal	0	0	8 gal
Radios	5	5	5	0	0
Multiplexes	2	2	2	0	0
Switch Board	1	1	1	0	0
Field Phones	2	2	1	0	1
Comm Wire	600 ft	600 ft	0	0	600 ft
Pigs	88	13	0	75	0
Chicken	150	67	0	83	0
Goats	1	1	0	0	1
Water Buff	6	0	0	6	0
Movie Projector	1	1	1	0	0
Reels of Film	20	20	20	0	0
Loud Speakers	2	2	2	0	0
Amplifier	1	1	1	0	0
122mm Gun	12	6	2	6	44
57mm Gun	4	4	0	0	0
75mm RR	1	1	1	0	0
57mm RR	23	23	8	0	15
60mm	12	12	2	0	10
82mm	13	13	5	0	0
120mm Mortar	1	1	0	0	0
.50 Cal	5	4	0	1	4
12.7 Gun	34	24	3	10	21
20mm	21	19	0	2	0
23mm	4	0	0	4	0
37mm	1	0	0	1	1
40mm	2	2	0	0	2
Trucks	66	31	0	35	31
Tractors	15	4	0	11	4
APC	3	0	0	3	0
Jeep	1	1	0	0	1
Prime Mover	6	6	0	0	6
Front Loader	1	1	0	0	1
Engines	3	3	0	0	3
Generators	3	3	1	0	2
Tractor Cab	1	1	0	0	1
Hyd Pump	2	2	0	0	2
Tires	18	18	0	0	18
Fuel	2,750 gal	2,750 gal	0	0	2,750 gal
Grease	370 gal	370 gal	0	0	370 gal
Fuel Drums Empty	397	397	0	0	397
Tool Kit	1	1	0	0	1
Bicycle Parts:					
Frames	108	108	0	0	108
Rims	228	228	0	0	228
Tires	2,176	2,176	0	0	2,176
Pumps	52	52	0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>ITEM</u>		PHYSICALLY CAPTURED	EVACUATED	DISPOSED BUT NOT CAPT	CAPT AND DESTROYED
Capt	Bicycles 18	18	0	0	18
Air	Compressor 1	1	0	0	1

CONFIDENTIAL

**KEEP  
COPY**

OPERATION DEWEN CANYON  
22 JANUARY 69-18 MARCH 69

KIA	1,613
POW	5
DETAINEE	0
CHU HOI	2
BUNKERS	1,000
STRUCTURES	373
TWC	1,223
CSWG	243
S/A ATTO	607,874
.50 CAL	17,598
12.7	65,126
20MM AA	920
23MM AA	3,635
37MM AA	23,730
75 PACK HOW	10
60MM MORTAR	34,683
82MM MORTAR	23,281
120MM MORTAR	4,983
UNK RDS	65
85MM ARTY	556
57MM RR	2,004
75MM RR	994
122MM ARTY	7,298
122MM ROCKET	770
140MM ROCKET	257
RPG RDS	14,808
AT MINE S	1,621
AP MINE S	885
CLAYMORES	444
EX. LOSIVES	1,910 1/2 LBS
BLASTING CAPS	476
FUZES	1,212
DIE CORD	1,950 FT
G GRENADES	50,203
R/G GRENADES	10,226
S MCHL	36
RICE	220,800
MEAT	705 LBS
PEAS	200 "
LARD	34 "
SUGAR	12 "
COFF	863 "
TOBACCO	210 "
FLOUR	50 "
POTATERS	6,690 "
SALT	4,045 "

MIXED VEGETABLES	46 LBS
SOY BEAN OIL	8 GAL
RADIOS	5
AMPLIFIERS	2
SWITCH BOARD	1
FIELD PHONES	2
COMM WIRE	600 FT.
FIGS	<u>ALIVE</u> 213
CHICKEN	<u>DEAD</u> 75
GOATS	83
H <sub>2</sub> O BUFF	1

MISCELLANEOUS GEAR

MOVIE PROJECTOR	1
REELS OF FILM	20
LOUD SPEAKERS	2
AMPLIFIER	1
<u>ARTY</u>	
<u>CAPT</u>	<u>DEST</u> <u>DIG</u>
122MM	6 5 1
85MM	4
UNK	1
75MM RR	1
57MM RR	23

<u>MORTARS</u>		<u>CAPT</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>DIG</u>
60MM	12			
82MM	13			
120MM	1			
<u>AA GUNS</u>		<u>CAPT</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>DIG</u>
.50 CAL	4		1	
12.7	24		9	1
20MM	19		2	
23MM			4	
37MM			1	
40MM	4			

411

	<u>CAPT</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>DATE</u>
MOTOR TRANSPORT			
TRUCKS	20	20	7
TRACTORS	4	10	1
APC		3	
JEEP	1		
PRIME MOVERS	6		
FRONT LOADERS	1		
ENGINES	3		
GENERATORS	3		
TRACTOR CAB	1		
HYD PUMP	2		
TIRES	10		
FUEL	2,750 GAL		
GREASE	370 "		
FUEL DRUMS EMPTY	397 "		
TOOL KIT	1		
BICYCLE PARTS:			
	108 FRAMES		
	228 RIMS		
	2176 TIRES		
	52 PUMPS		
	18 COMPLETE BICYCLES		
AIR COMPRESSOR	1		

## BREAK DOWN OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED

PISTOLS, MUGERS	2
SKS'S	950
AK-47'S	161
MISH-43	41
MAUSERS	6
RIG'S	18
IL-1	1
IL-16	1
MACHINE PISTOL	43

1000

DRAFTED BY: MAS/RKR  
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION  
CWO W

IMMEDIATE

Z MAR69

COPY TO: G-2

G-3

RECON REP

FSC

CIC

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN  
TO: CO III MAF, DNG, RVN  
INFO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN  
CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN  
CO FORLOGCMD, DNG, RVN  
CG FIRST MAW, DNG, RVN  
CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN  
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH), QT, RVN  
CG TF ALPHA, NKP, THAI  
FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THIRD RECON WING, KORAT, THAI  
FOURTH MARINES, VCB, RVN  
THIRD MARINES, DGH, RVN  
NINTH MARINES, VCB, RVN

SECRET/NOFORN

DUFFEL BAG/DUEL BLADE OPER SER NO 011/11-17 MAR 69 (U)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

SECTION II FOL DUFFEL BAG REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW. VERY LIGHT ACTIVITY NOTED IN DUFFEL BAG SENSORS THIS WEEK. STRINGS 302 AND 305 WERE RECOVERED BEFORE SELF-DESTRUCTION.

NEW BATTERIES INSTALLED AND RELOCATED TO PROVIDE A MORE EFFECTIVE SCREEN OF APPROACHES TO QUANG TRI CITY.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: STRING 304 DETECTED ONE SQD SIZE TARGET WHICH WAS FIRED ON WITH 12 MORTARS AND 90MM TANK FIRE, EGOATIVE BDA.

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS EN APPEARS TO BE PERIODICALLY TESTING APPROACHES TO QUANG TRI, AND UPON RECEIVING RAPID FIRE MISSION

RESPONSES TO HIS PROBES, WITHDRAWS.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS: SENSORS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MEANS OF DETECTING EN MVT OF APPROACHES TO QUANG TRI CITY FROM

BASE AREA 101. THIS COVERAGE HAS PERMITTED 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (M) TO RELEASE FORCES FOR USE IN VICINITY OF A-1 AND LEATHERNECK SQUARE

WHERE HEAVY CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN INFLICTED ON ENEMY DURING PAST WEEK.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

CIC

C

2/3

PK

SECRET

(2) EMPLACEMENT: INCLEMENT WEATHER ONCE AGAIN PREVENTED THE INSERT O RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS BY HELICOPTER INTO THE DMZ FOR

SENSOR IN ADDITION HEAVY CONTACT WITH NVA FORCES ON 16 MAR POSTPONED THE INSERTI OF TWO SENS SC STRINGS NORTH OF

CON THIEN. CHANNEL 30 ASSETS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO REPLACE ALL . STRINGS THAT EXPIRED IN THE AREA

READOUT BY A-4.

(3) READOUT VALUITY NONE

(4) RFI: NONE

(5) SERVICEABILITY: NONE

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: 15 HANDSID/MAGID, 5 ADSID, 1 ACOUBUO.

4 (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSORS: 31 MINI/HANDSID, 13 MAGID, 14 ADSID, 6 ACOUBUOY, 1 PIRID.

5. (S) ACTIVE TFA CH 23 TONE CODES 16 THRU 19. ACTIVE 3D MARDIV CH-23 TONE CODES 03 AND 04.

CG/ 76 RELEASED BY

IM

MAR69

COMM CENTER: REQUEST XMIT TO TF ALPH AND 553 RE WINCM  
VIA KEG-1 CIRCUIT.

SECRET

**C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES:** TWO COMPLETE STRINGS OF MINIHANDSIDS WERE RECOVERED AFTER APPROX 47 DAYS OPERATION AND

REFURBISHED WITH NEW BATTERIES AND LOCATED ON OTHER TRAILS. THIS TECHNIQUE APPEARS TO BE ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE HEREIN MECHANIZED

VEHICLES ARE AVAL TO REACH THE AREA FOR RECOVERY WITH MINIMUM RISK TO PERSONNEL. ACOUBUOY ALSO RECOVERED BEFORE DESTRUCTION.

**D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS:** NONE

3. (S) 8 ACTIVE STRINGS

4. (S) 23 MINI/HANDSIDS, 8 MAGIDS

SECTION II. FOL DUEL BLADE REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: SINCE LAST OPREP TFA SEEDED STRING 63133 WAS AIR DELIVERED IN NORTHERN PORTION OF PURPLE MARTIN AO CONSISTING OF

4 ACOUBUOYS. 4 HAND EMPLACED 4 ADSID, AND 3 ACOUBUOY STRINGS EXPIRED DURING THIS PERIOD. SENSOR READINGS IN CENTRAL

PORTION OF DIV AO LINED SOUTH OF DMZ CONTINUE TO SHOW HEAVY READINGS WITH STRING 124 ACQUIRING 18 TARGETS THIS WEEK WHILE STRING

119 ACQUIRED 22 TARGETS. BOTH AREAS HAVE BEEN SITE OF HEAVY ENEM CONTACT DURING PAST WEEK.

2. MISSION SUMMARY: IN ARVN AO 6 TARGETS ACQUIRED WITH 400 ROUNDS MIXED ARTY/MTRS FIRED IN RESPONSE. 3D MARDIV AO STRINGS ACQUIRED

69 TARGETS WITH 351 MIXED 105/155 ARTY RDS FIRED IN RESPONSE. TFA SEEDED STRING 63211 ACQUIRED 7 TARGETS WITH 52 RDS 105 FIRED IN

RESPONSE. ALL NEG BDA.

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: EN APPEAR TO CONTINUE HIS INFILTRATIONS AND PROBINGS SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST FROM DMZ WITH SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS

MADE WITH FRIENDLY FORCES DURING PAST WEEK.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS: AGGRESSIVE PATROLING AND FRIENDLY SWEEPS MULTIPLIED DURING THIS WEEK IN RESPONSE TO EN PROBES AND

ATTACKS BY FIRE.

**C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES:** NONE

**D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS:**

SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1157

*2081*

DE DIV AND DATE RE 483

483

OO UMSOF UMSOF  
 DE UMSOF 1959 2776105  
 ZNY 00000  
 C 180105Z MAR 69  
 FM THIRD MARDIV CMC BGM  
 TO UMSOF/XXIV CORPS TCC BGM  
 INFO UMSOF/III MAF CMC BGM  
 BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SUBJ: FRIENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE (ATTN MAJ RAUSCH)

REF: (A) PCV TCC MSG 220730Z APR 68

IN IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED FOR PERIOD  
 ENDING 172400H MAR 69.

UNIT	PROV	STAT	COORD	CONTROL
3RD MAR (-)	QUANG TRI	VCR	001433	TASK FORCE
3/3 (-)	QUANG TRI	DGH	095570	1ST BDE
GR-A				

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL***John*

1. (U) EFFECTIVE 12/22/77, THE SUBJECT REPORT SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE BATTALION BY 2100 DAILY IN THE BELOW FORMAT.

2. (C) - FORMAL.

3. (U) EFFECTIVE 12/22/77, THE SUBJECT REPORT SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE BATTALION BY 2100 DAILY IN THE BELOW FORMAT.

4. (C) - FORMAL.

A. UNIT LOCATIONS: LIST THE LOCATION OF ALL UNITS DOWN TO THE COMPANY LEVEL. PLATOON LOCATIONS WILL BE SHOWN SEPARATELY IF THE PLATOON

PAGE TWO UNMSQ 1062 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
IS ASSIGNED A SEPARATE MISSION FROM ITS PARENT COMPANY.  
B. PLANS: LIST THE PLANS FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY DOWN TO COMPANY LEVEL. PLATOONS WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY IF ASSIGNED A SEPARATE MISSION.  
C. SCOUT SNIPERS: LIST SCOUT SNIPER TEAMS EMPLOYED BY EACH BATTALION INDICATING UNIT, NUMBER OF TEAMS AVAILABLE, (C 734 91 TEAMS EMPLOYED DURING THE DAY, NUMBER OF TEAMS EMPLOYED DURING

THE NIGHT AND RESULTS.

D. BUSHMASTERS: LIST ALL DAY AND NIGHT ACTIVITIES OF EACH BATTALION. WHEN USING OTHER THAN SECURE COMMUNICATIONS THE BELOW BREVITY CODE WILL BE USED TO REPORT BUSHMASTER ACTIVITIES:

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	FIRE TEAM		SQUAD		PLATOON		COMPANY	
	DAY	NIGHT	DAY	NIGHT	DAY	NIGHT	DAY	NIGHT
LP/OP	A	AA	C	CC				
AMBUSH	E	EE	U	X	Y	Z		
PATROLS (COMBAT)	V	VV	N	RR	P	Q		
RECON	FF	G	D	H	HH	O		
SECURITY	N	ZZ	KK	JJ	RR	BB		

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET****SHOVE**OP CHIEF *MD*G-2 W.O. *WSD*G-2 A.C. *O-H*

DCPO

APO

ACTION

ZZ UUMSK

DL UUMSQD 1067 0771000

ZNY SSSSS

Z 181000Z MAR 69 *TOG BURS / TFI/DO*

FM THIRD MAR DIV COC D.H.

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOCPMB

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC LSD

TWELFTH MARINES FDC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPECIAL DMX OPNS REPORT

1. ALL DMZ RECON PATROLS ARE CANCELLED UNTILL FURTHER NOTICE.

CP-4

BT

1067

29

Copy 4 of 4

**SECRET**

**SECRET***Quah*

ZNY SSSSS  
 P 181410Z MARCH  
 FM: CG TASK FORCE 4064  
 TO: CG THIRD MANDIV  
 INFO: THIRD RECON BN  
 ZEN/FOURTH MARINES  
 ZEN/NINTH MARINES  
 ZEN/THIRD MARINES  
 MAG THREE NINE

*From P/70R/280/2/12/64*

BT

SECRET

## 48 HOUR PLAN SUMMARY

## 1. INSERTIONS TOMORROW

TEAMS	DATES	R.Z. COORD	METHOD
DRAKE POOL	19-21	9874-0868	ALL HELLO
IRON HAND	19-23	9965-2163	
PISTON ROD	19-21	7265-7463	
DESERT SANDS	19-21	7760-7958	
SAND BOX	19-21	8253-8451	
DANCY DAN	19-21	8055-9253	
CLOUDY SKY	19-21	6947-7145	
DEE MAE	19-21	8333-8531	
AMANDA	19-23	8138-8236	
124 D 69	19-21	9228-9127	
125 D 69	19-21	9432-9531	
126 D 69	19-21	8927-9026	
127 D 69	19-21	8043-8241	
128 D 69	19-21	8139-8337	

## 3. EXTRactions TOMORROW:

TEAM	DATES	EX. COORD	METHOD
WABASH PANNER	15-19	16A	ALL HELLO
CANDY TUFT		15-19	
HARBOR QUEEN	15-19		

## 2. INSERTIONS NEXT DAY:

TEAM	DATES	R.Z. COORD	METHOD
130 D 69	20-24	9332-9530	ALL HELLO
131 D 69	20-24	8032-8230	

2. B. EXTRactions NEXT DAY, NONE.  
 C-4

BT

*COPY 1 of 5***SECRET**

**SECRET**

9

*John*

OO UUMSO  
 DZ UUMSO 190W 077171N  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 181718Z MAR 69  
 FM FIRST MAF COC  
 TO III MAF COC  
 THIRD MARDIV COC  
 NINTH MARINES  
 BT

S E C R E T  
 THIRD MARDIV PASS TF HOTEL  
 A6 ARMED RECCE  
 1. MISSION 1059  
 2. TOT 2159  
 3. SYSTEMS UP  
 4. D45 NORTHWEST TO 16-30N  
 5. MOON BEAM DIRECTED 2 DB ON UNKNOWN MOVERSHAT XD 640225.  
 2 DB ON UNKNOWN NUMBER OF MOVERS AO XD 640205, AND 7 DW ON  
 UNKNOWN NUMBER OF MOVERS AT 580230 ALL HEADING NORTHWEST RESULT-  
 ING IN INSECONDARY FIRE  
 6. NO HARD TARGETS  
 7. N/A  
 8. NO OTHER OBSERVATIONS

PAGE TWO UUMSO 190W S E C R E T  
 9. NO PROBLEMS WITH CONTROLLERS

A6 ARMED RECCE  
 1. MISSION 1061  
 2. TOT 2145-2220  
 3. SYSTEMS UP  
 4. ROUTE 922  
 5. MOONBEAM DIRECTED 22 D2 ON UNKNOWN NUMBER OF MOVERS  
 STOPPED AT 16-18N 106-41E AND 4 DB ON UNKNOWN NUMBER OF  
 MOVERS HEADING NORTH FROM 16-17N 106-40E RESULTING IN  
 A LARGE SECONDARY FIRE  
 6. 0 HARD TARGETS  
 7. N/A  
 8. RECEIVED 23MM FIRE FROM D45 NORTHEAST 3 1/2 MILES  
 9. NO PROBLEMS WITH CONTROLLERS

BT  
 CP-4

*Copy 1 of 6***SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL***John*

OO UUMSK UUMSC

DE UUMSOD 1984 0781735

ZNY CCCCC

O 181735Z MAR 69 *100 / 182040 / 111 MOF*

FM THIRD MURDIV COC

TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC

INFO UUMSC/III MAP COC

TASK FORCE HOTEL

BT

C O M F I D E N T I A L FINAL SEC OF TWO

B. 1ST RDE 5 TH INF RECH

(1) 1/11NO CONTACT

(2) 1/61 AT 181740Z M/3/61 VIC 914407 ELEMENT RAN INTO A/T MINE ON SPD. 11R VIA 9 MIA(?)

(3) 1/77 NO CONTACT

(4) 3/5 CAV AT 181741Z M/3/5 VIC 163684 FWD 2XNVA DEAD AND

2 AC-47'S, RDS 2 MIA VIA 2 LMC

M. 181712Z M/3/5 VIC 110709 REC'D SNIPER FIRE. RETURNED FIRE WITH BUSTERS AND MGS NEG RES

(5) 4/4/12 CAV NO CONTACT

(6) 1STHAMTRAC BN NO CONTACT

C. FLSGP AT 171410Z FLUGE CONVOY VIC VD 935561 ENROUTE FROM VCH TO DCH REC'D BRDS OF MORTAR FIRE UNK SIZE NEG DAMAGE

D. 8/40 AT 181610Z 2/40 CONVOY ON RT 9, VIC 955565 REC'D MORTAR FIRE OF UNK SIZE. CONVOY ENROUTE FM DCH TO ECH. NEG CAS OR DAMAGE.

PAGE TWO UUMSOD 1984 C O M F I D E N T I A L

E. 3RD RECON BN. SEE 3RD RECON BN 24 MG SITREP

F. ARTILLERY AND TANK CUSTODY SUPPORT SEE 12 TH MAR 24 NR SITREP

G. GENERAL LOW CLOUD COVER DURING EARLY MORNING HRS HINDERED HELICOPTER AND AC SORTIES. DURING LATEMORNING AND AFTERNOON THE WEATHER IMPROVED ALLOWING SIGNIFICANT TROOP MOVEMENTS AND RESUPPLY TO BE ACCOMPLISHED

H. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

PATROLS		AMBUSHES			S&D		LIST		SCOUT	
UNIT	FT	SOD	PLT	FT	SOD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPER	
3 RD MAR	DA	0	0	0	0	0	0	10		
	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	10		
4TH MAR	DA	3	1	0	0	0	0	10		
	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	7		
5TH MAR	DA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6TH MAR	DA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
1ST RDE	DA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
5TH INF	DA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
10TH	DA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

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PAGE THREE HUMSOD 1984 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 I SMALL UNITS CONTACTS.

PROVINCE	DATE	ACTION	FR UNIT	EN UNIT	UNIT BY
COORD	TIME	SIZE/TYPER	LOSSES	LOSSES	US/VC
XD 825619	171910H	SOD AMB	G/2/4 NONE	UNK 1 NVA KIA	US
XD 877592	171910H	CO DEF	F/2/4 NONE	UNK 1 NVA KIA	US
A-4	172245H	CO DEF	M/3/3 NONE	UNK NONE	US
XD 823615	180230H	SOD AMB	G/2/4 NONE	UNK UNK	US
XD 871598	181143H	PLT PATROL	F/2/4 NONE	UNK NONE	VC
XD 821625	181145H	CO DEF	G/2/4 NONE	UNK NONE	VC
XD 959658	181215H	CO DEF	L/3/4 NONE	UNK NONE	VC
YD 835561	181410H	CONVOY MORTAR	FLSGR NONE	UNK NONE	VC
YD 855565	181610H	CONVOY MORTAR	R/44 NONE	UNK NONE	VC

PAGE FOUR HUMSOD 1984 C O N F I D E N T I A L

YD 827562	181630H	CONDEF	4/2/9	UNK	VC
		SNIPER	1 KIA(E)	NONE	
YD 837577	181645H	CV DEF	G/2/9	UNK	VC
			NONE	NONE	
YD 119108	181710H	CO DEF	3/5	UNK	VC
		SNIPER	NONE	NONE	
XD 914407	181740H	CO	P/1/61	UNK	VC
		MOVEMENT	1 FR KIA	NONE	
		MINE	9 WIA(E)		
XD 947624	181955 H	CO DEF	K/3/4	UNK	VC
			NONE	UNK	

#### J. PACIFICATION SUPPORT

1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.

A. K/3/3 CONTINUES COORDINATED OPNS WITH RD/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOC TOAN.

B. I/3/3 CONTINUES COORDINATED OPNS IN CAM LO DISTRICT.

C. TWO SOD OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.

D. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (REGN) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1SC AND

SOD ARVN FOR A THROUGHT PROSECUTED COASTAL ARE.

E. 1ST BDE 10TH INF (REGN) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1SC AND

SOD ARVN FOR A THROUGHT PROSECUTED COASTAL ARE.

F. 1ST BDE 11TH INF (REGN) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1SC AND

SOD ARVN FOR A THROUGHT PROSECUTED COASTAL ARE.

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1. RECENTLY, THE 1ST ARMY HAS BEEN  
2. ON THE 15TH, THE 1ST ARMY HAS BEEN  
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10. THE 1ST ARMY HAS BEEN ON THE 15TH, THE 1ST ARMY HAS BEEN

82

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUHMVP 0382 S E C R E T  
FRNX VCB LSA TO LZ

T PARIS  
401 ALPHA ONE/THREE (MINUS) 0300  
(120 PAX) 149. QUANG TRI  
LSA TO FSB SAIGON  
401 BRAVO HELO ASSAULT BY AFTER  
ALPHA/ONE/THREE (181 PAX) 401 A.  
FROM VCB R/W TO LZPASSPORT  
401 CHAPYIE CMD  
P/ONE/THREE (123 PAX, AFTER  
5 106RR D/MULES) FROM 401 B  
VCB R/W TO LZ SAIGON/PARIS  
401 DELTA HELO ASSAULT BY BRAVO/ONE/ AFTER  
THREE (188 P2) FROM KICB R/W 401 C  
EC LZ TIGER (XD830233)  
401 ECHO PLT/0644 /TWO/THREE (15 PAX, AFTER  
6 106RR W/MULES) FROM 401 DJ  
VCB R/W TO LZ SAPVON  
401 FOXTROT CMD GP/THIRD MARINES (38 PAX, 1400  
1000 INT) FROM FSB  
SNAPPER TO FSB SAIGON

PAGE FOUR RUHMVP 0382 S E C R E T

401 GOLF PLT/L/MA/THREE/NINE HUA 0630  
(27 PAX) FROM KICB LSA  
TO VCB R/W

4-1  
SSBT

**SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL***Don*

00 UUMSQD  
 DE RUMLBPM 1160 0771805  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 0 181800Z ARR .6  
 FY CO ST INF BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) QTR RVN  
 TO COC 3RD MAR DIV

C ( **CONFIDENTIAL** ) CITE 1660 1401-C ATTN: G-3  
 SUBJ SIX HOUR SITREP NO 72 1-5 ME AO (181600-182 ) 1A,  
 A. UNIT LOCATIONS: A 3/5 YD 128710 V.  
 B 3/5 YD 129699  
 1ST AND 3RD PLT: C2  
 ALL OTHERS: NO CHANGE

B. SUMMARY OF LAST SIX HOURS: ALL UNITS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO FIXED LOCATIONS AND CONDUCT NIGHT ACTS.

C. ENEMY CONTACT: NONE

D. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: 181735 XD914417 B 1-61 WHILE DIGGING IN FOR THE NIGHT DET A BOUNCING BETTY MINE (AP) RESULTING IN 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA (M) AND 7 US WIA (E).

E. PLANS FOR NEXT SIX HOURS: NO CHANGE FROM SITREP NO, 71.

F. CASUALTIES: ADD:

FRIENDLY: 1 KIA (US), 7 US WIA (E), 2 US WI (M)

*121***CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET***not*

DE UUMSOW 92 0771937

ZNY SSSSS

O 181937Z MAR 69

FM FIRST MAF CICO

LTO III MAF COCO

THIRD MARDIV COC

NINTH MARINES

**PT**

SECRET

THIRD MARDIV PASS TF OTEL

A6 ARMED RECCE

1. MISSION 1067

2. TOT 0020

3. SYSTEMS UP

4. ROUTE

5. NO MOVERS

L6 HARD TARGET TPO

9. MOONBEAM DIRECTED I D2 ON INTERDICTION POINT AT YD 89060084

WITH NO PDA


INC•OTHE OBSERVATIONS

95 NO PRO S WITH CONTROLLERS

**SECRET**

**SECRET**


OO UJMAO  
 DE UUMSQW 193 2772000  
 7NY SSSSS  
 O 1320000 MAR 69  
 FM FIRST MAW COC  
 TO III MAF COC  
 THIRD MARDIV COC  
 NINTH MARINES


**S E C R E T**

THIRD MARDIV PASS TF HOTEL

LA ARMED RECCE

1. MISSION 1075

2. TOT 0140-0215

3. SYSTEM UP

4. ROUTE 922, D4&amp; TO 45

5. NO MOVERS

6. MOONBEAM CONTROLLER 22 D? PANDED SNAKES ON AN INTERDICTION POINT

7. XD 3906008 WITH NO BDA

7. N/A

8. NO OTHER OBSERVATIONS

9. NO PROBLEMS WITH CONTROLLERS

**SECRET**

g

W SRA A4...384...384...384...

OP UUMSQD UUMSEMA UUMSQD UUMSJEA RHUGUIN  
 IT JUNK 1116 0720635

END EEEET

O 190600Z MAR 68 ZFF-6  
 FM XXIV CORPS TOC, CP HOCHMULH  
 TO UUMSQ/III MAF CDC DNG  
 31-0 UUMSEMA/SA, 1ST ARVN DIV, HUE  
 UUMSQD/3RD MAR DIV COC, DGH  
 UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV DTIC, CEE  
 RHUGUIN/70'S USS NEWPORT NEWS

BT

UNCLASSIFIED E F T O

SUBJ: FORECAST OF OPS REPORT WEEK OF 23 MAR- 29 MAR (U)

REF A. CG III MAF MSG DTG 160306Z JUN 68 (C).

B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUL 68 (C).

IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, NEGATIVE REPORT IS SUBMITTED. PRESENT OPS  
 CONTINUE IN XXIV CORPS AO.

BT

432/0700/XXIV/1

SECRET

DRAFT... 3/REL/M -  
SEC COC PHONE 00

IMMEDIATE 07: ZMAR69

COPY TO: C/S  
COC  
0-3  
G-2FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH  
TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL LSD  
1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (TECH)  
3D RECON BN  
INFO: 12TH MARINE REGT  
3D MARINES  
4TH MARINES  
9TH MARINEEMBO  
CEO

//SECRET//

## SPECIAL DMZ OPERATIONS (S)

A. XXIV CORPS OP PLAN 12-69

ON  
1. (S) 17 AND 18 MARCH 69 THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REFERENCE (A)  
CAUSED THE TEMPORARY CESSATION OF DMZ GROUND RECONNAISSANCE PATROLLING.

2. (S) EFFECTIVE 190800H MAR69 RESUME DM RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS.

3. (C) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND SPECIAL NOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THESE  
RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES REMAIN UNCHANGED.

GP-4

CCN 182 REL Y#

DATE/TIME 191... HMAR69

S 3/2/FSCC/EMBO/CEO

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*any*  
article filing

*W*

29

ACTION

SECRET

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ZNY SSSSS

M"CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
 30 THIRD MARDIV COC DAG

BT1

SECRET

REF: (A) 3D MARDIV 190450Z MARG9

1. DESIRED PRIORITIES AND COMMENTS.

AS FOLLOWS:

- A. FIRST PRIORITY: QT 8427. WILL  
 DELAY PURPLE MARTIN OPNS INTO  
 VALLEY NORTH OF FSB ARGO. E UNTIL  
 COMPLETION OF TRIKE. 24-HR DELAY IN  
 OPN ACCEPTABLE THIS COMMAND. IFM  
 NOT ACCOMPLISHED BY 210000H DESIRE  
 CANCELLATION OF SUBJ. ARCLIGHT.
- B. SECOND PRIORITY: QT 8453. WILL  
 REQUIRE 24-HR NOTICE TO MOVE CO TO  
 SAFE POINT. 4TH MAR WILL EXPLOIT ARCLIGHT.
- C. THIRD PRIORITY: QT 8429. SAME  
 REMARKS AS B. ABOVE.

PAGE TWO RUHVP 040: S E C R E T  
 D. ARCLIGHT AT QT 8472, TA-19-206,  
 TA-19-207 NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THIS  
 COMMAND. SUBJ STRIKES WOULD REQUIRE  
 WITHDRAWAL OF SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER  
 OF TROOPS IN CONTACT UNDER ENEMY  
 OBSERVATION.

PAST EXPERIENCE HAS PROVE THIS TACTIC  
 TO BE EXTREMELY COSTLY IN FRIENDLY  
 CASUALTIES THUS, RECO TGTSD  
 IS HELD IN ABEYANCE OR SHIFTS TO  
 WEST.

2. IT IS THE COMMANDERS OBSERVATION  
 THAT ARE PROPOSED TGTIS LIE SOUTH OF  
 THE DMZ. INTELLIGENCE GATHERED AT  
 THIS COMMAND INDICATES THAT THE  
 OPERATING BASE OF THE ENEMY L  
 WITHIN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF  
 THE DMZ, AND ARE RECOMMENDED  
 AS BEING MORE LUCRATIVE TGTIS FOR  
 ARCLIGHT EXPENDITURE.

GP-4

BT

# SECRET

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000000 ZZ UUMSQ UUMSQD UUMSJE A UUMSEM RUMLBPR RUHGUIN  
 DE UUMSI 1345 0781642  
 ZNYY SSSS  
 Z 0 191627Z MAR 69  
 FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
 TO UUMSO/CG III MAF DNG  
 INFO UUMSQD/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH  
 UUMSJE A/CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEE  
 UUMSEMA/CG 1ST ARVN DIV HUE  
 RUMLBPR/TF CLEARWATER CVT  
 RUHGUIN/CTG 70.8  
 BT

*To 1*  
*1 11161*

SECRET AVII-CC

SUBJ: CHANGE TO COMMANDERS W RRTIME FORCAST OF OPERATIONS FOR 200  
MAR 69 (U)

1. PARA I A. (1ST LINE) SHOULD BE CHANGED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:  
4TH MAR REGT: 1 CO OF 1/4 CA INTO FSB ARGONNE AS 1/4 MAR CONTINUES RIF IN  
OPERATION PURPLE RTIN(NVA)

GP-4

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OO UUMSQD.  
 DE RUMLBPM 1176 0781650  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 191640Z MAR 69 "91 kv"  
 FM CO 1ST INF BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) QTR RVN  
 TO COC 3RD MAR DIV  
 BTBT  
 C O V F I D) 1 L CITE 1679 AVBL-C AITN: G-3  
 SUBJ SIX HOUR SITREP. NO. 76 1-5 MECH AO (191801-192400H) MAR 69.  
 A. UNIT LOCATIONS: IF 3-5: A: YD111682

B: YD132657  
 1B AND 33: C2

B 1-9 (-): C2  
 1B 1-9: CAM LC  
 ALL OTHERS: NO CHANGE

B. SUMMARY OF LAST SIX HOURS: ALL UNITS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO FIXED LOCATIONS AND CONDUCT NIGHT ACTS.

C. ENEMY CONTACT: 1 NO

D. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE

E. PLANS FOR NEXT SIX HOURS: A 3-5 MOVES TO NORTHERN BOUNDARY AND  
 REPLACES GROUND: WORKS WITH A MARINE ELEMENT. B 3-5 STANDS DOWN  
 AT C2. 1/B 1- CONDUCTS PATROLS IN AREA OF C2, 2/B 1-9 GOES TO A4  
 IN PREPARATION TO RELIEVE MARINE COMPANY TOMORROW.

F. CASUALTIES: NO CHANGE.

GP-4

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DUMAS TO MAG THREE NINE  
 THY 8888  
 120032Z MAR 69 TO R 120032Z  
 THREE TASK FORCE HOTEL  
 20 FIFTH MARINES  
 TEN/FOURTH MARINES  
 TEN/NINTH MARINES  
 TEN/DEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR  
 100 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 100 FIRST MAR  
 100 FIFTH MARINES  
 MAG ONE SIX  
 MAG THREE SIX  
 MAG THREE NINE  
 FIRST BN 100 MARINES  
 SECOND BN 100 MARINES  
 TEN/THIRD BN 100 MARINES  
 THIRD REGIMENT  
 100  
 S E C R E T  
 MAG ORDER 70  
 100 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 120032Z MAR 69

PAGE TWO RUMAVP0003 S E C R E T  
 1. THIRD MARINES: CONTINUE OPERATION  
 MAINE CRAG  
 2. FOURTH MARINES: NO CHANGE REF (A)  
 3. NINTH MARINES: NO CHANGE REF (A)  
 4. DEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR.  
 5. CHANGE REF (A)  
 6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:  
 A. INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY UNITS EMPLOYED WITHIN THE VIC  
 TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT TRAINING  
 DURING RESHORE FROM COMBAT OPERATIONS IN  
 THE FIELD.  
 B. HELO MOVEMENTS SCHEDULED FOR TF HOTEL  
 FORCES AND SUPPORTING FORCES FOR 20 MAR 69  
 (READ IN FOUR COLUMNS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT)  
 MISSION NUMBER, LINE DESIGNATION, EVENT NUMBER  
 AND PLANNED EXECUTION TIME:  
 1. ALFA 100 TEL COM DET 1 A PA  
 2. CHAS FIVE 100 P  
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X UUMSOD  
 DE RUMLBPBM 1177 0702215  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 0192213Z MAR 69  
 FM HQ 15 INF BDE 4 INF DIV (M) QIR RVN  
 TO COC 3RD MAR DIV  
 BT  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE 1680 AVBL-C ATTN: G-3  
 SUBJ: SIX H: SITREP NO 77 1-5 MECH AO (100001-200000) MAR 69.  
 A. UNIT LOCATIONS: NO CHANGE  
 B. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS: ALL UNITS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY  
 TO FIXED LOCATIONS AND CONDUCT NIGHT ACTS.  
 C. ENEMY CONTACT: NONE  
 D. PLANS FOR NEXT 12 HOURS: NO CHANGE FROM SITREP NO. 75  
 E. CASUALTIES: NONE

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*[Handwritten signature]*

000 DIA AND 10 DIA (4 EVAC).  
 001 CPM RUSSELL BEACH: 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D.  
 002 TUNALSA: 1 FRO DIA (EVAC).  
 003 CPM IRON MOUNTAIN: LZ AWY (BS474525) 13  
 004 - 001 LONG BEACH WAS HIT BY HEAVY USING SAM, RPG  
 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 038 039 040 041 042 043 044 045 046 047 048 049 050 051 052 053 054 055 056 057 058 059 060 061 062 063 064 065 066 067 068 069 070 071 072 073 074 075 076 077 078 079 080 081 082 083 084 085 086 087 088 089 090 091 092 093 094 095 096 097 098 099 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996

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PAGE THREE BUMSC 1048 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 30 FRD KIA AND 77 WIA.

31 5TH ARVN RZGT: OPN QUYET THANG 806 CONT'D  
 WITH NO CONTACT OR CWS RPT'D.

32 OPN QUYET THANG 24: CONT'D WITH 3 SMALL  
 CONTACTS RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD KIA AND 9 WIA.

33 OPN QUYET THANG 458: RPT'D 1 MINE INCIDENT  
 AND TERMINATED 191400H. FINAL CUM TOTALS: 2 FRD KIA  
 AND 2 WIA.

34 (C) CAP UNITS: IN A DELAYED RPT 191300H, CAP 2-4-2  
 ENGAGED A LARGE EN FORCE WITH SAF AND M-79'S (BT120570)  
 2.5 KMS W OF HOI AN. AO OBS APPROX 100 EN IN AREA.

CAP'S SPT'D BY 2 A/S, 2X INM MORT MSNS, GUNSHIPS AND A  
 SWIFT BOAT. LATER IN AFTERNOON, AO RPT'D LSIGHTING  
 43 EN KIA. ACTION CONT'D THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. A

SWEEP OF AREA NEXT MORNING REVEALED 16 HOUSES DEST  
 BUT NO BODIES. CIV'S IN AREA STATED THERE WERE OVER  
 100 EN KIA AND WIA AND THAT LOCAL POPULACE HAD BEEN  
 FORCED TO HAUL WOUNDED WEST DURING THE NIGHT.

35'S ALSO RPT'D MANY EN WPNS BURIED IN AREA. THE  
 LOCAL DIACC RPT'D AGENTS HADTCONFIRMED 19 EN KIA AND

PAGE FOUR BUMSC 1048 C O N F I D E N T I A L

13 EN WIA. (NOT 1 CLUDED IN CUM TOTALS). 8 VC SET  
 FIRE TO 2 HOUSES IN A VIL 3 KMS NNE OF TAM KY

(BT345295). A PLT FROM CZP 1-1-6 MOVED TO THE SCENE  
 AND ENGAGED THE VC WITH ORG WPNS. RESULTS: 5 EN

KIA AND 2 IWC WITH NO FRD CAS RPT'D. CWCO 1-1 WAS INFORMED  
 BY QUANG TIN PROV CHIEF THAT RF COMPOUND (BT340177) 6

KMS SE OF TAM KY HAD BEEN OVERRUN AND WAS HELD BY EN.  
 CO REACTED WITH FORCE CONSISTING OF CAP'S 1-1-2 AND

1-1-3 PLUS PF'S FROM TAM KY DIST HQ. AS THEY AP-  
 PROACHED COMPOUND THEY REC'D SAF. ARTY AND A/S

LGALLED. SHORTLY AFTER 0900H THE FORCE ENGAGED EST 2  
 PLTS OF NVA. EN FLED. FORCE FND REMAINS OF 12 PER-

SONS IN COMPOUND. RESULTS 17 EN KIA, 5 IWC AND 2  
 CSVC WITH 2 PF KIA AND 3 PF WIA (MINOR). ELSEWHERE 5

SMALL CONTACTS WERE RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 32 EN KIA, 1  
 SPV, 5 DETS, 7 IWC AND 2 CSVC WITH NO FRD CAS RPT'D.

7. (C) SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES: CRT OPNS IN ICTZ RE-  
 SULTED IN 375 EN KIA, 17 PW, 28 DETS AND 122 WPNS

LCAPT'D. ARVN FORCES ACCT'D FOR 143 EN KIA, 15 PW  
 AND 52 WPNS CAPT'D; ARVN LOSSES WERE 25 KIA AND 142 WIA.

PAGE FIVE BUMSC 1048 C O N F I D E N T I A L

HE AND PWNAF RPT'D A TOTAL OF 232 EN KIA, 2 PW, 23  
 DETS AND 10 WPNS CAPT'D. US AND PWNAF LOSSES WERE 38  
 EN KIA (152 EN KIA).

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SHOVE COC  
OP CHIEF *[Signature]*  
W.O. *[Signature]*  
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ZZ UUMSK  
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Z 201035Z MAR 69  
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH  
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TO CPHB  
INFO TASK FQ CE HOTEL COC LDS  
TWEL FTH MARINES FDC DGH

*Tos/201243/001*

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SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3RD MARDIV

A. 1/5 TM WAINSCOT ENCOUNTERED LARGE BRUSH FIRE AND HAS NO YET REACHED ASSIGNED RZ.

2. ML S-1

A. NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 21 MARCH 69

3. ARVN

A. 1M SAMPLE CASE SCHEDULED TO EXIT DMZ 210000 MARCH 69.

GP-4

1149

*COPY 5 OF 4* <sup>29</sup>

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DRAFTER 3P/KEF/dae  
SEC G-3

PRIORITY

4Z MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
INFO: CG III MAF  
COMSEVENTHFLT  
TF 79  
TG 79.5

BT

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REQUEST FOR SLF EMPLOYMENT (U)

1. (S) INCREASED EAD Y MORTAR AND SHIPING ATTACKS  
AGAINST VEHICLES TRAVELING ROUTE 9 BETWEEN DONG HA AND  
VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE; SAPPER AND MORTAR ATTACKS  
AGAINST PSB'S AND FIXED POSITIONS; AND RECENT CONTACTS  
BY FORCES OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF LZ'S MAC AND SIERRA  
INDICATE ENEMY IN THE AREA NORTH OF DONG HA  
MOUNTAIN AND CAM LO.
2. (S) PRESENT COMMITMENT OF THIRD MARINE DIVISION FORCES  
TO OPERATIONS MAIL CRAG, PURPLE MARTIN, AND SURVEILLANCE  
0 THE DMZ LEAVES INSUFFICIENT FORCES IN EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS IN  
THE AREA NORTH OF CAM LO.
3. (S) REQUEST EMPLOYMENT OF SLF IN AREA OF OPERATIONS  
BOUNDED ON WEST BY 00 N-3 GRID, ON EAST BY 15 N-3 GRID,  
ON SOUTH BY ROUTE 9 AND ON NORTH BY SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF  
THE DMZ. SLF WOULD CONDUCT A HELICOPTERBORNE ASSAULT  
INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA TO CONDUCT S/D OPERATION TO DESTROY  
ENEMY FORCES FORTIFICATIONS AND SUPPLY CACHES IN THE AOo

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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DURATION OF THE OPERATION WILL BE APPROXIMATELY THREE  
WEEKS.

4. (U) IF APPROVED, REQUEST DIRLAUTH WITH ARG/SLF TO  
COMMENCE DETAILED PLANNING.

GP-4

CCDNJ: REL BY \_\_\_\_\_,

TIME

MAR69

PAGE    OF PAGES

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DRAFTER 3P/KEF/dac  
SEC G-3P PH 3203049  
PRIORITY

MAR69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHE  
INFO: CG III MAF  
COMSEVENTHFLT  
TP 71

BT

//SECRET//

REQUEST FOR SLF EMPLOYMENT (U)

1 (S) PRESENT COMMITMENTS OF THIRD MARDIV FORCES TO OPERATIONS MAINE CRAG, PURPLE ARTIN, AND SURVEILLANCE OF DMZ AND THE PLACING OF 1ST AMTRAC BN IN CADRE STATUS LEAVES MINIMAL FORCES AVAILABLE FOR SECURITY OF THE CUA VIET WATERWAYS AND REDUCES PATROLS AND AMBUSHES TO PREVENT ENEMY MINING ACTIVITY ALONG THE CUA VIET RIVER.

2. (C) NINT AGT RPTS SINCE 21 FEB 69 HAVE PLACED UNITS UP TO AND INCLUDING BN SIZE IN THE EASTERN AREA BELOW THE DMZ MOSTLY CONCENTRATED IN THE LA XUAN (YD 2669), NHI HA (YD 2770), AND VINH QUANG (YD 2666) AREAS. SIX RPTS MENTIONED LAM XUAN (YD 2669) AS AN AMMO/RKT (122MM) CACHE SITE OR AN OCCUPIED AREA AND TWO MENTIONED ARTY UNITS WITH 122MM RKT LAUNCHERS MOVING INTO OR LOCATED IN THESE AREAS. DONG HA AND CUA VIET ARE TO BE THE MAJOR TARGETS FOR ELLING ATTACKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL MORTAR ATTACKS AND ONE COMPANY SIZE GD ATTACK INITIATED BY THE EN AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES LOCATED BELOW THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ SINCE 22 FEB 69 AND SENSORS IN

PAGES

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UNCLAS

TIL 24TH OF FEB, AND EST TWO EN COMPANIES IN THE YD GRID ON 28 FEB ALONG WITH SEVERAL SMALLER DETECTIONS OF ENEMY MOVING THROUGH THE AREA. THE ARVN OBSD AN UN KNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE IN THE VIC OF YD 2569 NEAR LAI XUAN. THIS AREA APPEARS TO BE A LUCRATIVE TARGET AS INDICATED BY THESE AGENT RPTS AND INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA, ALONG WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A STORAGE AREA/AMMO CACHE IN THE VIC OF LAI XUAN.

3. (S) REQUEST EMPLOYMENT OF SLF IN AREA OF OPERATIONS BOUNDED BY GRID COORDINATES YD 282770 TO 267763 TO 289735 TO 280720 TO 240667 ALONG STREAM TO CUA VIET TO SEA ALONG TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT BOUNDARY. SLF TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AND S/D OPNS IN AO TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, FORTIFICATIONS AND SUPPLY CACHES. DURATION OF OPERATION APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS.

4. (U) IF APPROVED, REQUEST DIRLAUTH WITH ARG/SLF TO COMMENCE DETAILED PLANNING.

5. 9. 1. 5 ALTERNAT EMPLOYMENT FOR  
GP-41 PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED IN AREA NORTH OF CAM LU.

CCN/96 REL BY

TITLE

H MAR69

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGE

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 DE UUMSO 1068 1791455  
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 O 201455Z MAR 69 TOLIN  
 FM III MAF COC  
 TO UUMS/MACV CMD CNTR NG RVN  
 INFO UUMSK/XXI CORPS TOC PHB RVN  
 UUMSOI/ CORPS TOC DNG RVN  
 UUMSOA/AMERICAL DIV TOC CHU LAI RVN  
 UUMSON/FIRST MAW COC DNG RVN  
 UUMSOD/THIRD MAR)IV CO DONG HA RVN  
 UUMSJE/ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV TOC  
 UUMSA/I FFORCEV MHA RVN  
 ZEN/HORNHDASC RVN  
 ZEN/FMFPAC HA-  
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 BT

E C R E T

FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

A. 1ST ARVNHDI :

(1). 2D ARVN REGT (REINF): TF DUNG ASSUMES OPCON OF 1/2 ARVN AND  
 CONTINUES PATROL AND RIF OPS

CIA-1, A-2 AND OLD A (NVA, VCLF). 3/2 ARVN (-) CONTINUES CLEAR  
 AND SEARCH OPS SW OF LZ TORCH TOARD LAOTIAN BORDER (NVA).

PAGE TWO UUMS 13. S E C R E T

2D ARVN REGT COMMAND ELEMENT, ONE CO OF 3/2 ARVN, ONZ BTRY ARVN  
 ARTY AND SIX BMM MORT AT LZ TORCH CONTINUE TO CONTROL AND SUPPORT  
 ARVN FORCES IN OP MAINE RAG (NVA). 4/ ARVN (-) FIRS N AND W OF  
 C-1 (NVA, VCLF).

(2). 1ST ARVN REGT (REINF): 1/1 ARVN (-) CONTINUES SEARCH OPS  
 LIN MY CHANH AO (VCLF). 2/1 ARVN CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS  
 NE OF LZ JAKE (YD255332) (NVA). 3/ ARVN CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH  
 OPS N OF FSB DAVIS (NVA). 4/1 ARVN (-) CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH  
 OPS VIC FSB DAVIS WHILE ONE COMPANY PROVIDES SECURITY FOR (NVA) 1/11  
 ARVN CAV CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC LZ NANCY (VCLF).

(3). 3D ARVN REGT (REINF): 1/3 ARVN CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH  
 OPS SW OF HUE (VCMF, VCLF). 4/3 ARVN IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1/506  
 INF CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS ALONG SONG BO RIVER AND VIC OF  
 FSB BASTOGNE (NVA, VCLF). 3/3 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS SW OF FSB  
 TENNESSEE (NVA). 2/3 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS NE OF FSB SPEAR (NVA).  
 3/54 ARVN CO CONTI S HUE SECURITY MISSION. BLACK PANTHER CC AT  
 KITHO. NTIN M-1UT PATROL OPS N OF FSB T-BONE (VCLF).

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PAGE THREE JUMS 10 SECRET  
E OF PHU AI AIRFIELD (VCI, VCLF).

(5). 7TH ARVN CA TF: 2/7 ARVN CAV (REINF) AND 3/7 ARVN CAV (REINF)  
CONTINUE CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS VIC "STREET WITHOUT JOY" (VICN VCLF).  
B. QUANG NAM: 51ST REGT WILL CONT CDT BN CLEARING OPNS WITHIN  
THE INDIVIDUAL AO'S. 1ST RNGR GP WILL CDT LE LOI IV, WITH 37TH AND  
39TH RNGR BN CDT. 21ST RNGR BN WILL REMAIN ON I CORPS SECURITY AND  
WILL REMAIN PREPARED FMR CONTINGENCY MISSIONS.

C. (C) 2ND ARVN DIVISION WILL CONT CDT QUYET THANG WITH 2/5  
CMTD AND OTHER OPNS AS REPORTED IN PARA 4.

GP-4

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ZNY SSSSS

P 201530Z MAR 69

FM: CG TASK FORCE 4014

TO: CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO: THIRD RECON BN

ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

ZEN/NINTH MARINES

MAG THREE NINE

BT

S E C R E T

48 HOUR PLAN SUMMARY

1. INSERTIONS TOMORROW

TEAMS	DATES	R.Z. COORD	METHOD
PISTON ROD	21-25	7265-7463	ALL HELO
SAND BOX	21-25	82-8451	
FANCY DAN	21-25	9055-9253	
DARTING STAR	21-25	0043-2141	
WY RIDE	21-25	0139-0237	
129 D 69	21-25	0332-0530	
131 D 69	21-25	8032-8230	

PAGE TWO RUMMVP 0432 S E C R E T

132 D 69 21-25 0835-1033

133 D 69 21-25 1233-1431

B. EXTRACTIONS TOMORROW:

TEAM	DATES	EX. COORD	METHOD
CODMOTHER	17-21	FBA	ALL HELO

2. INSERTIONS NEXT DAY:

TEAMS	DATES	R.ZM COORD	METHOD
134 D 69	22-26	1044-1242	ALL HELO
138 D 69	22-26	9168-9366	
140 D 69	22-26	8947-9145	
137 D 69	22-26	9762-9960	

2.B. EXTRACTIONS NEXT DAY:

TEAMS	DATES	EX. COORD	METHOD
BIG SHOT	19-22	FBA	HELO

BT

BT

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21 MAR / ML

RUMHVP-THIRD MARDIV CUC  
 RUMH PAI-MAG THREE NINE

ZNY SSSSS  
 02019507

ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

ZEN/NINTH MARINES

INFU: CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

TWELFTH MARINES

MAG ONE SIX

MAG THREE SIX

MAG THREE NINE

FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES

SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES

THIRD RECON BN

ZEN/VANDERGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR (VIC)

SE C R E T

FRAG URDER 78-69

. THIRD MARINES. CONTINUE OPERATION MAINE CRAG

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 0434 S E C R E T

2. FOURTH MARINES

A. CONTINUE OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN

B. CONTINUE OPERATIONS FROM FSB ARGONNE,  
ALPINE, NEVILLE, RUSSELL AND FULLER.C. 0430-43 TU ASSUME OPCON OF MIKE/  
THREE/THREE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN OPERATION  
PURPLE MARTIN ON ORDER.

3. NINTH MARINES

A. CONTINUE REHABILITATION AND REDEPLOYMENT  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANNING GUIDANCE.B. CONTINUE SECURITY MISSION FOR KHE GIU  
BRIDGE, ECB, SIGNAL HILL, VCB AND CALU.C. CONTINUE OPERATIONS FROM FSB CATES A HILLS  
691 AND 950.

4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: RE VEMENTS

FOR QUEBEC HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING  
FORCES FOR 21 MAR 69 (AD IN FOUR COLUMNS FROM

LEFT TO RIGHT: MESSAGE NUMBER, LINE DESIGNATION

AND DE SIGNAT II

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PAGE THREE RUMVP 0234 S E C R E T  
CH46 EXT) FROM VCB L S  
TO FSB ARGONNE

303 ALPH PLT 2ND PROV/ONE/TWELVE 1100  
(25 PAX, 500LB CH46 MT,  
16 CH53 EXT AND 2 CHTR EXT)  
FROM FSB ALPINE TO FSB  
ARGONNE

303 BRAVO DET 3RD TANK BN (1 CH54 ON CALL  
EXT) FROM VCB LSA TO  
LZ PARIS

303 CHARLIE DET 3RD TANK BN (1 CH54 ON CALL  
EXT) FROM FSB SMAPPER TO  
LZ PARIS

401 ALPHA MIKE/T (E/ / EE (160 PAX) 0800  
FROM VCB R/W TO FSB

401 BRAVO DET CP./ONE/FOUR (75 PAX) 0800  
FROM FSB ALPINE TO FSB

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
PAGE FOUR RUHMVP 0434 S E C R E T  
 FROM FSB ALPINE TO 401 B  
 FSB ARGONNE  
 401 DELTA CO/ONE/FOUR (180 PAX) AFTER  
 FROM FSB ALPINE TO 401 C  
 FSB ARGONNE.  
 401 ECHO HELO ASSAULT BY THIRD AFTER  
 BN/2ND ARVN (275 PAX) 401 D.  
 FROM VCB R/W TO LZ  
 QUEEN.  
 401 FOXTROT FLT/KILO/THREE/THREE AFTER  
 (50 PAX) FROM MAI 401 E  
 LOG TO FSB FULLER  
 401 GOLF FLT/KILO/THREE/FOUR CONTINUOUS  
 (50 PAX) FROM FSB  
 FULLER TO VCB R/W  
 401 HOTEL CP/THIRD MARINES (35 PAX, AFTER  
 1000LB INT, 1-CH46 EXT) 401 G  
 FROM FSB SNAPPER TO  
 FSB SAIGON  
 401 INDIA BRAVO CMD/ONE/THREE AFTER

PAGE FIVE RUHMVP 0434 S E C R E T  
 (125 PAX, 4 106RR W/MULES 401 H  
 AND 5 MULES) FROM  
 VCB R/W TO LZ PARIS.  
 401 JULIETT PLT/LIMA/THREE/THREE AFTER  
 (43 PAX) FROM LZ SNAPPER 401 I  
 TO LZ DAVIS. (XD889241)  
 401 KILU FLT/106RR/TWO/THREE AFTER  
 (15 PAX, 6 106RR W/MULES) 401 J.  
 FROM VCB R/W TO  
 FSB SAIGON  
 401 LIMA 81SEC/FOXTROT/TWO/THREE AFTER  
 (15 PAX, 6 CH46 EXT) FROM 401 KM  
 FSB SAIGON TO LZ PARIS.  
 401 MIKE DET/THIRD TANK BN (10 PAX, ON CALL  
 3 CH46 EXT) FROM VCB W/303B  
 LSA TO LZ AT XD790231.


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DO  
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ACTION



UUMSQD - MAG THREE NINE  
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U 2 10915Z MAR 69  
FM CG TASK FORCE HUTEL  
TO ZE W/THIRD MAI

- 9

7/04/0713

SW/NINTH MAR  
INFO CG THIRD MARD IV  
CG FIRST MAW  
TWELFTH MAR INES  
MAG uNE SIX  
MAG THREE SIX  
MAG THREE E NINE  
FIRST BN TWELFTH MAR  
ZEN/SECO D BN TWELFTH MAR  
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
THIRD RECO BN  
ZEN/VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATIO COORDINATOR (VIC)

SECRET  
A. CG TASK FORCE HUTEL 201850Z MAR 69  
1. THIRD MA INES. CONTINLE uPERATIUN MAINE

2,000

PAGE TWO RUMHVP0448 SECRET  
CRA G

2. FOURTH MARINES. NO CHA GE FROM REF A.  
3. NINTH MARINES. NO CHANGE FROM REF A.  
4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: HELU MOVEMENTS  
FOR TASK FORCE HUTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING  
FORCES FOR 22 MAR 69 WILL BE PASEP.

GP 4  
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(313)

1. INTEL  
 2. DISSEM 1155 050100Z  
 3. 1500Z  
 4. 1041Z MAR 69  
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TOP SECRET-XXIV  
 21/05/69

1. L R E T  
 2. SPECIAL DMZ OPS REPORT  
 3. AND MARDIV  
 4. 1041Z MAR 69  
 5. NO RECON WAS NO TOS SCHEDULED FOR 22 MARCH 69  
 6. 1041Z MAR 69  
 7. NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 22 MARCH 69  
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A-1  
**SECRET**

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OO UUMS UUMSO

ZNY CCCCC

O 211930Z MAR 69

FM THIRD MARDIV COC

TO JUMSK/XXIV CORPS

INFO UUMSO 111 MAR

TASK FORCE HOTEL

10 NF 1'D 2 N T I A L

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

3/5 CA AT 2112Z H 3/5 VIC 093617 APV HIT UNK TYPE MINE, BLEI  
 F ROAD WHEELS AND ARMS PUT HOLE IN ULL. VEHICLE EVAC'D RES 31WIA

2115Z 3/5 VIC 09161 APC HIT UNK TYPE MINE. VEHICLE

NOT REPAIRABLE, RES ? WIA(E) 1 WIA(M)

T 211745H 3/5 VIC 091619 VTR STRUCK UN TYPE MINE. EVAC'D VTR TO RED  
 DEVIL.

(5) A/4/1 CAV NO CONTACT

(6) 1ST AMTRAC BN

(LATE ENTRY) AT A COI3 ST AMTRAC BT VIC 297694 AM SPOTTED

EN. ENGAGED WITH SAF. SWEEPED AREA WITH NEG RES

CMCR- 52 017211215 MCR-52 QUARRY VIC 070573 REC'D 1 RD 75 MM RR  
 AND APPROX 1 RD 2MM FIRE, CALLED ARTY AND 81MM MSN WITH UNK RESULTS  
 SECURED QUARRY OPERATIONS.

1. FLSG P AT 21145 VCB CONVOY ONRT9 GRID SQ 0657 REC'D UN NR 2MM RES2  
 (TA 1)

PAGE TWO UUMSO 1209 C O N F I D E N T I A L

E 3RD RECON BN SEE 3RD RECON BN 94 4R SITREP.

F. ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE.

SUPPORT. SEE 12 TH MAR 24 4R SITREP.

1. GENERAL. EXCELLENT WEATHER ENHANCED OFFENSIVE  
 OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT DIVISION AO.

H. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

PATROLS AMBUSHES S&D OIST SCOUT

UNIT FT S&D PLT FT S&D PLT CO POST SNIPER

3RD MAR

1/3 MAINE CPAG-----

1/4  
 2/4/19  
 3  
 4  
 5  
 6  
 7

MOBq  
 PURPLE MARTIN  
 3 4 5 6 7

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PAGE THREE UUMSOD 1209 C O N F I D E N T I A L

904 MAR

1/9 DO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2/9 DO	9	4	0	0	0	0	0	3
NA	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	14
3/9 DO	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1
NA	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)								
1/11 DO	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	6
NA	0	1	1	3	0	0	5	5
1/61 DO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NA	5	3	20	0	0	0	4	0
1/77 DO	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
NA	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
3/5 DO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1ST MATRAC								
DI	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	5
NA	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	6
OTCB DO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NA	5	0	0	1	0	0	6	0
T1	23	12	0	0	0	4	32	21
NA	13	10	24	23	0	0	48	11
T5	36	22	24	23	0	4	80	33

PAGE FOUR UUMSOD 1209 C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. SMALL UNITS CONTACTS.

PROVINCE	DATE	ACTION	FR UNIT	EN UNIT	INIT BY
COORD	TIME	SIZE/TYPE	LOSSES	LOSSES	US/VC
XD 959658	180730H	PLT PATROL	L/3/4	UNK	VC
		SFD	2 WIA (E)		
YD 019593	201630H	CO DEF	K/3/4	UNK	VC
		INCOMING	1 WIA (E)	UNK	
			1 WIA (M)		
YD 097594	202130H	SOD AMP	A/1ST AMTRAC	UNK	US
			BN (NONE)	UNK	
YD 085620	210630H	CO DEF	L/3/3	UNK	VC
		INCOMING	NONE	UNK	
YD 062566	210945H	CO DEF	G/2/9 UNK		VC
	T0-211415H	INCOMING	3 WIA (E)	UNK	
YD 018592	211000H	CO DEF	K/3/4	UNK	VC
		INCOMING	NONE	UNK	
YD 066602	211025H	CO DEF	I/3/3	UNK	VC
		INCOMING	5 WIA (E)	UNK	
			1 WIA (M)		
YD 018592	211045H	CO DEF	K/3/4	UNK	VC
		INCOMING	NONE	UNK	
YD 018592	211105H	CO DEF	K/3/4	UNK	VC
		INCOMING	NONE	UNK	
YD 0657	211145H	CONVOY	FLSG B	UNK	VC
		INCOMING	CONVOY	UNK	

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PAGE FIVE HUNDRED 1969 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 1. 479573 211215H INCOMING MCF-53 UNK VC  
 NONE UNK  
 2. 485617 211224H MINE 8/3/5 UNK VC  
 3. 485656 211230H CO DEF 1/3/4 UNK US  
 NONE UNK  
 4. 485615 211237H CO DEF 1/3/3 UNK US  
 NONE 3 NVA KIA  
 5. 485619 211238H MINE 2/3/5 UNK VC  
 2 KIA(E) NONE  
 1 KIA(M)  
 6. 485619 211645H CO DEF 0/2/4 UNK VC  
 INCOMING NONE UNK  
 7. 491610 211745H MINE 8/3/5 UNK VC  
 NONE UNK  
 8. 485613 211915H CO DEF 1/3/3 UNK VC  
 INCOMING NONE UNK  
 9. 485617 211920H PLT 7/1/61 UNK US  
 AND NONE UNK  
 10. PACIFICATION SUPPORT

PAGE SIX HUNDRED 1969 C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.
2. 8/3/5H CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS WITH 20/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOU TOAR.
3. 1/3/3 CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS IN CAM LOU DISTRICT.
4. TWO SOD OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.
5. 41ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN REGT'S THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL ARE.
6. DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PLOC) BY 3/3 BDE, 10TH, AND 1ST BDE 11TH INF (MECH)
7. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/HAMLET CAS DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE

GP-4

BT

1969

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\$3 77.0 214 0802330 1 0D  
 ZNY CCCC:k  
 0 212330  
 FM THIRD ARDIV COC DGM  
 TO UUMSK/IV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO U I MAF COC DNG  
 AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF TWO

(5) AT 211200 VIC FSB FULLER K 3/4 REC (4)  
 82MM MORTAR IMPACTING IN VIC OF XI 022590.  
 1000M NORTH OF POSITION. 81MM MORTAR MSN  
 000000 YA ENEMY XD 036586.

(6) AT 211400 843522 3RD RECON TM  
 WAS BEING INSERTED, 2 MEN WERE OFF THE BIRD WHEN  
 THEY SPOTTED (3) NVA 20-3 METERS TO THEIR NORTH. TM  
 MADE CONTACT WITH (1) NVA TO THE N AND NE WITH NO  
 CASUALTIES O. EITHER SIDE. INSERT HELO LFT LZ AND  
 GUNSHIPS EXPENDED ORDNANCE ON ENEMY. INSERT HELO  
 RETURNED WITH 2 MEN AND PICKED THEM UP. TAKING 2  
 HITS ON ENEMY WERE WEARIN KHAKI AND GREEN

UNIFORMS MIXED. A 81MM MORTAR WAS OBSERVED NEAR THE  
 TM MEMBERS BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO RETRIEVE IT.  
 9TH MARINES

PAGE TWO UUMSOD 121- C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 (1) AT 210945H VIC XD 062566 G 2/9 RECEIVED (9) 61MM  
 MORTAR FIRE FROM VIC XT 045588. RETURNED FIRE WITH 61MM  
 MORTAR.

(2) AT 211135H VIC XD 058566 G 2/9 RECEIVED (10) 61MM  
 MORTAR RDS FROM 055575. RETURNED FIRE WITH  
 81MM MORTARS.

(3) AT 211215H VIC XD 045367 3RD TECON AS  
 INSERT HELO WAS APPROACHING INSERT COORDS. IT WAS  
 UPON BY UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF ENEMY MISSION ABORTED.  
 NO CASUALTIES.

(4) AT 211230H VIC 04420 3RD RECON TM  
 OBSERVED 9 ENEMY WEARING GREEN UTILITIES AND  
 CARRYING 5 CANTEENS APIECE 15 METERS TO THEIR NE.  
 AS TM WAS TRYING TO CAPTURE ENEMY THEY HEARD  
 MORE ENEMY TO THEIR NORTH. TM MOVED OUT OF AREA.

(5) AT 211415 VIC 056564 G 2/4 TOOK HEAVY 61MM  
 MORTAR FIRE. TM HAS STOPPED AT PRESENT TIME.

RESULTS (3) PR WIAF

(6) AT 211515H VIC 092425 3RD RECON  
 TM OBSERVED 3 ENEMY WALKING ON TRAIL THUGH

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AGE REE UUM 001214 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 REELINE. MOVING FROM EAST TO WEST. TM COULD NOT  
 OBSERVE UNIFORMS OR WEAPONS.

C. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)

1. 211140H YD 093617 - APC OF B 3-5 HIT AT MINE BLOWING OFF  
 ALL ROAD WHEELS AND ARMS ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE APC AND BLOWING  
 A HOLE IN THE HILL. APC BEING EVACUATED TO C2 AND IS TENTATIVELY  
 CLASSIFIED AS A COMBAT LOSS. RESULTS: 3 USA KIA(E)

2. 211350H, YD. 72615 - ELEMENTS OF I 3-3 FOUND A 44WEEK  
 OLD BUNKER COMPLEX CONSISTING OF 15 BUNKERS 5'X6' AND 10 BUN-  
 KERS 10' X INSIDE THE BUNKERS WERE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:  
 1 RPG RD, 22 60, MORTAR RDS, 27 FUZES 2 BELTS RPD AMMO, 2 HEL-  
 METS, 1 PONCHO, 2 TRENCHING TOOLS, 1 PICK AND 1 SAW EQUIP  
 EVACUATED AND BUNKERS DESTROYED. RESULTS: ABOVE ITEMS CAPTURED.

3. 211530H, YD 092139 - APC OF B 3-5 HIT AT MINE BREAKING TRACK  
 AND BLOWING OFF TWO ROAD WHEELS ON ONE SIDE. APC BEING RECOVERED  
 TO C2. RESULTS: 2 USA KIA(E), 1 USA KIA (M)

5. PLANS:

A. 4TH MARINES: UNITS CONTINUE TO CONDUCT COMBAT  
 OPNS & MSNS ASSIGNED

B. 1ST MARINES: UNITS CONTINUE TO CONDUCT COMBAT

1 FOUR DUMSOD 1214 C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPNS 1ST MARINES ASSIGNED

C. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)

1. A CO ( ) CONTINUES S/C N. OF LZ ANNE. B 1-77(-)  
 2/A 1-77 AND 2/A 1-11 MOVE TO LZ SHARON. 1/A 1-11 AND D CO (-)  
 SECURE LZ SHARON ONE PLAT OF D 1-A AND 3/B 1-77 SECURE THE  
 LAND CLEARING OPN WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO START 22 MAR 69 S. OF  
 LZ SHARON

1-61(-): C CO CONT SECURITY OF WUNDER BEACH, CONDUCTS PLAT  
 SIZE S/C OPNS ALONG "STREFT" AREA S. OF WUNDER BEACH. C CO CON-  
 DUCTS PLAT SIZE I/C OPNS VIC BO BANG SCOUT PLAT STANDS DOWN AT  
 LZ SHARON IN PREPARATION FOR AGI.

3. TF 1-77 A 1-77 CONT SECURITY OF MINESWEEPS AND BRIDGES ALONG  
 PLAT VIC L7 NANCY. A 4-12 CONT S/C OPN VIC YD 4039, ESTABLISHES

NIGHT RECON SCREEN FROM YD 389408 TO YD 420400. B 1-11 CONT S/C  
 OPN VIC YD 3843.

4. TF 3-5 CAV: TRP REVERTS OPCON TO 3-5 CAV EFF 21 00H, A  
 TRP AND B TRP WITH 2 PLAT OF D 1-11 BEGIN S/D OPNS IN THE VALLEY NORTH  
 OF DONG HA MOUNTAIN. E 1-11 SECURES AA THEN CHOPPED OPCON TO 1-9  
 MARINES ON 22 MAR AND MOVES TO CUA VIET FOR REHAB. C 1-9 CLOSED  
 C2 AT 1815 HRS OPCON TO 3-5 CAV FOR DEFENSE OF C2 TONIGHT

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PAGE FIVE UUMSOD 1214 3 0 N F I E N T I A L

5. 3-3 MARINES: I CO, K CO, 3-3 HQS ARE CHOPPED OPCON TO  
 ERD MARDIV EFF (TIME UNKNOWN) 21 MAR 69 FOR OPN S IN THE 3D  
 MARDIV AO.

6. 1ST AMTRAC: A CO OPERATES FROM MY LOC, B CO OPERATES FROM C4  
 AND OCEAN VIEW. PRC OPERATES VIC XUAN KHANH. H&S PLAT OPERATES  
 FROM DAI DO.

7. 1-1 MARINES: CHOPPED OPCON TO 1-5 MECH (TIME UNKNOWN).  
 IN TURN GAINS OPCON OF B 1-9 AND C 1-9 AND SECURING KHE  
 GIO BRIDGE, MAI LOC, CAM LO, C3 BRIDGE, C2 AND A4.

8. CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES: ADD (4) USMC WIA (E).

(5) USA WIA (E) USA WIA (M), (3) NVA KIA, (5) VC KIA, (1) POW:  
 (3) IWC.

## A. FRIENDLY

	USMC	USA	USN
IA	45		21
WIA (E)	189	104	1
WIA (M)	21	18	1

## B. ENEMY

	NVA	VC	DET	79
KIA	415	15		
POW	7	6	IWC	129
RET		1	CSWC	23

GP-4

BT

1914

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET**

(314)

DRAFTED BY: RNB/ANB  
 ,ROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION  
 CNO

PRIORITY 220237 2 MAR 69

COPY TO: G-2(CIC)

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DCH, RVN  
 TO: COMUSMACV, SEN, RVN  
 INFO: CG III MAF, DNG, RVN  
 CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN  
 CG USASOPCO, CRB, RVN  
 CG TF NGDEL, VCB, RVN  
 THIRD MARINES, DCH, RVN  
 FOURTH MARINES, VCB, RVN  
 FIFTH MARINES, VCB, RVN  
 FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (ABCH), FT, RVN

G-3  
 FSC  
 CIC  
 CCG

63-4

SECRET

FOR CODE J3-04

SENSOR ACTIVATION/DEACTIVATION REPORT (C)

A. LACV DIR 525-27

## 1. (S) POL SUBMITTED IAW REF A FOR STRING 111:

- A. TWO MINIHARDSIDS, ONE FIRID, ONE GSID
- B. 30/05, 3 ID  
30/06-22, 1 INLEARDSID/FIRID  
30/07, 1 INLEARDSID
- C. YD 09457110  
YD 09407115  
YD 09397118
- D. 171200 11 MAR 69
- E. ALL SET FOR END OF BATTERY LIFE
- F. DESTRUCT ACTIVATED IN RECOVERABLE MODE
- G. SIXTEEN (DUEL BLADE)

## 2. (S) POL SUBMITTED IAW REF A FOR STRING 114:

- A. THREE MINIHARDSIDS, ONE TAGID; ONE ACOURBUOY
- B. 30/04, 1 MINIHARDSID  
30/03-21, 1 MINIHARDSID/TAGID  
30/02, 1 MINIHARDSID ; 23/08, ACOURBUOY
- C. YD 114007320  
YD 114007335  
YD 114007350

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

G.S.V.

2/3/FSC/CIC/CC

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

- D. 201400H MAR 69
- E. ALL SPT FOR END OF BATTERY LIFE
- F. DESTRUCT ACTIVATED IN RECOVERABLE MODE
- G. SEVENTEEN (DUCEL BLADE)

- 3. (S) DELETE STRING 140
  - A. THREE HANDSIDS, ONE LAGID
  - B. 31/04, HANDSID
    - 31/05-23, HANDSID/LAGID
    - 31/25, HANDSID
  - C. YD 13205320
    - YD 13405320
    - YD 13405330
  - D. 8 JAN 69
  - E. 21 MAR 69
  - F. SEVEN (DUFFEL BAG)

- 4. (S) DELETE STRING 141
  - A. TWO HANDSIDS, ONE LAGID
  - B. 31/26, HANDSID
    - 31/28-27, HANDSID/LAGID
  - C. YD 12905315
    - YD 12755313
  - D. 8 JAN 69
  - E. 21 MAR 69
  - F. SIX (DUFFEL BAG)

GP-4

CCN 2088 RELEASED BY *MacLough* TIME 0910 11 MAR 69PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(315)

DRAFTED BY: QWB/RKR  
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION  
CWOPRIORITY 220540 Z MAR69COPY TO: G-2  
G-3  
RECON REF  
FSC  
COC  
CIC  
TIO

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG TF HOPEL  
 INFO: THIRD MARINES  
 FOURTH MARINES  
 NINTH MARINES  
 TWELFTH MARINES  
 ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN ARTY GROUP  
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)  
 FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES  
 SECOND BN, TWELFTH MARINES  
 THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES  
 FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MARINES  
 FIRST BN, FORTIETH ARTY  
 FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARTY  
 FIRST BN, SEVENTY-SEVENTH ARMORED  
 FIRST BN, ELEVENTH INF  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 THIRD BN, FOURTH MARINES  
 FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES  
 THIRD SQUADRON, FIFTH MECH

G-3H

SECRET

SENSOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN, PERIOD ENDING 2400 22 MAR 69 (U)

A. CG 3D MARDIV 170020Z MAR69

1. (C) DELETE FOL SENSOR STRINGS FROM REF A: STRING 110, STRING 111.
2. (S) ADD FOL TO REF A:

STRING CH/TONE CODE	KILL ZONE	TGT NO	READOUT SITE	TYPE TERRAIN
111 30/05,06-22,07	YD09507100	SD0111	A-4	OPEN, EL GRASS
	YD09377125	SD1111		
114 30/04,03-21,02; 23/08	YD11007310	SD0114	A-4	OPEN, EL GRASS
	YD11007360	SD1114		

GP-4

CCN 2116 RELEASED BY *[Signature]* 1315 H MAR69

CISV

2/3/RECON REF/FSC/COC/CIC/TIO

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

317

DRAFTYR 21/3MC/601  
 SEC 71R 30 MANDIV 323  
 CHG

21/3MC/601 21/3MC/601

SEC 71R 30 MANDIV 323  
 CHG 21/3MC/601 21/3MC/601

1/10/69 11

21/3MC/601 21/3MC/601

3. REFERENCE TO THE 21/3MC/601 OF MARCH 1969. THE FOLLOWING INFO  
 a. 21/3MC/601  
 b. 21/3MC/601  
 c. 21/3MC/601  
 d. 21/3MC/601

21/3MC/601

21/3MC/601

21/3MC/601

21/3MC/601

G3H

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(318)

CHAPTER 10E/WHB/10E  
SBC CNO PHONE 3166  
C O

NOU/VA 220922 Z MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD MANDIV  
TO: CG 111 FAF  
INFO: CG 158K FORCUT HOSBL

COPY TO: COMM CTR

SECRET

AUTHORIZATION FOR TOP SECRET TRANSMISSION (U)

- A. OTHAV/EST 05510.900 PAGE 5
- B. CSM-36 CHAP 1
- C. OTHAV/EST 05510.91

1. HQ AUTH TRANSMIT TOP SECRET MESSAGES ON CPT 10001 BETWEEN THIRD MANDIV/FAF FORCUT HOSBL.

2. FAF-2613 TO BE USED. AVAIL FOR USE BOTH COMMANDS.

3. REQUIREMENTS LISTED REF A, B, C, CERTIFIED.

4. CPT LINE NOT RECOMMENDED.

GP-4

CCN 2122 RELEASED BY

*M. Russell*

FILE 221700 H MAR 69

CEO

COMM CTR P

6314

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(319)

ZZ UUMSK  
DE UUMSQD 1222 0811120  
ZNY SSSSS

Z 221120Z MAR 69  
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH  
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PNB  
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC UCI

TWELFT MARINES FDC DGH  
BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3RD MARDIV

A. 1/5 TM WAINSCOT CANCELLED 22 MARCH 69

B. 3RD RECON TM AMANDA SCHEDULED FOR 23 THRU 27 MARCH 69 INFO

RZ UL YD SIGR LR YD 0365

B. MLS -1

A. NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 23 MARCH 69

B. ARVN

A. TM ELITE ACTION EXITED DMZ AT 220050H MARCH

B. TM BIG ALICE ENTERED DMZ R Z UL YD 190773 LR YD 2075 AT  
071000H. TM WILL REMAIN IN DMZ UNTIL 241000H MARCH 69.

BT

BT

1. 22

*700/221230z / 24 / 794 /*

**SECRET**

**SECRET****SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF H  
 G-3 W O **Douglas Stirling**  
 G-2 W.O. N  
 DCPD W  
 APO West  
 ACTION

ARMY WFO 20 MAR 68 113155  
 TO RUMLOP  
 20 MAR 68  
 071000W WFOLEP 2014 0811715-8889--RUMLOP.  
 20 MAR 68

0 221600Z MAR 68  
 TO CG XXICORPS RVN  
 TO C-THIRD MAR DIV DGN  
 0 250845Z MAR 68  
 FM HORN DASC DNG  
 TO AFM TACC TBN RVN  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 3-XXIV CORPS HUE PNB  
 433 MAW DNG RVN  
 407 MAR DIV DNG HA  
 20

THE C-THIRD MAR DIV DNG DASC  
 SUBJECT: ADJUSTMENT OF ICIZ BUFFER ZONES REF DPMSC-031050 MAR  
 407 AF NSC 21 155 MAR 1968.

1. REFERENCE MESSAGES EXTRA LISHED BUFFER ZONES IN CONJUNCTION WITH  
 FRIENDLY FORCES OPERATING NEAR THE SVN/LAOTIAN BORDER. AS A RESULT  
 OF THE TERMINATION OF OPERATION DEWEY CANYON, THE EXPANSION OF  
 OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN/MA IN CRA G AND OPERATION MASS STRIKER,  
 REQUEST THE BUFFER ZONES OUTLINED IN REFERENCE A & B BE CANCELLED  
 AND NEW BUFFER ZONES AS INDICATED BELOW BE INITIATED. EFFECTIVE  
 2000Z/00 MAR 68. A. PURPLE MARTIN/MA IN CRA G. FROM LAOS/RVN

A-3

COC

1. 2 RUMLOP 2614 SECRET  
 DEPLER AT YD 656679 WESTWARD ALONG THE HOVA NAM O RIVER TO YD 610655  
 THENCE SOUTHWARD PARALLELING THE LAOS/SVN BORDER AT A DISTANCE  
 OF 2 KMS TO YD 980 33 AND THENCE TO THE LAOS/SVN BORDER AT YD 010165.  
 2. MASS STRIKER. FROM THE RVN/LAOS BORDER AT YC 390860 TO YC 392810  
 AND PARALLELING THE BORDER AT A DISTANCE OF 5 KM TO YC 470720, THENCE  
 EASTWARD TO INTERSECT THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF SPECIFIED STRIKE  
 AREA STRIKER AT YC 526720

29

3

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

G-3 PLANS ROUTING

Plans Off

File

Museum  
South

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

IMMEDIATE 221830 Z JAN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MAJ DIV REG  
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHIB  
 INFO: CG III MAJ DIV  
 CG 101ST ABN DIV C&G  
 CG 1ST MAJ DIV  
 CG 4TH ARVN DIV HQ  
 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

//SECRET// JTH MAJOR REPT

(S) NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO CONDUCT MAJOR COMBINATION

- A. REF TO 342105 DTD 10 NOV 67  
 B. CG XXIV CORPS REG 525-1 OF 15 OCT 68  
 C. CG THIRD MAJ DIV MSG 150230Z JAN 68

1. (U) PURSUANT TO REFERENCES (A), (B), AND (C) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

A. (S) OPERATION CODE NAME: LEXY CANYON

B. (S) BACKGROUND: THE OBJECTIVE AREA IS LOCATED IN THE  
 AND LOGISTIC AREA FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE AREA IS LOCATED IN  
 THUA THIEN PROVINCE, AND QUANG NAM PROVINCE, 100 KM SOUTH OF  
 BASE AREA 611 IN LAOS, BASE AREA 101 SOUTHWEST OF DANG PHU AND SOUTH OF  
 OF RUE. HEAVY VEHICULAR TRAFFIC HAS BEEN REPORTED ACCORDING TO THE  
 PORTION OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA. A MAJOR ENGINEER HAS REPORTED ON A ROAD  
 AREA, PARTICULARLY IN THE VICINITY OF TIGER LAKE (YD 1051000). SMALL  
 AIRCRAFT FIRE INCIDENTS HAVE SLIGHTLY DECREASED DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS.

C. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: THE THIRD MAJ DIVISION WILL CONDUCT  
 TION B LEXY CANYON AS A PHASED OPERATION.

PHASE 1: WITH FSB TON TAY (YD 1091200) THE 101ST ABN DIV (YD 106266)  
 (YD 106266) WILL BE OPENED ON D-1 AND EXPANDED TO ACCORD WITH THE

PAGE 1 OF 2

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PHASE II: INCLUDES THE ASSEMBLY OF A BATTAL OF ONE REGIMENT, ONE BATTALION, AND OCCUPATION OF A PERIMETER (1000) WITHIN 1000 METERS OF THE SHORE.

PHASE III: INCLUDES THE ASSEMBLY OF ONE BATTALION, ONE BATTALION, AND OCCUPATION OF AN AREA WITHIN 1000 METERS OF THE PERIMETER, THE PERIMETER OF THE FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT, AND THE PERIMETER WITH ASSOCIATED BATTALION, SUPPORTING ARTILLERY BATTALION, AND ARTILLERY.

PHASE IV: INCLUDES THE ASSEMBLY OF ONE BATTALION, ONE BATTALION, AND OCCUPATION OF AN AREA WITHIN 1000 METERS OF THE PERIMETER, THE PERIMETER OF THE FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT, AND THE PERIMETER WITH ASSOCIATED BATTALION, SUPPORTING ARTILLERY BATTALION, AND ARTILLERY.

PHASES II, III, AND IV WILL BE COMPLETED SUCCESSIVELY, AND THE PERIMETER OF THE FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT, AND THE PERIMETER WITH ASSOCIATED BATTALION, SUPPORTING ARTILLERY BATTALION, AND ARTILLERY.

1. (S) THE ORGANIZATION:

UNITED MAR DIV

9TH MARINE CORPS (1000)

1ST BN (1000)

2ND BN (1000)

3RD BN (1000)

2ND BN, 12TH MARINE CORPS (1000)

CO C, 3RD MARINE BN

1. (S) THE DENEY CANYON AND ITS BOUNDED TERRAIN ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE WEST GRID LINE, ON THE WEST AND SOUTH BY THE LAOTIAN BORDER, THE TONKIN RIVER, THE QUANG TRI/PHU THUAN BORDER, AND THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE CONG MICH RIVER SOUTH TO THE LAOTIAN BORDER.

1. D-DAY 22 JAN 1969

1. ESTIMATED DURATION: 24 DAYS

PAGE 10 OF 10 PAGES

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SECRET

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1

1

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**SECRET**

(320)

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ

02 HUNSD 1241 0020149

NY 00588

030110Z MAR 69 Tel 1036/KPH

1. THIRD BORDIV CUC DON

2. FOURTH BATTLES FSC

3. 1TH FSC

SECRET L I M D I S

STOLIGHT

1. THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS HAS BEEN MADE ON TOT FOR QT 8404.  
 THE CORRECT TOT IS 231135H MAR 69.

00-4

10

1241

00 CRAD

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(321)

DRAFTED BY: WWB/RKR  
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION  
CWO

PRIORITY 230344 Z MAR69

COPY TO: G-2  
G-3  
RECON REP  
FSC  
COC  
CIC  
TIO

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: CG TF HOTEL  
INFO: THIRD MARINES  
FOURTH MARINES  
NINTH MARINES  
TWELFTH MARINES  
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)  
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH ARMY GRP  
FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES  
SECOND BN, TWELFTH MARINES  
THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES  
FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MARINES  
FIRST BN, FORTIETH ARTY  
FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARTY  
FIRST BN, SEVENTY-SEVENTH ARMORED  
FIRST BN, ELEVENTH INF  
THIRD RECON BN  
THIRD BN, FOURTH MARINES  
FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES  
THIRD SQUADRON, FIFTH MECH

**SECRET**

SENSOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN, PERIOD ENDING 2400 23 MAR 69 (U)

A. 1710Z  
A. 170020Z MAR69

1. (S) AND FOL TO REF A:

STRING	CH/TONE CODE	KILL ZONE	TGT #	READOUT SITE	TYPE TERRAIN
64223	08/11,12,13,14	XD70804965 XD71464945	SD0223 SD1223	BAT CAT & HILL 950	OPEN, EL GRASS
64227	08/05,06,07,08	XD70324495 XD71264538	SD0227 SD1227	BAT CAT & HILL 950	OPEN, EL GRASS
64226	26/06,08,11,21	XD69964690 XD70764660	SD0226 SD1226	BAT CAT & HILL 950	OPEN, EL GRASS
63142	26/24,25,26,27	XD68145276 XD67365326	SD0142 SD1142	BAT CAT & HILL 950	OPEN, EL GRASS

GR 4

CON 2-198 RELEASED BY *McDowell* TIME 1100 H MAR69

**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL  
RIT'D.

(4) OPN IRON MOUNTAIN: 1 INCOMING INCIDENT  
AND 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD KIA WND  
4 FRD WIA (EVAC).  
B. 2ND ARVN DIV/12TH BTA:  
(1) RF/PF UNITS: 5 SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D.  
CUM TOTALS: 19 EN KIA AND 7 WPNS CAP'D WITH 6 FRD  
KIA AND 8 WIA.

6. (C) CAP UNITS: IN A DELAYED RPT 211630H, CAP 1-4-2 CONDUCTED A MORT PREPARATION (BS765849) 17 KMS NE OF QUANGNGAI CITY AND SWEEP THE ARE IN RESPONSE TO US ARMY SIGHTINGS. 4SAF WAS REC'D BY THE SWEEPING CAP AND A SECOND MORT MSN WAS FIRED. THENSWEEP WAS THEN COMPLETED AGAINST LIGHT SAF. RESULTS: 9 EN KIA, 7 PW (MIA (EVAC)) WITH 1 CIV WOUNDED. CAP 1-1-4 WHILE CROSSING A RICE PADDY (BT668284) 5 KMS WSW OF

# SECRET

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE UUNSO 11.9 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 TAM KY REC'D SAF FROM 9 VC. PTL ISLT'D THE EN PSN  
 KILLING 4 VC AND CAPT'G 1 IW. WHILE RTN'G TO OHE CAP  
 CP PTL AGAIN REC'D SAF. MCHFIRE WAS RTN'D KILLING  
 2 VC. TOTAL RESULTS: 6 EN KIA, 2 DETS AND 2 IWC  
 WITH 1 PF KIA AND 2 PF'S, 1 KIT CARSON AND 1  
 SCOUT DOG WIA (EVAC). ELSEWHERE 5 SMALL CONTACTS  
 WERE RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 18 EN KIA, 9 PW, 3 DETS AND  
 6 IWC WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 8 WIA (1 EVAC).  
 7. (C) SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES: CBT OPNS IN ICTZ RE-  
 SULTED IN 162 EN KIA, 5 PW, 11 DETS AND 31 WPNS CAPT'D.  
 ARVN FORCES ACCT'D FOR 71 EN KIA, 3 PW AND 14 WPNS  
 CAPT'D; ARVN LOSSES WERE 8 KIA AND 10 WIA. US AND  
 FMMAF RPT'D A TOTAL OF 91 EN KIA, 2 PW, 11 DETS AND  
 17 WPNS CAPT'D; US AND FMMAF LOSSES WERE 17 KIA AND  
 1134 WIA (122 EVAC).

GP-4

BT

1199

**SECRET**

322

7-10-68 ALL ADDRESSES

02Z UNCLAS  
 DE UNCLAS 000000 0001500  
 00NY 00000  
 00Z 00000000 0000 00  
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 00000 00000 00000  
 00000 00000 000  
 00 0000 00000  
 00 00 00 00 00

[illegible]

0-83 379 2514 S 2 0 0 1 1

HMM-161: 231240H, CH450, (X0115698), 30 FT AGL INT SA  
 AM WPT CAL, 1000 COCK PIT, 1 KIA  
 HMM-165: 231415H, CH450, (X0115965), 50 FT AGL, IVGJLINT SA  
 AM 30 CAL, NO HIT  
 HMM-167: 231400H, CH450, (X0115961), 50 FT AGL, MOD SA  
 AM 30 CAL, NO HIT  
 HMM-265: 231305H, CH450, (X0255601), 40 FT AGL, INT AM  
 30 CAL, NO HIT  
 HMM-354: 230925H, CH450, (X0255695), 1200 FT AGL, MOD AM  
 60 CAL, NO HIT  
 HMM-402: 231100H, CH450, (X0255995), 20 FT AGL, INT AM  
 100 CAL, 1000 COCK PIT, 13 HITS, 5 ROUNDS PASSCOMP, 1 ROUND  
 EXPLOSIVE COMP, 1 ROUND NIGHT WHEEL BRACKET, 1 SHRAPNEL HITS  
 7:11, FORCED TO LAND WILL BE RECOVERED  
 230900H, CH450, (X0255671), 50 FT AGL, MOD AM 50 CAL,  
 NO HIT  
 230900H, CH450, (X0255672), 1000 FT AGL, INT AM 10 CAL,  
 10 KIA, 2 ROUNDS COCK PIT, 10 PASS COMP, 2 MAIN ROTOR,

# SECRET

4. IT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE  
COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT ARE NOT TO BE  
A PART OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT  
OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.  
THE AMERICAN CONTINENT IS NOT  
8-4  
BT

# SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL****09**

DE DIV AND NR 629)  
V  
00 UUMSK UUMSO  
DE UUMSO 1262 0821530  
ZNY CCCCC  
O 231830Z MAR 69  
FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC  
INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC  
K FORCE HOTEL C C

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SEC OF TWO

2. 1/61 NO CONTACT

(C) 3/4 AT 231145H L/3/4 VIC 945654 OBS 2 VA MOVING EAST TO  
WEST. FIRED 81MM MSN WITH UNK RES.

(3) 1/77 AT 211030 B/1/77 VIC 293466 BULL DOZER FROM 59TH EN CO  
UNCOVERED ? BUNKERS. INSIDE BNKS FND 1 M1 CARBINE 1 SMS REP 2 IWC

(4) 3/4 CAV AT 231650H 3/4 CAV CP VIC 055614 REC'D 2 RDS RPG FIRE.  
APC HIT SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE. RETURNED FIRE. RES 1 USA KIA, 4 USA  
WIA(M) 11 NVA KIA.

(5) A/4/12 CAV NO CONTACT

(6) 1ST AMTRAC BN AT 230315H 1ST AMTRAC BN VIC 297747 RADAR  
AND STARLIGHT SCOPE SIGHTED 10-15 NVA IN TWO GROUPS

0

PAGE TWO UUMSO 1262 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
MOVING SOUTH, FIRED NGF, TANKS AND DUSTERS WITH 2 UNK RES  
C. QTCB. AT 231200H PATROL FROM QTCB VIC 282552 CHECKING OUT AREA  
OF SEC EXPLOSION SUSTAINED 3 WIA(E) 2 MEN TRIPPED SFD, 1 MAN FELL IN  
PUNGAI PIT. PATROL FND PALLET OF GREN'D, BELIVED TO HAVE BEEN DROPPED BY  
VELO. PALLET HAD BEEN BROKEN INTO. PATROL OBS 2 EV FLEEING WEST. FIRED

4.2 MORTAR MSN WITH UNK RES RES 3 WIA(E)

AT 231645 H QTCB VIC 260550 ENGAGED ?-3 VC WITH SAF. 2 VC WOUNDE AND  
CRAWLED AWAY PATROL IN PURSUIT TRIPPED SFD 3 WIA(E) SEARCH CONTINUING  
FOR VC. RES 3 WIA(E)

D. 3RD RECON BN. SEE 3RD RECON BN 24 HR SITREP. E. ARTILLERY AND  
NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. SEE 12 TH MAR 24 HR SITREP.

FQ GENERAL. CLEAR WEATHER THROUGHOUT 3RD MARDIV AO ENHANC ED OFFENSIVE  
OPNS

G. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

PATROLS	AMBUSHES	S&D	LIST	SCOUT
UNIT FT	SQD PLT	FT SQD	PLT CO	POST
3RD AR				SNIPER

---- AINE CRAG

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE UUMSOD 1262 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3/3 D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4TH MAR									
1/4	-----PURPLE MARTIN								
2/4 D	3	3	0	0	0	0	10	0	
N	0	0	0	6	0	0	8	0	
3/4 D	3	3	0	0	0	0	9	2	
N	0	0	0	9	0	0	7	1	
9TH MAR									
1/9 D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2/9 D	7	1	0	0	0	0	3	5	
N	0	0	0	7	0	0	11	0	
3/9 D	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	
N	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	
1ST BDE									
5TH INF									
1/11 D	3	0	0	0	0	1	3	8	
N	0	0	0	11	0	0	5	7	
1/6 D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

PAGE FOUR UUMSOD 1262 C O N F I D E N T I A L

0 N	0	0	27	0	0	0	0	0
1/77 D	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
N	3	1	0	3	0	0	0	0
3/5 D	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0
N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1ST MATRAC BN								
D	3	0	0	0	0	4	4	
N	0	0	4	2	0	4	5	
QTCB D	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
N	0	0	0	1	0	6	0	
D	17	16	0	0	0	31	21	
N	3	3	24	39	0	46	13	
T	21	19	24	39	0	77	34	

H. SMALL UNITS CONTACT.

PROVINCE	DATE	ACTION	FR UNIT	EN UNIT	INIT BY
COOR	TIME	SIZE/TYPER	LOSSES	LOSSES	US/VC
YD 297747	230315H	CO DEF	1ST AMTRAC	UNK	US
			NONE	UNK	
XD 945654	231145H	CO DEF	L/3/4	UNK	US
			NONE	UNK	
YD 282552	231200H	SEC PAT	QTCB	UNK	VC
			3 MIA (E)	UNK	

0

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE FIVE UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

YD 055614 231634 CO DEF 3/5 UNK VC

YD 260550 231645H PLT 1 KIA, 4 WIA 1 NVA KIA US

COMBAT 0TCB UNK

PATROL 3 WIA (E) UNK

US C DEF 12/4 UNK VC

NONE UNK

XO 818624 231735H PLT COMBAT 3/2/4 UNK US

PATROL 5 WIA (E) UNK

# 1. PACIFICATION SUPPORT

## 1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC

INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.

A. A/1/9 CONDUCTS COMBINED OPNS WITH RD/PF/CID IN MAI LOC TOAR.

B. B/1/9 CONDUCTS COMBINED OPNS IN CAMLO DISTRICT.

C. TWO SDO OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.

D. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN REGT'S THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL ARE.

2. DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PIOCC) BY 9TH MARINES, DGCB, TCB AND 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)

3. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/ HAMLET C&S DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE

GP-4

BT

176

**SECRET**323

DRAFTER 3/RED/cgw  
 SEC COC PHONE 3180  
 CWO

DATE/TIME/PRIORITY 2325/10 3 MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV DCU  
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
 9TH MARINE REGIMENT  
 INFO: XXIV CORPS PHB  
 III MAF TNG  
 THIRD MARDIV

//SECRET//

PASSAGE OF OPCON (U)

1. (S) EFFECTIVE 241600H MAR 69 CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF 9TH  
 MARINE REGIMENT (REIN) FROM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL.

CP-41

CCN 2248 RELEASED BY Morganlot DATE/TIME 24 0630 H MAR 69

COC

STAND P

323**SECRET**

**SECRET****SHOVE COC**OP CHIEF *H*G-3 W.O. *M*G-2 W.O. *Jgw*

DCPO

APO

ACTION

ZNY 025  
 02410 / MAR 68  
 FM: CG - 12 1208 WHEEL  
 TO: ZEN / WING 1208 WHEEL  
 ZEN / FOURTH MARINES  
 INFO: CG THIRD MARINE  
 CG FIRST MAW  
 TEN / NINTH MARINES  
 TWELFTH MARINES  
 ONE ONE SIX  
 ONE THREE SIX  
 ONE THREE NINE  
 FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 ZEN / VA DECRYPT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR  
 BT

SECRET

MAG ORDER 22-69

4. CG TASK FORCE WHEEL 2010-68 PG 69

24-158-002

PAGE TWO NUMBER 22-68 SECRET

1. THIRD AND FOURTH TROOPERS TO THE 12TH RECON.  
 2. COORDINATOR FOR THE 12TH RECON. TO THE  
 FOR THE 12TH RECON. TO THE 12TH RECON. TO THE  
 FOR THE 12TH RECON. TO THE 12TH RECON. TO THE

**SECRET**

C-3

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**MAT *Se**7 - Main New*

ZZ UUMSK  
 DIDUUMSQD 1276 0831215  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 Z 241215Z MAR 69  
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC  
 BT.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: MAINE CRAG INCREMENTAL CACHE REPORT NR I (C)

1. RICE 600 TONS (APPROX)

SALT 1/2 TON

SUGAR 7500 LBS

LARD 100 LBS

CAN FOOD 1 TON

POWDERED MILK 1 TON

2. TNT 1150 LBS

COMM WIRE 60 METERS

AT MINES 1

CHI COMM GRENADES 8

AK MAGAZINES 400

TRUCKS 3 (1 6X6 RUSSIAN, 1 FRENCH, AND 1 FLAT BED)

4. 122 MM RKT RDS 44

82MM MORTAR RDS 4083

RPG RDS 3000

*35' / 24 / 812 /*  
*AK*

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1276 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SMALL ARMS AMMO 100 I, JDS

12.7 MM AMMO 5 BEL

JWC 2 (10 AK 50, 199 AK 47)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL***XXIV Corps Msg*

UNRECORDED

UNRECORDED 1450 0831625

ZNY CCCCC

241533Z MAR 69

FM XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

TO DUMSO/111 MAF COC ONG

FROM UHNS/MACV CMD CTR SGN

SUBJ 241533Z MAR DIV COC DON

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ MAINE CRAG CACHE RPT

1. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF CACHE FINDINGS IN OPERATION MAINE CRAG

FOR PERIOD 22-24 MAR 69.

WGT 600 TONS (APPROX)

WGT 1000 LBS

WGT 7,500 LBS

WGT 100 LBS

CANNED FOOD 1 TON

POWDERED MILK 1 TON

TNT 1,150 LBS

COMM WIRE 600 METERS

TRUCKS 3 (1 RUSSIAN G/6, 1 FRENCH, 1 FLATBED)

PAGE TWO DUMSK 1452 C O N F I D E N T I A L

22 MM RKTs RDS 44

30MM MORT RDS 4,083

APG RDS 3,000

SMALL ARMS 103, 280 RDS

12.7MM AMMO 5,000 RDS

INC 269 (10 AK-50, 199 AK-47) 119 PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN PARA 3,

THIRD MAR DIV COC MSG DTG 222200Z MAR 69, MAINE CRAG SITREP 36.

OSVC 2

SP-1

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET **N** **30N**DRAFTED BY: MAS/RKR  
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION  
CWODATE) **01/3**

Z MAR69

COPY TO: G-2

G-3

RECON REP

FSC

CI

TIO

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN  
 TO: CG III MAF, IG, RVN  
 INFO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN  
 CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN  
 CG FORLOGCMD, DNG, RVN  
 CG FIRST MAW, DNG, RVN  
 CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN  
 FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)  
 100TH ALPHA, NK THAI  
 CG FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THIRD RECON WING, KORAT, THAI  
 FOURTH MARINES  
 THIRD MARINES  
 NINTH MARINES

SECRET/NOFORN

DUFFEL BAG/DUEL BLADE OPREP-5 SER NO 012/18-2 MAR 69 (U)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

SECTION I. FOL DUFFEL BAG REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: NO TARGETS WERE ACQUIRED BY DUFFEL BAG SENSORS  
 THIS WEEK. STRINGS 140 AND 141 LOCATED IN MAI LOC TAOR EXPIRED.

STRINGS 306, 307, AND 308 WERE EMPLACED ALONG THE APPROACHES TO  
 QUANG TRI CITY TO PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DETECTION. FOUR

UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO CLANDESTINELY INSERT STRINGS IN THE BA LONG  
 VALLEY WERE ENCOUNTERED.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: A NEW READOUT SITE WAS ESTABLISHED AT  
 SIGNAL HILL, VCB TO READ OUT PLANNED SENSOR EMPLACEMENTS IN THE BA

LONG VALLEY. ONE INSERT MISSION WAS ABORTED BECAUSE TWO GSIDS  
 WERE NOT FUNCTIONING WHEN EMPLACEMENT ATTEMPTED. SECOND MISSION

ABORTED WHEN SENSOR EMPLACEMENT MAN INJURED ON INSERT AND REQUIRED  
 MED EVAC. THIRD MISSION EXPERIENCED COMM DIFFICULTIES WITH READOUT

SITE SO TEAM MOVED TOWARD VICINITY OF YD097423 WHEN THEY ENCOUNTERED  
 TWO VC. TY INITIATED SAF RESULTING IN 1 KIA AND ONE FEMALE WIA.

THREE MORE NVA/VC APPEARED, TM FIRED CLAYMORE RESULTING IN 3 ADDTL  
 KIA. TM MOVED TO LZ AND ENCOUNTERED 1 MORE NVA/VC, TM INITIATED SAF

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

6 51

/R. COO.

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SECRET

I

RESULTING IN 1 KIA. WIA LATER DIED. FOURTH ~~EMPLACEMENT~~ MISSION  
ENCOUNTERED 7 NVA/VC VICINITY YD072420 TM SET UP ~~AMBUSH~~ AND

INITIATED ~~SAF~~ RESULTING IN 5 KIA. OVERALL RESULTS OF ALL CONTACTS  
WAS 11 EN KIA (C) AND 3 FRNDLY WIA (M) CAPTURED EN EQUIP WAS

1/AK-47, 2 PACKS, 20 LBS RICE AND MISC GEAR.

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS NONE DISCERNED.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPS: PLANS UNDERWAY TO SWEEP BA LONG VALLEY  
AS SOON AS TACT SITUATION PERMITS IN VIEW OF MANY EN ENCOUNTERED  
DURING ~~EMPLACEMENT~~ MISSIONS.

C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUE: NONE

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS:

(1) TRAINING: NONE

(2) ~~EMPLACEMENT~~: EN CONTACTS AND ~~INJURY~~ PREVENTED FOUR  
EMPLACEMENTS.

(3) READOUT ~~VALIDITY~~: NONE

(4) RFI: NONE

(5) ~~SERVICEABILITY~~: TWO GSIDS DID NOT OPERATE AFTER  
REACHING ~~EMPLACEMENT~~ SITE ALTHOUGH MINISIDS DID. IT APPEARS

GSID MAY BE MUCH MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO DAMAGE WHEN TRAVERSING OVER  
ROUGH TERRAIN, SINCE ALL ITEMS CHECKED OUT 5-BY PRIOR TO DEPARTING  
FOR ~~EMPLACEMENT~~ SITE.

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: NINE

4. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSOR 12 HANDSID; 11 ~~MINI~~HANDSID; 8 MAGIDS;  
3 GSIDS; 2 PIRIDS.

5. (S) ONE XM63 TRANSMITTER AND 4 XM63 RECEIVERS PRESENTLY BEING  
EMPLOYED BY 1ST BN, 11TH INFANTRY SCOUT SNIPER TEAMS. RESULTS

HAVE NOT BEEN OBTAINED TO THIS DATE.

SECTION II. FOL DUEL BLADE REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: SINCE LAST OPREP 7 TFA STRINGS AND TWO HAND  
EMPLACED STRINGS WERE RESEEDD IN DUEL BLADE AREA. PREVIOUSLY

SECRET

# SECRET

DECEASED STRING 115 ~~WAS~~ BACK TO LIFE FOR A PERIOD OF 3 DAYS AND ACQUIRED 12 TARGETS. STRINGS 119 AND 111 IN THE EAST-CENTRAL

PORTION OF DMZ BORDER WERE ESPECIALLY ACTIVE WITH 39 TGTS ACQUIRED. ONE ARTY MSN ON LATTER TGT RESULTED IN ONE SECONDARY EXPLOSION. STRING

111 ALSO DETECTED TWO GRPS OF 350 AND 70 EN WITH ONE AIR STRIKE AND ONE MECHANIZED SWEEP WITH NEG BDA. THESE HIGH READINGS HAVE BEEN

FULLY VALIDATED BY SUBSEQUENT HEAVY EN CONTACTS IN 4TH MARINES AND 1ST BDE, 5TH INF (MECH) AO. TWO RECENTLY ACTIVATED DIV GRND

SURV TMS EQUIPPED WITH DUEL BLADE PPS-5, TVS-4, AND MSS-3 WERE ESPECIALLY VALUABLE IN DETECTING THREE EN THRUSTS AT A-4 AND C-2.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: IN ARVN AO SIX TGTS WERE ACQUIRED WITH STRING 102 ACCOUNTING FOR 5 OF THE TOTS IN WHICH 600 RDS OF ARTY

AND NGF WERE FIRED IN RESPONSE. TFA SEEDED STRING 211 HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY VALUABLE IN PROVIDING SECURITY TO FSB ALPINE WITH 11

TGTS ACQUIRED. ELSEWHERE IN DUEL BLADE AREA 87 TOTS WERE ACQUIRED WITH 1345 RDS MIXED ARTY, MTRS AND DUSTERS FIRED IN RESPONSE.

OTHER THAN ONE PREV MENTIONED SECONDARY EXPLOSION ALL WERE NEG BDA. TWO NVA KIA (C) WERE CREDITED TO NOW DECEASED STRING 114 WHEN

EMPLACEMENT TM SWEEP AREA FOR RESEEDING AND FOUND TWO EN BODIES IN KILL ZONE THAT WERE KILLED BY ARTY APPROX 2 WEEKS AGO. NOD

ACQUIRED TWO NVA CARRYING WHAT APPEARED TO BE RPG, 81M MSN CALLED RESULTING IN 2 NVA KIA (C).

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: EN CONTINUES TO BE DETECTED IN INFILTRATIONS AND PROBINGS BY SENSORS AND SURVEILLANCE DEVICES.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS: INCREASED FRNDLY OPS IN AREAS OF HIGH SENSOR ACTIVITY HAVE CONTINUED TO MEET HEAVY EN CONTACTS,

ESPECIALLY IN CENTRAL AND NORTHWESTERN PORTIONS OF DIV AO SOUTH OF DMZ.

C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES: NONE

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS: NONE

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: 17 HANDSID/GSID/PIRID/MAGID; 9 ADSID; 2 ACOUBUOY.

4. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSORS: 34 MINI/HANDSIDS; 9 GISDS; 37 ADSIDS; 3 MAGIDS; 2 PIRIDS; 11 ACOUBUCYS.

SECRET

SECRET ,

5. (S) ACTIVE TFA CH-23 TONE CODES 16 THRU 19, 07 THRU 09, 11.  
ACTIVE 3D MARDIV CH-23 TONE CODES 03, 04, 08.

GP-1

CCN

RELEASED BY MA [signature] TIME 0920 H MAR 69

PAGE OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL****SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

G-2 W.O.

DADA

PO

ACTION

OO RUMHVP RUMLBPN  
 DE RUMLBPM #1259 0540330  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 250332 MAR 69  
 PP C IS INF Du: F DIV (M) STR R  
 TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV

INFO RUMLBPN/CG XXIV CORPS  
 ZEN/CO 1-11 INF  
 ZEN/CO 1-61 INF  
 ZEN/CO 1-77 ARMOR  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE 1774 AVBL-B 3D MAR DIV ATTN:G-2

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ENEMY CONTACT ON 241030H MAR 69.

1. CONTACT WAS INITIATED AT 241030H MAR 69 VIC YD047624 AGAINST AN ENEMY COMPANY DUGIN VIC YD045623 AND YD041616. AT 241115H MAR A BUNKER

COMPLETED OCCUPIED BY AN ESTIMATED ENEMY PLATOON WAS SIGHTED VIC YD059632. BUNKERS WERE ALSO SEEN VIC YD050615. ENEMY TROOPS EMPLOYED SMALL AHMS AND RPG FIRE AGAINST THE 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV. USMC GUNSHIPS RECEIVED HEAVY GROUND FIRE WHILE IN SPECTING A LZ AT YD038628. FIRE RECEIVED WAS 50 CAL FROM THE EAST. TWO TRACK VEHICLES (1 TANK - 1 VTR) STRUCK MINES VIC YD070619 AT 241350H MAR RESULTING IN 7 FR WIA (E). THE ENEMY

MAINTAINED CONTACT UNTIL 241730H MAR AT WHICH TIME ENEMY FIRE CEASED.  
 2. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV IS IN CONTACT WITH AN

PAGE TWO RUMLBPM 1259 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 ENEMY BATTALION DUE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF 2 SEPARATE MANEUVER ELEMENTS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE VALLEY MOUTH. ALSO, THE RECEIVING OF 50 CAL MG FIRE FROM AN LZ VIC YD038623. APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY WAS DEFENDING THE MOUTH OF THE VALLEY TO PROTECT SOMETHING OF PRIME IMPORTANCE - POSSIBLY A REGIMENTAL HQ. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE ENEMY ELEMENT IS A BN OF THE 27TH NVA REGT SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO OPERATE IN THIS AREA.

3. CONTACT WAS RESUMED AT 250930H MAR VIC YD047635 WHEN 20 ENEMY WERE SIGHTED AND ENGAGED.

RESULTS AS OF 251000H MAR: FRIENDLY - 1 KIA, 13 WIA  
 ENEMY - 14 KIA (CONFIRMED)

GP-4

29

76?

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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UUMUSO UUMSIFA

DD U-J 13 6, 83 2545

ZNY CCCCC

O P 250545Z MAR 69 T6R1

FM IIP MAF COC

TO UUMSOI/I CORPS TOC

UUMJI/XXIV CORPS TOC

UUMUOG/FIRST MARDI

SOM/FIRST MIWTOPNS

UUMSOR/SECOND 20KMC IDE

UUMSOA/AMERICAN DIV TOC

INYO UUMSOO/THIRD MARDI

UUMSJEA/ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV (AM)

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FPNAL SECTION OF TWOHSECTIONU

1/5TH REGT AND A RECOL 1/5TH REGT) ON OPN CT 25 KND

NUMEROUS EN CA VIC BU627684 5HKMS SSW OK QUANG NGAI

CITY. CAU WERE ATTRIBUTED TO SPOOKY WHICH HAD BEEN

WORKING OUT IN THE AREA. TOTAL FIND: 63 E KIA, 2

PW AND 6 IWC. ELYEMBER 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM

TOTALS: 91 EN KIA, 2 PW, AND 6 IWC WITH 6 KRD KIA

(4) DI 25: CONT'D WITH 1 SMALL CONTACT

PAGE TWO. UUMUO 1616 C O N F I D E N T I A L

RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 2 EN KIA AND 1 IWC WITH NO FRO

CAS RPT'D.

(5) HQ/CT/732. A UANG TIN SECTO CONTROLLED

- ) CLEARING OPNS ALONG THE ROAD BETWEEN TAM KY AM

TIEN PHUOC COMMENCED AT 250700H. 1/6 AND 1/46 RK

ARE COMMITTED ALONG THE ROAD FOR 1 DAY.

6. (C) CAP UNIT: A PLT FROM CAP 1-3-5 OBU 10 NVA

IN KHAKI UNIFORMS (PS749668 11 KTS NE OF BINH UON.

THE PTL OPENED FIRE, CALLED ARTY AND UNEPT THE AREA.

DURING THE SWEEP THE PLT AGAIN REC'D SAF AND CALLED

ON FIRE SPT FROM SWIVROATU. RESULTS: 7 EN KIA AND

1 IWC 35, 9 14S :-7 405'D. ELSEWHERE 1 INCOMING

INCIDENT AND 6 SMALL CONTACT WERE RPT'D. CUM

TOTALS: 10 EN KIA, 1 PW, 1 DET AND 1 IWC WITH 1 KRD

KIA AND 4 WIA (2 EVAC).

7. CC&amp; SUMMARY OF CAUALTIES: CBT OPVS IN ICTZ RE-

SULTED IN 112 EN KIA, 17 DETS A. ????S

CAPT'D. ARVN FORCED W. W'D FOR 21 EN KIA, AND 15 WPNH

CAPT'D. ARVN LOSSEU W. 1 KIA AND 29 WIA. US AND

FWMAF RPT'D A TOTAL OF 91 EN KIA, 2 PW, 17 DETU AND

PAGE THREE UUMUB 1611 C O N F I D E N T I A L

107 WPNH CAPT'D; US AND FWMAF LOSSEU WERE 14 KIA AND

84 WIA (67 EVAC). A

CP-4

161 **61****CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE UUMSC 1615 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 COM TOTALS: 9 ENPKIA, 3 IWC AND 2 CSWC WITH 3 FRD  
 WIA.

3. (C) THUA THIEN PROVINCE:

1. 101ST ABN DIV(AM); 4/1/572 INF WHILE ON A  
 SEARCH AND CLEAR MSN (YC504973) 3 KMS S' OF FSB  
 VEHICLE, FND 7 EN BODIES APPARENTLY KILLED BY ARTY.  
 ELSEWHERE 2 SMALL CONTACTS, 2 BODYAMP FINDS AND 2  
 HELO INCIDENTS RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 13 EN KIA AND 4 IWC  
 WITH 4 FR KIA AND 4 WIA (EVAC).

B. 1ST ARVN DIV/1ST BTA:

(1) 1ST ARVN REGT: OPN LAM SON 261 CONT'D WITH  
 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 2 EN KIA AND 2  
 IWC WITH NO. FRD CAS RPT'D.

(2) 3RD ARVN REGT: OPN LAM SON 261 CONT'D  
 WITH 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 EN KIA  
 AND 1 IWC WITH NO. FRD CAS RPT'D.

(3) 54TH ARVN REGT: OPN LAM SON 245 CONT'D  
 WITH 1 WPVN FIND RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 MG CAPT'D.

(4) 7TH ARVN CAV REGT: OPN LAM SON 272  
 CONT'D WITH 1 MINE INCIDENT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 4

PAGE FOUR UUMSC 1615 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 FRD WIA.

(5) RF/PFHUNITS: NO CONTACT OR CAY RPT'D.

4. (C) QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND BORDERING AREA W/OF  
 HAI VAN PASS.

A. 1ST MRD DIV CUM TOTALS: 14 EN KIA, 1 PW,  
 16 DETS AND 2 IWC WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 14 WIA (11 EVAC).

(1) DAVANG TAOR: YAVANG AIR BASE REC'D  
 15X140MM RKT RESULTING IN DEST OF FUEL BLADDER AND  
 JP-4 LINE, MODERATE DAMTTO PARA LOFT AND MINOR DAM  
 TO ONE JEEP. THERE WAS 1 US WIA (MINOR) ELSEWHERE 2  
 OTHER INCOMM INCIDENTS, 5 MINE INCIDENTS, 16 SMALL  
 CONTACTS, 1 RECON FI AND 1 WP FPND RPT'D. CUM  
 TOTALS: 14 EN KIA, 1 PW, 16 DETS AND 2 IWC WITH 1  
 FRD KIA AND 14 WIA (11 EVAC).

B. ARVN OPNS:

(1) RF/PF UNITS: 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D.  
 CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD WIA.

(2) 1ST ARVN REGT: OPN LE LOI IV HAF  
 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 3 EN KIA AND 1  
 IWC WITH 3 FRD WIA.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE FIVE UUMSO 1615 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 (3) HUNG QUANG 1-07 CONT'D WITH NO CONTACT OR  
 CAS RPT'D.

C. 2ND ROKMC BDE: NO CONTACT OR CAS RPT'D.

5. (C) QUAN TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES:

A. AMERICAL DIV: CUM TOTALS: 42 EN KIA WITH

" FR KIA AND 16 MIA (?7 EVAC).

(1) OPN FREDERICK HILL: 11 INCOMING INCIDENT,  
 5 MINE INCIDENTS AND 6 SMALL CONTACTS WERE RPT'D.\*  
 CUM TOTALS: 9 EN KIA WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 8 MIA (EVAC&.

(2) OPN GENEVA PARK: A BTRY,  
 3/18TH ARTY IN SPT OF CID PTL, ENGAGED 100 VC IN  
 BASE CAMP AREA (BS267866) 8 KMS WSW OF TRA BONG.  
 RESULTS: 10 EN KIA WITH 1 US MIA (EVAC) (FO).  
 ELSEWHERE 2 INCOMING INCIDENTS AND 1 SMALL CONTACT  
 RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 11 EN KIA WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 6  
 MIA (EVAC).

(3) OPN RUSSELL BEACH: 1 MINE INCIDENT RPT'D.  
 CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD KIA AND 2 MIA (EVAC).

(4) OPN IRON MOUNTAIN. TRA BONG DET A/107  
 ON A CO-SIZE CIDG OPN, SAMM USHD BY 2 VC PLTS

PAGE SIX UUMSO 1615 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 (BS275863) 7 KMS OF TRA BONG. THE CIDG ASLT'D  
 THE EN PSNS. RESULTS: 19 EN KIA WITH 1 CID KIA  
 4 CID MIA (EVAC) AND 3 US MIA (1 EVAC). A/4/21  
 INF REC'D 40 AMF FROM 3 EN BUNKERS (BS525752) 13  
 MS WNW OF CI JG NGAI CITY. GUNSHIPS WORKED THE  
 BUNKERS OVER AND A SWEEP WAS MADE FINDING 5 DEAD  
 NVA. AT 1720H, E/1 CA AND RECON 4/21 REC'D AMF  
 ZUSTAININ 9 MIA (3 EVAC). OVER THE NEXT 3 HRS  
 A/4/21 INF WHILE INYNDP REC'D 28X82MM MORT RDS.  
 RESULTING IN 6 FR MIA (3 EVAC). TOTALS: 5 ENH KIA  
 WITH 15 FRD WPA (6 EVAC). ELSEWHERE 1 INCOMING  
 INCIDENT, " MINE INCIDENTS AND 3 SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D.  
 B. NO ARVN DIV/12TH DTA:

(1) RF/PF UNITS: 3 SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D.  
 CUM TOTALS: 9 EN VIA AND 3 WPMS CAPT'D WITH 1 FRD  
 VIA AND 11 MIA.

(2) 5TH ARVN EGT: OPN QUYET THANG 806  
 CONT'D WIT NO CONTACT OR CAS RPT'D.

(3) QUYET THANG 25: RVN UNITS (1/4 ACAT,  
 GP24

CT

1615

11

LNNHM

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET****325**DRAFTER 15:DCM:SLQ  
SEC DIV ENGR PHONE DGH 3215  
CWO *Dwg*PRIORITY 250648t 2 MARCH 1969FM: CG, THIRD MARDEIV DGH  
TO: COMNAVFORV REP ING  
INFO: III MAF ING**S E C R E T**

FY 71 MILITARY CONST PROGRAM FOR THIRD MARDEIV (U)

A. III MAF MSG 100840Z MAR69 (U)

1. IAW REF A. THE FOIL REQUIREMENTS ARE SUB:

A. BILLETING REQUIREMENTS FOR QTCB

- (1) 16'X32' SEAHUTS FOR QTCB
- (2) CONSTRUCT 405 SEAHUTS FOR BILLETING TO REPLACE EXISTING FAC
- (3) CAT CODE: 722
- (4) SCOPE: 405 SEAHUTS (16'X32')
- (5) UNIT OF MEASURE: 207,360 SQ FT
- (6) EST COST: \$293,919

(7) JUSTIFICATION: AT THE TIME FY 71 PROGRAM WILL GO INTO EFFECT, IT IS DEEMED NECESSARY THAT ~~THE~~ <sup>405</sup> SEAHUTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO BE REPLACED DUE TO AGE OF STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS CAUSING DETEIORATION.

B. BILLETING REQUIREMENTS FOR DONG HA COMBAT BASE

- (1) 16'X32' SEAHUTS FOR DHCB
- (2) CONSTRUCT 670 SEAHUTS FOR BILLETING TO REPLACE EXISTING FAC
- (3) CAT CODE: 722
- (4) SCOPE: 670 SEAHUTS (16'X32')
- (5) UNIT OF MEASURE: 343,040 SQ FT
- (6) EST COST: \$186,286

(7) JUST: SEAHUTS REQUIRED TO REPLACE FIELD STANDARDS WHICH HAVE DETEIORATED DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.

ENGR

12 *Dwg***SECRET**

**SECRET****C. MESSHALLS AT QTCB AND DHCB**

- (1) 500 AND 250 MAN MESSHALLS AT DHCB AND QTCB
- (2) CONSTRUCT (2) 500 MAN MESSHALLS AT QTCB, (2) 500 MAN  
MESSHALLS AT <sup>DH</sup>QTCB, (3) 250 MAN MESSHALLS AT QTCB, AND (2) 250 MAN  
MESSHALLS AT DHCB
- (3) CAT CODE: 723
- (4) SCOPE: (4) 500 MAN MESSHALLS AND (5) 250 MAN MESSHALLS
- (5) EST COST: UNKNOWN
- (6) JUST: MESSHALLS REQUIRED TO REPLACE FIELD STANDARDS WHICH  
HAVE DETERIORATED DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.

CCN 2424 REL BY JR Lilley TIME \_\_\_\_\_**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

VV  
 00 UUMSK  
 DE UUMSQD 1305 0841130  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 0 251130Z MAR 69  
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TO C  
 BT

*700/1210/XXIV*

CONFIDENTIAL  
 AGC CUMULATIVE CACHE REPORT NUMBER  
 1. CUMULATIVE CACHE STATISTICS AS OF 251800H MAR 69  
 A. RICE 1000 TONS  
 SALT 7000 LBS  
 SUGAR 7500 LBS  
 LARD 100 LBS  
 CAN FOOD 1 TON  
 POWDERED MILK 1 TON  
 B. TNT 1190 LB  
 COMM WIRE 600 METERS  
 AT MINES 1  
 CHI COMM GRENADES 8  
 AR MAGZINES 409  
 CLAYMORES 11

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1305 C O N I D E T I L  
 FUZES 75

CLOTHES 40 SMALL BUNDLES  
 PLASTIC WRAPPING 2 ROLLS

PACKS 25

GAS MASKS 3

E-TOOLS 2

C. TURCKS 3

D. 122MM RKT RDS 44

82MM MORTAR RDS 592

60MM MORTAR RDS 143

RPG-2 RDS 3003.

12.7MM AMMO 7500

SMALL ARMS AMMO 103,280

37MM RDS 8

D. IWC 209

CSWC 13(INCLUDES 6 RPG'S)


F. NOTE 82MM AMMO IN PARAGRAPH D. FIGURE IN REPORT NO 1  
 SHOULD HAVE BEEN 483 VIC 4083. FIGURE OF 592 IS CORRECT FOR THIS REPORT.

GP-4

BT

1305

N



00 UUMSQ UUMS UUMSQ  
 02 UUMSK 1476 02 0757  
 000000  
 0 251423Z MAR 69  
 01 XXIV CORPS TOC PTH  
 03 UUMSQ/III MAP COC DNG  
 04 UUMS/NACV CMD STR SGN  
 05 UUMSQ/ 3D MAR DIV COC DCH  
 06

07 0 N M I D E N T I A L  
 08 0 B J : H A I N E C R A G C A C H E R F T .  
 09 1 ( C ) C U M U L A T I V E S T A T I S T I C S O F C A C H E F I N D I N G S I N O P E R A T I O N M A I N E  
 10 C R A G A S O F 251420H MAR 69:  
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C-3 W/O. *MD*

0300 TWC UUMSK 1476 C O N F I D E N T I A L

D E N T I A L

CLAYMORES 11  
 FUZES 75

CLOTH: 40 SMALL BUNDLES

PLASTIC WRAPPING 2 ROLLS

PACKS 25

GAS MASKS 7

E-TOOLS 2

TRUCKS 3 (1 5KG RUSSIAN, 1 FRENCH, AND 1 FLAIBED)

120MM RKT RDS 41

82MM MORTAR RDS 502

82MM MORTAR RDS 143

RPG-2 RDS 3000

12.7MM AMMO 7500

55MM ARMO AMMO 103,280

37MM RDS 8

100 200

COUNC 18 ( INCLUDES 6 RPG'S )

0300 82MM MORT AMMO IN PARAGRAPH 1, XXIV CORPS TOC MSG DTG

241533Z MAR 69, SHOULD HAVE BEEN 485 VICE 4,983. FIGURE OF 592 IN

PARA 1 ABOVE TO CORRECT AS OF THIS RPT. 0974

01

076

43

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OSL AT 1731  
 WKILOZCZCEAA495  
 00 UUMSK  
 DE UUMSQ 1633 0341645  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 251645Z MAR 69  
 FM III MAF CO  
 TO UUMSK/XXI CORPS COC  
 INFO UUMSQ/TWRID MARDIV COC  
 BT

C O N I D E N T I A L / W I R E N O T E

STATISTICAL DATA TO OPERATION DEWEY CANYON (U)

A. XXIV CORPS FINAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY SUBMITTED TO III MAF  
 G-2 ON OPERATION DEWEY CANYON.

STATISTICAL RECAP FOR OPERATION DEWEY CANYON PREPARED BY  
 CAPT T. H. MEEVER (3RD MARDIV FACT SHEET).

1. (C) PERCEPTIBLE DISPARITIES EXIST BETWEEN REFERENCES A  
 AND ON FOLLOWING ITEMS:

REF REPORTED

ITEM

REF B REPORTED

BT KIA

IFT

DOW

DFT

15  
 1126

1227  
 244

ALLOW! AMMO

PAGE TWO UUMSQ 1633 'O. F I E N T I A L / W I R E N O T E

6533	50 CAL	175983
69641	12.7MM	65126
19474	3MM TR	23281
5982	12MM MTR	4983
1408	12MM ARTY	7298
328	12MM RKT	770
5	CLAYMORE MINES	444
3321 LBS	EXPLOSIVES	1910-1/2 LBS
34164	NO RENADES	50293
132691 LBS	RICE	22080 LBS
13	TRUCK (CAPTR/DEST)	77

2. (C) IT IS FURTHER NOTED THAT THE TYPES OF IWC AND  
 CSWC ARE INCONGRUOUS IN THE REFERENCES. -

3. (C) IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU RECONCILE THE  
 DIFFERENCES CITED HEREIN AND PROVIDE THIS HEADQUARTERS  
 WITH CORRECT FIGURES AT THE EARLIEST.

GP-4

BT



*Let's - get  
 WG-2 and  
 have G-2  
 check*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

13 JUMSQ JUMSEMA JUMSRO JUMSJA RUMGUIN  
 12 JUMSK 1434 0350132  
 KWR UUUUU  
 0 120100Z MAR 68 LFVS  
 XXIV CORPS TOC OP.  
 TO JUMSQ/III MAF CCG DNG  
 INFO JUMSEMA/5. 1ST ARVN DIV TUE  
 JUMSRO/3RD MAR DIV CCG DNG  
 JUMSJA/101ST AEN DIV DTGC CEE  
 RUMGUIN/CTG 70.8

BT  
 UNCLASSIFIED E F T O RVTI-AC  
 SUBJ: FORECAST T OF OPS REPORT WEEK OF 30 MAR-5 APR 68  
 REF: A. CG III MAF MSG DTG 160606Z JUN 68 (C).  
 B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUL 68 (C).  
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, NEGATIVE REPORT IS SUBMITTED .PRESENT OF  
 CONTINUE IN XXIV CORP AO.

GP-4

BT

'48'

SECRET

DRAFTER 14/JMC/tel  
SEC AIR 3d MAIDIV 3214  
Z 0

IMMEDIATE 6044 Z MAR69

FM: CG THIRD MAIDIV DGH  
TO: CG XXIV C R'S PHB  
INFO: CG III MAF DNG

//SECRET//

SUBJ: M-121 REQUEST

1. REQUEST A M-121 DROP BE MADE ASAP, THE FOLLOWING INFO IS PROVIDED:
- A. XD79206201
  - B. ASAP
  - C. OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN

GP-4

CCM&

REL BY\_\_

A1.

2  
SECRET

SECRET

327

VMM  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 Z 260730Z MAR 69  
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC DG  
 TO FOURTH MAF FSC  
 INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL FSC

BT  
 SECRET LIMDIS  
 ARC LIGHT

1. THIS HEADQUARTERS IS PRESENTLY CONSIDERING CLEARANCE OF ADDITIONAL ARC LIGHT TGTS IN SUPPORT OF 4TH MARINE OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN. XXV CORPS ADVISES THAT TGTS QT 8429 AND QT 8458 MAY BE FAVORABLE CO SID KI TROOP SAFETY LIMITS CAN BE OBSERVED.
2. AT PRESENT THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS OFFH/4M AND 2/4 LOCATED AT XD 755608 AND XD 822623 RESPECTIVELY, AND FSB CATAPULT.
3. REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HEADQUARTERS ASAP WHICH IF ANY ABOVE UNITS WOULD BE MOVED TO ALLOW OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE OF ARC LIGHT TGTS Q 841 AND QT 8458.

10044

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

**SECRET****SHOVE COC**OP CHIEF *MD*G-3 W.O. *MD*G-2 W.O. *QHL*

DCFO

APO  
ACTION

000000 ZZ UUMSQ UUMS UUMSQI UUMSQD UUMSEMA

DE UUMSK 1500 0851447

ZNY SSSSS

Z 261437Z MAR 69

FM XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG

INFO UUMS/MAV CMD CTR SGN

UUMSQI/DSA I CORPS TOC DNG

UUMSQD/3D MAR DIV COC DGH

UUMSEMA/SA 1ST ARVN DIV COC HUE

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT(S)

1 (S) AT 261100H MAR 69, PATROL "MAGIC SPELL,"

VIC XD 932656 FOUND A 50-60 BNKR COMPLEX

W/LARGE TRAIL LEADING EAST. PATROL CHECKED

BNKRS AND FOUND 1-82MM MORT RD AND 2

CANS 50 CAL ANNO. PATROL "MAGIC SPELL" EXITED

DMZ AT 261600H MAR 69.

2 (S) PATROL "HARSH WORD" WALKED OUT OF

DMZ 261900H MAR 69

GP-4

BT

1500

TCD/1545/XXIV/TTT

29

**SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. UJMSQ  
 2. UJMSQ 1351 0851750  
 3. 0000  
 4. 261730Z MAR 60  
 5. 3RD MARDIV COG  
 6. UJMSQ XIV CORPS FOC  
 7. UJMSQ XIV CORPS FOC  
 8. TASK FORCE NOTE.

5.  
 6. CONFIDENTIAL FIN SEC OF TWO  
 7. 00000000

INF 1/1012	0	5	0	0	1	5	0	5
AS	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
176100	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
AS	0	9	0	0	0	0	20	0
177700	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
AS	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2750 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1ST AMTRAC BN								
00	2	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
N 0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
0000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
00	12	23	0	0	1	0	0	15
N 0	3	9	2	10	2	3	07	10
11	15	32	2	20	5	9	55	25

PAGE TWO UJMSQ 1-61 CONFIDENTIAL

1. SMALL UNITS CONTACT.

PROVINCE	DATE	ACTION	FR UNIT	EN UNIT	UNIT BY
COORD	TIME	SIZE/TYPE	LOSSES	LOSSES	US/VC
00082610	251840H	PLT PATROL	P/2/4	UNK	US
			NONE	UNK	
00285500	260050H	SNIPER	27TH MTB	UNK	VC
			1 WIA(E)	NONE	
00043620	260300H	CO DEF	A/31/11	UNK	VC
			1 KIA, 8 WIA(E)	3 NVA KIA	
00085500	260320H	CO DEF	M/3/9	UNK	US
			NONE	UNK	
00051610	261930H	CO DEF	B/3/5	UNK	VC
			1 WIA(E)	UNK	
			2 WIA(M)		
A-4	262135	CO DEF	B/1ST	UNK	US
			AMTRAC	UNK	
			NONE		
00287530	262100H	CO DEF	GTB	UNK	VC
			NONE	UNK	
00287530	262100H	CO DEF	GTB	UNK	
			POW	UNK	

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. 1ST BATTAL BUNSONG 1961 CONFIDENTIAL

2. 1ST BATTAL BUNSONG

3. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC  
INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.

4. A. 1ST BATTAL CONDUCT CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH  
REPTVONG IN MAI LAM LOU.

5. B. 1ST BATTAL CONDUCTS CO-ORDINATED OPNS IN DAW LO DISTRICT.

6. THE 300S OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH WITH CAG

7. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES

CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN REGTS THROUGHOUT POPULATED  
COASTAL AREA.

8. DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (P1000) BY 9TH MARINES.

9. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)

10. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/HAMLET CAS DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE

OP-4


27

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


SECRET




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**CONFIDENTIAL**



HEADQUARTERS  
XXIV CORPS  
TACTICAL SEMINAR



MINE S  
AND  
BOOBY TRAPS



27 MARCH 1969

**CONFIDENTIAL**

GROUP 4  
Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals; declassified  
after 12 years

**CONFIDENTIAL**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS  
APO San Francisco 96308

MAJ Roush/glt/2506

AVII-GCT

28 May 1969

SUBJECT: Fourth XXIV Corps Tactical Seminar

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Attached as inclosure is report of the fourth XXIV Corps Tactical Seminar on the subject "~~Mines~~ and Booby Traps".

Presentations were made not only by subordinate XXIV Corps elements but also by representatives from MACV, USARV, and III MAF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
asH. R. T. C  
CPT, AG  
Asst AG

## DISTRIBUTION:

CG, 101st Airborne Div (AM) 200  
CG, 3d Marine Div 200  
CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) 70  
COMUSMACV 10  
CG, USARV 10  
CG, IFFORCEV 10  
CG, II FFORCEV 10  
CG, III MAF 10  
CG, XXIV Corps 70  
CG, 1st Infantry Div 10  
CG, 4th Infantry Div 10  
CG, 9th Infantry Div 10  
CG, Americal Div 10  
CG, 25th Infantry Div 10  
CG, 1st Cavalry Div (AM) 10  
CG, 1st Marine Div 10  
CG, 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Div 10  
CG, 199th Infantry Bde Sep Lt 10  
CG, 173d Airborne Brigade 10  
CG, 11th Armd Cav Regt 10  
CG, 5th Special Forces 10

CG, 1st Logistical Comd 5  
CG, USA ECAV 5  
CG, Engineer Troops V (Prov) 5  
CG, USA Headquarters Area Comd 5  
CG, I FFORCEV Artillery 5  
CG, 23d Artillery Gp 5  
CG, 54th Artillery Gp 5  
CG, 108th Artillery Gp 5  
CG, 1st Avn Bde 5  
CG, 1st Signal Bde 5  
CG, 44th Medical Bde 5  
CG, 18th Military Police Bde 5  
CG, 34th General Support Gp 5  
CG, 509th RR Gp 5  
CG, 525th Military Intelligence Gp 5  
CG, 4th PSYOP Gp 5  
CG, 507th Transportation Gp 5  
CG, 1st Military Intelligence Bn 5

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SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURES

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HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS

TACTICAL SEMINAR

271000H-1500H March 1969

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**LIST OF ATTENDEES**

**HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS**

**TACTICAL SEMINAR**

**271000-1500H March 1969**

HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS

**3D MAR DIV**

**MG Drake**

**BG Bolling**

**CO Glikes**

**COL Le Tellier**

**COL Osteen**

**LTC Buchanan**

**LTC Dickens**

**LTC Fleming**

**LTC German**

**LTC Ghormley**

**LTC Jones**

**LTC Keenan**

**LTC Marder**

**LTC Merrell**

**MAJ Eiche**

**MAJ Chase**

**MAJ Dyer**

**MAJ Fiel**

**MAJ Janke**

**MAJ Lapge**

**MAJ Leathers**

**MAJ Rotish**

**COL De Normandie**

**LTC Britt**

**MAJ Knesman**

**MAJ Mills**

**LT Hagensen**

**GY SGT Pickett**

**COL With**

**LTC Sherron**

**MAJ orin**

**CPT Friedrich**

**MSG Albanese**

**SGT Brown**

**CP Jewett (USN)**

**LTC Colleton**

**LCDR Holmes**

**1ST k-r th Inf v**

**SSG Foster**

**SSG Kuck**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**XXIV Corps (Cont)**

MAJ Stevens

**MAJ Van-Steenbergen**

CPT Mitchell

**1LT Breitweiser****1LT Guthrie**

1LT Kunis

**1LT Zimmer****SFC Cleverley****SP4 Barnes****SP4 Hedrick****MACV J2 CMEE**

SSM Ziegler

**SFC Brolo**

USARV En

MAJ Skinner

**III MAF G2**LTC **Bunnell**MAJ **Snydenham****32d NCR**CDR **Wingast**

CDR Daniel

**LT (JG) Kunz**

CE-1 Sweatt

**UT-1 Collins**GY SGT **Minehart**CDR **Moger**LT (JG) **Skikeleather****45th Engr Gp****CPT Reh****27th Engr Bn****1LT Hanish****1LT Hollands****HQ XXIV Corps Apty**

LTC Spradlin

CPT **Massa**

MSG Halterman

**1SG Canafax****UNCLASSIFIED**

HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS  
MARCH TACTICAL SEMINAR

AGENDA  
271000H-1500H March 1969

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

	TIME (hours)
Opening Remarks (DCG, XXIV Corps)	1000 - 1005
3d Marine Division Presentation	1005 - 1035
Group Discussion on 3d Marine Division Presentation	1035 - 1055
Morning Coffee Break	1055 - 1105
Task Force Clearwater Presentation	1105 - 1135
Group Discussion TF Clearwater's Presentation	1135 - 1155
Lunch	1155 - 1300
101st Airborne Division Presentation	1300 - 1330
Group Discussion on 101st Airborne Division's Presentation	1330 - 1350
Afternoon Coffee Break	1350 - 1400
MACV J2 CMEC Presentation	1400 - 1415
Discussion on MACV J2 CMEC's Presentation	1415 - 1420
III MAF G2 Presentation	1420 - 1430
Discussion on III MAF G2's Presentation	1430 - 1435
USARV Engineer Presentation	1435 - 1450
Discussion on USARV Engineer's Presentation	1450 - 1455
Closing Remarks (DOG, XXIV Corps)	1455 - 1500

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## ORGANIZATION OF DOCUMENTS

This publication is a report of the fourth XXIV Corps Tactical Seminar presented on 27 March 1969 in the XXIV Corps Conference Room, Headquarters, XXIV Corps. The subject of the seminar was "Mines and Booby Traps".

MG Clifford B. Drake, Deputy **Commanding** General, XXIV Corps, opened the **seminar**.

The **first** of **six** presentations was made by 1Lt Hagensen, 3d Marine Division. CPT (USN) Jewett, Task **Force** Clearwater, made the second presentation. The **third** **topic** was presented by LTC Sherron and CPT Friedrich, 101st Airborne Division (**Airmobile**). SSM Ziegler, MACV J2 **CMEC**, presented the fourth topic. **MAJ** Skinner, USARV Engineer, presented the **fifth** topic. The sixth and final presentation was made by LTC Bunnell and MAJ Sydenham, **III MAF** G2. A brief question and answer period followed each **presentation**.

This Document contains the following annexes:

- 1) ANNEX A: Opening Remarks, DOG, XXIV Corps
- 2) ANNEX B: 3d Marine Division Presentation
- 3) ANNEX C: Task Force **Clearwater** Presentation
- 4) ANNEX **D**: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Presentation
- 5) ANNEX E: **MACV** J2 CMEC Presentation
- 6) ANNEX F: USARV Engineer Presentation
- 7) ANNEX G: **III MAF** G2 Presentation
- 8) ANNEX H: **Summary** of Discussion Questions
- 9) ANNEX I: Closing Remarks, **DCG**, XXIV Corps

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OPENING REMARKS

MAG Clifford B. Drake, USMC  
Deputy CG, XXIV Corps

On behalf of General Stilwell, the Corps Commander, it is my pleasure and privilege to welcome you to the fourth Corps Tactical Seminar. In our first seminar last spring, we addressed the subject of "Night Operations" and published a summary of the presentations and the discussions which followed.

In the second seminar on "Combined Operations", the theme which emerged was that combined operations are a "thing of the present and future within XXIV Corps".

After these seminars were reproduced and distributed down to the company/battery/troop level, we requested feedback from the divisions as to whether anybody had bothered to read them. Assuming that all good soldiers, sailors, and marines tell "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth", the responses were very gratifying.

We conducted the third Corps seminar in December. The subject was "Tactics and Techniques Employed on Reconnaissance Missions in Airmobile Operations". We continued our distribution of this seminar down to the company level. Thus, we are continuing our programs of Corps Tactical Seminars.

For those of you who are here for the first time I think you will find that this will be a very interesting day. Our subject, "Mines and Booby Traps", is most apt for any time frame of this year. There has probably been no war in which mines and booby traps have been a greater casualty-producer and greater hindrance to our operations than the type of war we are now fighting in Vietnam. By all rights we should have started with this subject. Perhaps, through our combined inquisitiveness, creativity, discussion, and questions both smart and seemingly stupid, we can produce some ideas which can reduce casualties from these devices.

Therefore, today, we will devote our efforts to the subject with presentations by the two divisions of the Corps and our naval element, Task Force Clearwater. In addition, teams from outside Corps will broaden the depth of the subject with brief presentations. Representatives from MACV, USARV and III MAF bring additional expertise to this conference.

In these opening remarks, I attempt to set the stage for the seminar. A seminar is not something in which presenters discuss their subject matter and we sit here, dutifully, as the audience. A seminar is of value only if we obtain maximum participation from all present. This means questions, comments, discussion, and challenges to ideas. Earlier, I mentioned the stupid question.

Gentlemen, sometimes what may seem to you to be a stupid question may very well be the one that sparks the best idea of the seminar. Please do not hold back. Any time you feel like interrupting a presentation feel free to do so. I am sure the presenters are fast enough on their feet to pick it up from there. Again, we are glad to have you here. Permit your inquisitive mind to work in conjunction with loose jaws. Let us start with the Third Marine Division.

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## PRESENTATION

3d Marine Division-

MINES AND ~~BOOBY~~ TRAPS

### INTRODUCTION

General Drake, General Carney, gentlemen. My name is Lt **Hagensen**, Assistant Operations Officer, 3d Engineer Battalion, 3d Marine Division. Assisting me today is Gunnery Sergeant Pickett, also a member of the 3d ~~Engineer Battalion~~, who was instrumental in the establishment of the 3d Marine Division Land Mine ~~Warfare/Demolitions~~ School.

My presentation concerns a subject in which the 3d Engineer Battalion has gained much practical knowledge and expertise. The main thrust of our topic concerns route mine sweeps. During the course of this presentation, I will address four separate areas concerned with route sweeping: 1) enemy ~~mining devices~~ 2) enemy counter sweep activities; 3) enemy mining trends; 4) friendly counteraction.

The 3d Engineer Battalion is responsible for conducting route sweeps on ~~49,200~~ <sup>49,200</sup> meters of road daily. ~~These sweeps~~ are conducted east and west along Route 9 from Cam Lo to Vandegrift Combat Base and north and south on Route 556 and ~~558~~ from Con Thien to Mai Loc. The specific items I will discuss today are the results of experience gained by our sweep teams on these particular routes.

Displayed on the table before you are ~~some~~ of the more common manufactured enemy mines that are being employed by the enemy-in the Third ~~Marines~~ Division ~~CAOR~~.

This is the P.M. 60. It is believed to be an East German manufactured mine with the following characteristics (chart 1);

- 1) Diameter: 12 inches
- 2) Thickness: 5 inches
- 3) Pressure required to ~~actuate mine~~: 300-50 pounds
- 4) Amount of ~~exp~~ <sup>live</sup>: 23 pounds TNT or ~~amotel~~
- 5) Number of ~~fuze wells~~: two

The ~~mine~~ is made entirely of ~~plastic~~ and ~~is very difficult~~ to pick up with the P 153/158 ~~mine~~ detector. This mine is being used frequently to interdict Route 9 at this time. The only metal found in this mine ~~is~~ the very ~~small~~ amount located in the firing device ~~itself~~.

The next mine is the Soviet ~~TM41~~ <sup>TM41</sup> which ~~has~~ the following characteristics (chart 2);

- 1) Height: 10 inches
- 2) Weight: 11.9 pounds

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Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals; declassified  
after 12 years

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- 3) Type of ~~mine~~: **blast**
- 4) Pressure required to actuate ~~fuze~~ **pressure**
- 5) Amount of explosives 8.4 pounds TNT
- 6) Method of activating ~~explosive~~ Russian MV5 pressure type **fuze**

As you can see it resembles a **dimmer switch** on our **vehicles**. There is a striker spring and striker at the top portion of the **device**. The spring and striker are held in place by a small ball bearing. When twenty six (26) pounds of pressure are placed at the top of this device, the small **tip** on the outside ~~case becomes~~ aligned thereby freeing the striker and striker spring, and hitting the detonating portion of the **fuze** which, in turn, activates the booster and actuates the mine **itself**. This **fuze** is **common** to many manufactured mines and many home made mines as we shall see **later**.

Now, this mine is the Soviet **TM 46** antitank mine which has the **following** characteristics (**chart 3**);

- 1) Diameter: **12.2 inches**
- 2) Type of ~~mine~~: **blast**
- 3) Height: **2.9 inches**
- 4) **Weight: 19.2 pounds**
- 5) Amount of **explosive: 12.2 pounds** TNT
- 6) Pressure required to activate ~~fuze: 400~~ pounds
- 7) Number of fuze ~~wells~~: **two**
- 8) Method of activating ~~explosive~~: **Russian MV5 pressure type fuze**.

In addition to these manufactured mines, within the past two ~~months~~, our **sweep** teams have been confronted with an **increasing number** of locally manufactured explosive **devices**. The most common of these ~~explosive~~ devices are 20 to 30 pound blocks of TNT assembled in a package and tied together with string or **vines**. The TNT block mine is effective for the following reasons: (1) It is easily **placed**; (2) It is **difficult to detect**; (3) The device can **be** positioned and the pressure type **fuze** added at a later date.

### ENEMY COUNTER SWEEP ACTIVITIES

**Next**, I **would** like to discuss enemy counter sweep activities or those actions designated to reduce the effectiveness of our route sweep teams.

The first of these is the "planting" or laying of false mines. The enemy will dig several holes in the road and simply fill them in **again**. This accomplishes two **things**: (1) It distracts the sweep team and forces them **to** probe each of these holes; (2) It also provides the enemy with a hole to put his mine in **with** little effort at a later date. The enemy will observe the sweep team probe the same holes for several days. After they have ceased their probing, the enemy will go in and plant his **mines**.

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Another means of planting false mines is to bury sandbags with tin cans enclosed. Again, it is designed to wear down the patience of the sweep team and make them careless.

One enemy counter sweep activity, which has recently been used quite frequently in our area of operations, is the practice of **emplacing** non-metallic or locally made explosive devices in the roads **without the metallic** firing device. Unless the sweep team is especially alert and **experienced**, it **will miss** the device and move on past the **area**. After the sweep team is safely out of sight or perhaps much later in the day, the enemy will move back into the area and rapidly fuse the **device**. The enemy has **gained** only limited success with this tactic due to the alertness of our sweep **teams**.

As the sweep **commences** and as it terminates, a tendency exists for **the sweep** team to bunch up which provides a lucrative target for the **enemy**. We have attempted to counter this by various means during the **past** several months. In our particular area of **operations**, the most effective means employed is to have converging sweep teams meet and continue on past each other a safe distance before concluding **their** respective **sweeps**. This accomplishes a number of things. It prevents the sweep team from bunching up and eliminates the possibility of a mine being missed at the point where the sweep teams **converge**. As an additional measure, the **teams never** meet at the same point twice which prevents the enemy from **effectively registering** mortars or establishing ambushes at that point where both **sweep** teams **meet**. Mortar and sniper fire have also been used to distract the **sweep team** as it approaches mines in the road in the hope that the sweep **team will** move **hastily** through the area and miss the **mines**.

**Another** favorite tactic employed by the enemy is to register their mortars on the position where the mines are buried. Once a mine is located, it is blown in place by the sweep team. This, alerts the enemy that the engineers and security are at that particular point. The enemy, then, quickly fires a few mortar rounds.

Directional antipersonnel mines are being used as ambush and booby trap devices. I would like to show you the devices. The first is the Chinese Communist claymore mine (**chart 4**). It works like our own claymore,

Next, we have the **DH-10** mine (**chart 5**) which has a matrix of **450** small fragments. **It can** be fired either electrically or **non-electrically** the same as our **claymores**. This particular mine has an **electric fuzing device** in it.

We **also** have detonating cord that has been **used by NVA** and VC elements. This is quite similar to our own detonating cord **but** of a much inferior quality.

This mine has been used several times on Route 556 **just** above Cam Lo (**chart 6**). What we see is a cluster of four mines placed in a staggered column in the road. The arrow indicates the direction in which the sweep team is moving. The enemy places the claymore mine approximately 25 meters from where each mine is laid and a **trip** wire is run out to the **side**. The mines are so positioned for two **reasons**. **First**, it is their hope that the flank security will trip the wire, thereby creating **casualties** before the mines are discovered and that in the resulting confusion the mines will be **forgotten**. If this fails to happen and the mines are discovered, the enemy hopes that curiosity will bring people from the flanks to look at the mines and, while doing so they will trip the mines and obtain a maximum number of casualties. This configuration has been found several times on Route 556 and is recognized as a pattern or a trend by this particular sweep team.

Here (**chart 7**) you see a sketch of an ambush that has been established to hit our sweep team on Route 9. As you see there are nine claymores set up with the killing zone oriented

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to hit the sweep team itself with fragments directed to hit the point security and, of course, the cluster of mines in the rear directed to hit the rear security. Fortunately, this particular ambush was discovered because some of the mines were detonated prematurely. Also, some of the claymore mines did not go off due to faulty detonating cord.

This (chart 8) is a booby trapping device that is becoming quite popular with the NVA. When an engineer team finds a mine in the road, it will probe and attempt to identify it from the top. When the identification has been positively made, the team will place one or two pounds of C4 on top of it with a one to two minute fuze. They will then light the fuze and move to the rear 100 to 200 meters. Note that a claymore has been set up to catch the rear security force.

The enemy has proven himself adaptable at mining techniques; yet he has established certain patterns. There seems to be a high incident rate one week of every month. The enemy harasses the sweep teams with false mines and for one week out of every month will plant mines daily. The mines are planted, in clusters of two, between 20 and 50 meters apart. These mines are located in a staggered column and frequently favor one side of the road. The enemy also plants mines in the center of the road. Where the roads are narrow, mines are planted on the shoulders of the road for obvious reasons (chart 9).

When the road was only wide enough for one way traffic, which precluded the detonation of mines in the center of the road, this led to the axiom that enemy mines are almost always found on the edges and shoulders of the road. As the roads widened and we continued to find their mines, the enemy began to place them in the center of the road. Our response was to use a third detector in the center of the road. As roads continue to be improved and widened, the mines were placed left and right of center with our response being the use of four detectors on each road.

As you notice, gentlemen, these detectors are employed approximately 20 meters apart for the safety of the sweep team. At the present time, the trend is to place mines left and right of the center in staggered column about 50-70 meters apart.

#### FRIENDLY COUNTER ACTION

Friendly counteraction to enemy mining activities has taken several forms. Continual training of sweep personnel is being conducted. The latest information on mining activities, markers, and indicators is disseminated to the sweep teams. Sweep discipline receives continued command attention to insure constant vigilance and compliance with established sweep practices.

The same men are left on the sweeps so they may become familiar with sections of the road. Ninety percent of the mines are discovered visually. This can be traced directly to the team's thorough knowledge of the road's surface. The sweep teams have also established good relations with indigenous personnel who have pointed out mines and ambushes on many occasions. By leaving the same men in the area, this rapport is strengthened and the source of information is maintained.

The Voluntary Informant Program (VIP) augments this camaraderie between the indigenous personnel and the sweep teams. A system whereby indigenous personnel bridge the gap monetarily for information on the location of enemy mines and ambushes. The 3d Engineer Battalion has sent its Vietnamese interpreters with the sweep team to explain this program to the Vietnamese people. This action has achieved good results. Recently a Montagnard pointed out a cluster of 6 mines on Route 9 west of Cam Lo. On another occasion, a small fort was found adjacent to a road upon which a sweep had started. The fort was built by

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children who play there every day. There ~~are objects, resembling~~ mortars, pointing to the sky. The sweep team was subsequently ~~not~~ ~~are~~ further down the road.

The Third Marine Division has ~~also~~ conducted an extensive land clearing project on each side of Route 9 for the ~~purpose~~ of denying the enemy easy access to the road. This reduced his ambush capability and made it more difficult for him to place his mines ~~undetected~~.

The training of non-engineer ~~personnel~~ has not been neglected. The Third Marine Division has ~~established~~ a Land Mine Warfare School which is operated and staffed by the Third Engineer Battalion ~~personnel~~. Each week ~~twenty~~ men attend a three day ~~comprehensive~~ course on explosives, route ~~sweep~~ equipment and techniques, and enemy mines and booby traps.

While booby traps and ~~mine incidents are~~ not as prevalent in the northern portion of our Division A0 as they are in the ~~southern portion~~, there is a definite trend in this direction. We have received ~~requests for schooling~~ on this subject from units such as the "Seabees" and the ~~Third Reconnaissance Battalion~~. In each case, we have endeavored to meet the demand. The training received by the participants results in a healthy respect for explosives and greater ~~confidence~~. It ~~teaches the~~ marine what to look for, thereby reducing ~~casualties~~ in the field.

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# *3RD MARINE DIVISION*

## *CHARTS*

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



CHART 1

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TM-41 A.I.




VIET T M A, T. MINE

CHART 2  
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


SOVIET TM-46 A T. MINE

CHART 3

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CHART 4



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


CHART 5  
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





CHART 6

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
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




CHART 8  
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



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## PRESENTATION

Task Force Clearwater

MINES AND BOoby TRAPS

General Drake, General Carney, and gentlemen. The primary areas of responsibility of Task Force Clearwater are the Cua Viet and Perfum Rivers. The frequency of mining incidents on the Perfume River within the past year has been almost non-existent. Only two such incidents were encountered by Task Force Clearwater personnel. On the other hand, the Cua Viet River has more mining incidents than any other river in the Republic of Vietnam (Chart 1). The main reason for the increased mine activity on the Cua Viet River stems from the fact that we can carry 3500 short tons of shipping per month down to Dong Ha and have carried an average of about 2200 short tons per month over the past nine months. That is a lot of logistics. Since the North Vietnamese are trying to gain a spectacular success of some sort, particularly during the bombing halt, they continue trying new things. One of these innovations is the river mine. The type of mines used by the enemy in the waterways are identical to those used against our coastal craft and ships at sea.

These include the following types: percussion, magnetic, acoustic, contact, and command detonated which we do not normally find at sea. The enemy has tried them all in the Cua Viet River. Some of these mines are very sophisticated. For this reason, I thought that it would be interesting to you if I gave a brief discussion of some of the enemy mines we have discovered in the Cua Viet River. - will also mention a few of the principles which these mines employ, theory of operation, and what we do to counter them.

The first mine I am going to discuss is the drifting contact mine (Chart 2) that the Viet Cong brought into the Cua Viet River. It is basically Bushnell's old torpedo. David Bushnell, as you may recall, invented the submarine. He also invented the drifting contact mine. This mine is basically just a case of gunpowder and a float. During the course of the American Civil War, a friction igniter was added. For a float, the Viet Cong use an inner tube. Instead of the wooden keg of gunpowder depicted on the chart, the Viet Cong use a 40 pound basket of C4 explosive (Chart 3). Little lines run from the basket to the float and wires, which circumvent the float, and connect to a pull-type friction igniter. The circuit then runs through a fuze to a detonator (1/2 pound block of TNT) and the mine explodes.

Usually something in the river touches the inner tube and displaces it from a basket. As soon as the displacement occurs, the igniters are activated which, in turn, completes the electrical circuit and causes the explosion. The explosion can result in the disappearance of forty pounds of C4 explosives and a friendly river vessel.

We attempt to counter this mine in several ways. One method employs the concussion grenade. The concussion grenade ruptures the innertube causing it to sink. If the inner tube remains in position on the surface of the river, the shock of the detonation will cause a horizontal displacement of the innertube on the river surface and force it to explode. We attempt to "sweep" this type of mine by running two boats parallel to each other and connected by a large strand of wire which is held approximately 18 inches beneath the surface. As the boats move in tandem on the river, the

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wire contacts the drifting contact mine and it exploded

Such mines are outlawed by the Geneva Convention. However, the enemy doesn't pay any attention to minor things like that. The only drifting mine that the United States has used was the Mark 19 mine during World War II. The North Koreans had a Soviet drifting mine during the Korean War.

The next mine that the enemy has used is the pressure mine. This type of mine first made its appearance in World War II. Our naval pressure mine, at the present time, cost approximately \$800 each. The Viet Cong's pressure mine costs about \$150 a copy.

As a matter of interest, I will review the basic principle of physics behind the operation of the pressure mine (Chart 4). Probably most of you are familiar with these already. As an example, let us say you have a pipe with water running through it. Along the length of the pipe you encounter a constriction which, of course, reduces the diameter of the pipe at that point. At the constriction, the velocity of the water increases. The velocity of the water at this point can be computed by a mathematical formula. In physics, this phenomenon is called Bernoulli's principle and is the basic principle used in all pressure mines. Using Bernoulli's principle, a boat going across the bottom like this (lower half of Chart 4) causes a displacement of the water. The water, which is temporarily displaced, seeks to return and fill the vacated space. The only way this physical action can occur is for the water to travel faster around the hull of the boat under the water. This causes a decrease in pressure. Obviously if a boat is at rest, pressure is normal. Therefore, the boat can stop over the mine and it will not explode. Also you can move a boat slowly over a pressure mine and a detonation will not occur. But if the boat obtains any appreciable speed over four knots - stand by - because this little "baby" will blow up. That is a quick review how a pressure mine operates.

This is a simplified diagram of a pressure mine (Chart 5). Again, you see the Viet Cong's favorite elements for constructing mines: the innertube and the big basket of explosives which can hold between 40 to 80 pounds of C4. The last one we picked up contained 75 pounds.

Let me explain this arrangement to you. At the top of the mine is a balloon. The balloon is connected to an upper pressure chamber that is filled with air. The upper pressure chamber is separated from the lower pressure chamber. Now if the ship crosses above the top of the mine, a decrease in pressure results outside the balloon causing it to expand. When this occurs, air in the upper chamber rushes into the balloon. This results in a state whereby there is more air in the lower pressure chamber than the upper pressure chamber. The only way that the differential can be eliminated is for air to push the bellows upward. This causes a completed firing circuit. The closing of the circuit and all actions previously mentioned occur only when a ship passes over the mine at a minimum specified speed.

As a parting remark, the pressure mine depicted is a North Vietnamese manufactured device.

The next mine I will discuss is the magnetic acoustic mine. Last summer, we found six of these things.

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Let me briefly discuss the basic principle of operation, (Chart 6). The magnetic field of the earth has a vertical component - a field which is constant in a particular area. This condition does not change as long as this particular area is not invaded by a metallic object. When a metallic object passes through the field, it changes the earth's magnetic lines. If you have some kind of detector that can detect this change, then you can use the detector to generate a small current. This action, in turn, can close switches, set off detonator circuits, etc. Ordinary search coils are used and when a change in the field results, a current will be induced into the coil and amplified to throw the switch and turn off detonators.

This device is called a search coil. The search coil was invented by the British. The Germans were the first to come up with a magnetic mine and use a dial needle. The British followed suit with one of a more sophisticated design.

Here is the basic principle as far as the magnetic acoustic mine is concerned (Chart 6). The Viet Cong will use all sorts of mines. He uses the magnetic principle to close and to detonate.

This is the HAT/2 mine (Chart 7). It is a very sophisticated mine. However, it is not on a par with our new mines. It consists of three sections. The center and end case mechanisms, made by the North Vietnamese, contain explosives. The firing mechanism section is a Russian firing device. The mine weighs 850 pounds of which 660 pounds are explosives. The three sections can be separated and all components can be carried by 9 to 15 men. The explosives are carried separately from the mine itself.

The HAT/2 mine is a divided section by section. A little space is left between the end case and the center section to allow for a "Z" section. The "Z" section is filled with C4 explosive. The firing mechanism is bolted atop the "Z" section. After the assembly is completed, a plastic tube is placed around the mine and the mine is then placed into the water and settles to the bottom.

The search coil, as mentioned, is located in the center case section and is the device that creates the magnetic "loop" as we call it. Here is the booster tube that connects to the firing mechanism.

There are several other prominent features of this mine that I might mention. It is hand portable and very rugged. For instance, we picked up one that had nine bullet holes in the battery pack. Yet, the battery pack was still operational. Another feature is that you can set this mine to fire from one to ten days. For example, if the Viet Cong want this to be a dud until ten (10) days from now, he can set it that way. Nine days from now - stand by - you will have problems. In addition to this delayed arming of ten days, the Viet Cong have installed a ship counting gadget. This device can count up to twenty one ships. This means you must wait ten days before it can be of any use at all; then, you have got to wait until 20 ships go by until you fire on the 21st ship. Therefore, theoretically, to ensure there is something like this down in the water, what you have to do every day for ten (10) days is run a minimum of 21 ship counts. This is assuming that you make perfect passes over this mine all the time. Actually, you would probably be required to complete at least thirty five passes.

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On the 21st of February, support elements clandestinely slipped into our area and destroyed some of our boats on the Cua Viet River. I felt they might have followed this up with a good mining endeavor. I was particularly concerned about the possible setting of a HAT/2 mine in our training base which could sink an LST or similar ship. Therefore, I decided to run the 21 ship count drill on the theory that I would make it safe for at least one day. In order to obtain the 21 ship counts, we had to close the Cua Viet River until 1300 hours.

This type of mine has an anti-counter mining device which means that you can throw a concussion grenade at it or, if a mine explodes, it won't activate. The entire electrical circuitry will be dead for a certain period of time before it will activate again. This is actually a type of protection. The HAT/2 mine also has some beautiful anti-recovery aspects. When this mine lies on the bottom, it is tilted at 7 degrees angle to the horizontal and it will blow up in your face if it exceeds this deviation from the horizontal. If you have some energetic EOD types that want to go down to the river bottom and "nosey" around with this thing, they will probably have it explode in their faces. There must be at least 9 feet of water for this mine to arm itself. Once it goes below 9 feet of water, it becomes armed through a hydrostatic type device. If it is brought above 9 feet again it will automatically explode. In other words, there is only one way to clear this mine if it's setting on the bottom. You must send a person down to the mine, place a charge on its external surface, and blow it in place. The one we found on the beach had safety forks on it, and the device was not armed. This was how we obtained our information on the HAT/2 mine.

Our own mines do not have quite the same amount of anti-recovery aspects to them. For example, there's a real disadvantage to this anti-tilting aspect of recovering the mine. If you take a wire and connect it to the HAT/2 mine, it will detonate in place if the tilt is enough.

The only other feature of interest about the Viet Cong mine is that there is no sterilization. This HAT/2 device could lay on the river bottom for a year and it wouldn't self-destruct unless the angle of tilt became excessive. Long ago the United States Navy learned to place a sterilizer into their mines so that after a certain period of time which could be adjusted by ninety days or so, we would achieve a dud. The rationale behind this sterilization procedure was an outgrowth of our World War II naval mine warfare experience. At that time, our naval mines did not contain sterilizers and we spread mines all over the North Sea, Adriatic Sea, and similar places. Many of these mines, to this day, haven't been blown. No method exists of sweeping these non-sterilized mines. The resultant lesson is that if you want to be able to send your own troops and boats in, it is nice to add a sterilizer to friendly mines.

The Viet Cong, however, are not interested in this. They are interested in putting something down that will cause trouble.

There is an additional problem with combating the HAT/2 mine. It is very difficult to sweep this thing. There are many ways the problem can be approached. You can run a wire called a "bottom catenary" along the bottom hoping it will do it. You can run very fancy sweeps or very close sweeps over the enemy mine and it will work. For instance we have a magnetic sweep that consists of an elongate thirty foot length of railroad track which we have changed into a magnet.

We have actually towed this device up and down the river along with a huge clapper bar we hang down afloat. It is towed between two ships. However, we usually use a two boat sweep, which is our finest sweep, consisting of large magnetic tails. The latter metallic boats make a magnetic signature in the water. However, the boats towing the railroad track are wooden in nature.

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I'd like to mention several other mines. The first is a limpet mine which we captured on the 21st of February. It's nothing more than a little, circular half-moon device. However, it gets a little nasty because once one of these mines is attached to the external surface of a ship or vessel, the only way of removal is to take the ship into dry dock and saw it off. You can disarm it but you can't take it off. If you do, it will blow up in your face.

The other devices I would like to mention are enemy booby traps. These are simple devices and designed primarily for use against our patrol boats. They are made of a small piece of styrofoam. Inside the styrofoam is a little grenade and a little string which runs down to the little bag of mud that holds it on the bottom. It operates under the principle that if anybody attempts to open up the styrofoam booby trap, it will blow up in the opener's face.

These are the results of our experience of nine months on the Cua Viet River (Chart 8). Of course, these figures are not comparable to those of our big Army and Marine divisions in the XXIV Corps Area of operations. However, for a nice peaceful river with friendly resettlement villages along the banks it is not too bad. We average, on a weekly basis, one explosion and three wounded. The last ships damaged were by limpet mines. One such mine blew a four foot hole in one of our ships and the backlash from it blew a similar hole in a sister ship near by.

What can we expect from the Viet Cong in the future? He can place a pressure device on his HAT/2 mine. We are obtaining some sophisticated naval equipment which will permit us to see if there are any foreign objects, like mines, on the river bottom. It is called "SHADOW GRAFT" and has never been used in the Republic of Vietnam.

In closing, I want to read you a little passage that we find in all our naval textbooks on sea mines and I think it is applicable for river mines. This is a definition of mine warfare. "Mine warfare is the science of big assumptions, based on debatable figures, taken from inconclusive experiments, performed with instruments of problematical accuracy, by persons of doubtful reliability, and of questionable mentality." Believe me, if you ever get into the mine business and you are on one side or the other this description is most appropriate.

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# *TASK FORCE CLEARWATER CHARTS*

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
ENEMY MINES  
AND  
BOOBY TRAPS  
ON THE  
CUA VIET  
RIVER

CHART 1  
UNCLASSIFIED

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# DRIFTING CONTACT

## BASIC PRINCIPLE



# A FRICTION IGNITER

CHART 2  
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


CHART 3  
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# PRESSURE MINE

## BASIC PRINCIPLE





CHART 4  
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# MAGNETIC-ACOUSTIC BASIC PRINCIPLE





CHART 6




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HAT/2



## FEATURES

MAN - PORTABLE  
 DELAYED ARMING  
 SHIP-COUNTING  
 ANTI-COUNTERMINING  
 ANTI-RECOVERY  
 NO STERILIZATION

CHART 7

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RESULTS SINCE  
1 JULY 68

38 EXPLOSIONS

4 SUNK

11 DAMAGED

15 KIA

26 WIA

CHART 8

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## 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)

## MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

Twenty seven casualties in twenty seven ~~days~~ due to booby traps. Because of this experience, we feel that we have a ~~story~~ to tell. We have lessons learned and use this opportunity as a vehicle to ~~convey~~ this ~~knowledge~~. This is a battalion's limited experience in its area of responsibility within the 101st Airborne Division (AM), area of ~~operation~~.

To set the stage we would like to resort to historical precedent. Late last year, a switch occurred between a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) and 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. This ~~switch~~ was accomplished in September 1968. Later, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was redeployed to the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam. This left a ~~geographical~~ area which was ~~then filled~~ by the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM). This ~~area~~ is north of Hue and south of Quang Tri City. The four ~~combat~~ maneuver ~~elements operating~~ in this area ~~are~~: 3d Sqdn, 5th Armd Cav (an organic element of the 9th Infantry Division); 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry; 2d Bn, 506th Infantry; and the 3d Bn, 187th Infantry (Chart 1). This ~~area~~ contains a large number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army elements.

Our battalion mission was to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in our assigned area of ~~operation~~. In order to provide you information concerning enemy and the terrain, I have asked CPT Frederick, the 3d Bde S2, to conduct the next portion of the ~~presentation~~.

Good ~~afternoon~~, Sir. I am CPT FREDERICK, S2, 3d Bde. The terrain in the area of interest (Chart 2) is unique in that the three basic types of terrain found in the Republic of Vietnam are located ~~here~~: rice paddies; low rolling hills; and mountains. The area is bounded on the east by the Song Bo River; on the west by the Song O Lau River; on the north by QL1; on the south by Rocket Ridge. Contrary to the view of this terrain that one would gather from looking at it on a map and from the air, this terrain presents an obstacle to the foot ~~soldier~~. The hills, though low in ~~elevation~~, are very ~~steep~~. The vegetation is extremely dense, consisting primarily of secondary growth ~~ranging~~ from six to fifteen feet in height. It is so dense that observation and ~~fields~~ of fire are virtually ~~nonexistent~~.

Movement is normally restricted to trails in the area which, very often, are tunnels. The enemy can often walk through these tunnels unobserved from the ~~air~~. The rice paddy area is dotted with an abundance of Vietnamese villages. The paddies are desolate because they haven't been planted ~~since Tet, 1968~~. The hedgerows and overgrown rice paddies offer ~~excellent~~ concealment for ~~the enemy~~ while abandoned ~~villages~~ provide locations for ~~caches~~. The Song O Ho runs through the center of the area from west to east. It presents no major obstacle to the foot ~~soldier~~. To the south, Rocket Ridge is covered with growth similar to that found in the Piedmont Area. The ~~primary~~ advantage of ~~controlling this side is that it~~ affords observation over the area of ~~interest~~. When the brigade moved into the AO, the

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GROUP 4  
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 intervals; declassified  
 after 12 years

enemy forces consisted mainly of C-113 local force **units** and reconnaissance elements from adjacent NVA battalions.

The enemy's mission was to maintain communication routes open between the mountains and the lowlands and to harass friendly forces by fire. There are two basic routes of **interest**. One is located along the Song Bo River from the village of Co Bi which is just south of the Song O Ho and up from Co Bi to Cao An which is located at the An Lo Bridge. The second route extends from the mountains to Hien An up to Hien Si and to Dong **Lam**. Dong **Lam** is situated directly to the north of Camp Evans.

The 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, entered its area of operations on the 3d of November. I will proceed to trace what our battalion has accomplished from that date until today (27 **March**).

We took the area from a battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). They were unhappy with the number of casualties they had sustained and were pleased to get rid of that piece of **terrain**. We entered with no experience in a booby trapped area and from the beginning, we began to sustain casualties. These casualties resulted from all types of booby **traps**. Within a matter of days, commanders at all levels sought to discover a pattern in the enemy mining activities.

Let's examine in more detail what the area **of** operations looks like (Chart 2). To identify a few key places, let me point out the following: (1) Camp **Evans**; (2) An **Lo** Bridge; (3) Song Bo River; (4) Song O Lau River; and (5) FSB JACK.

We looked for enemy mining **patterns**. First, we discovered that they were placing booby traps in our own night defensive **positions**. For example, after we had buried C-ration cans, the enemy returned and dug them **up**. The C-ration cans were then used to make their booby traps. In order to combat this trend, we ceased using the night defensive positions of previous **units** and began placing stay behind patrols in the positions from which we **moved**. This was usually successful because within two or three hours of dawn we would get a Viet Cong who entered the area to perform some **task**.

However, the enemy learns fast. Within a week this technique was no longer **effective**. As I mentioned **previously**, the trails were poor. We had to stay off these trails because of the likelihood that they were booby trapped. We established an SOP that movement on trails and in a straight line is **prohibited**. As you can see from the **terrain**, the enemy had direct observation of our area and could probably plot the direction in which friendly units were **moving**.

Let me cite and discuss a couple of examples of how continuous movement on trails causes **trouble**. On the 13th of February, with our battalion SOP well established, a friendly platoon moved out of a night ambush position. It did not move in a straight line but pursued a zig-zag pattern. The platoon sergeant, cognizant of the fact that we do not leave our litter on the battlefield, was checking the night ambush position to ensure nothing was left for Charlie's use. After his check was completed, he found himself approximately 200 meters behind the patrol

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so he decided to cut across country in an ~~attempt~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~intercept~~ the patrol. Then, he made two **mistakes**. First, he moved alone and blazed his own trail. When he realized that he was losing ground to the patrol, he ran across a trail and decided to use it. He moved several steps on the trail, encountered a booby trapped M-26 fragmentation grenade, and became a permanent **casualty**.

One of the Viet Cong's habits in this vegetation is to almost wave a flag at you and get you to start chasing him and follow in pursuit. After we spotted **two** Viet Cong, we started in pursuit and came across this trail. On the trail was this piece (Chart 3) of C-ration box with the following remarks inscribed in Vietnamese, "Trail **Marker** - Booby Trapped Trail - **Stay Off** the Trail". **This** particular platoon had an interpreter with it. Again, we were lucky. The interpreter suggested that we had better get off the trail. As soon as we moved left or right of the trail, two booby traps were discovered. Fortunately we found these devices before they found us.

This is indicative of the type of enemy we encounter in our area of **operations**. If we try something, he counters it. In order to gather information about the enemy's mine and booby trap capabilities, we began collecting data. These black dots (Chart 4) represent booby traps encountered by our battalion. Some of the dots represent a cluster of 3 or 4 mines. This provides you a general idea of what we faced when we worked this area.

We looked for patterns and attempted to determine if the enemy had some tactical scheme in mind. We generalized and determined that the **enemy's** mine and booby trap activities were keyed to two district geographical areas. We have designated these as Area A and ~~Area~~ **Area B** (Chart 4). As you can see, most of the incidents fall into these two areas. There is a reason for this. We normally occupy this area with two rifle companies. **How** else would you put the companies in there ~~except~~ **side** by side. The most lucrative area to find the VC was in the vicinity of the junction of the Song O Ho and the Khe Vuc An (Chart 2). That is where we inserted a company. This area had lucrative finds because the trails which come out of the mountains run into **Camp Evans**.

Both sides had tactical reasons. What could these reasons be? First, we thought the **enemy** might be hiding something in this area. **Why** booby trap unless you have got **something** you want to keep the enemy out of? We checked the area very carefully. We were attempting to find tunnels, **caves**, etc. We did locate some but there was not any large **cache**. We did find tunnels, caves, and spider holes which contained **some weapons**. Next, we thought it was a barrier - a barrier to our movement in this **direction** toward the foothills. We reasoned **this** because, in February, we found a 122mm rocket pointed toward LZ Sally at this location. We then commenced looking for **rockets**. We dug up the ridges and tried to find if they had a lot of rockets **there**. However, we were unable to find any rockets. We found a few weapons and a few places where they had been spending the night in the draws that lead out into the **foothills**. The next point we considered was that the enemy was using this area as a barrier for themselves. The VC, we found in this area, were normally rice carriers, who were propagandizing in the villages or were guides available to the NVA who were operating in this area. Therefore, this may have been a barrier just to keep us from pursuing them. I'll be frank in saying that when a small platoon is heading towards the foothills in pursuit of the enemy a booby trapped area will slow them for a matter of hours. As a final thought, this could just be the location of a good way station for the enemy.

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I'd like to briefly discuss some ~~different types of mines~~ and booby traps that we've ~~encountered~~. I'll start with ~~what is seemingly~~ the enemy's favorite and most prevalent booby trap. You'll recognize it as our M-26 fragmentation grenade. Put it in a C-ration can (Chart 5). Pull the pin and tie a wire across. It's just that simple. The only thing that Charlie has provided is a couple of sticks which can be found on the ground. We last encountered one of these devices on 13 February. The enemy uses this grenade against us because it's good for at least one casualty.

However, he may decide to daisy-chain them. There are many ways to daisy-chain (Chart 6). I do not mean to imply that this is the only way. A wire is run across the road to a grenade and the grenade is staked in the ground. The wire goes through the pin of the grenade and from the grenade it is wrapped around a spool, exerting pressure upon it. Pins are then pulled, sequentially down the line. The first one is tripped here. The explosion then breaks the string, relieves the tension on this grenade, releases the spool which causes the second explosion and the process is repeated on down the line. The enemy uses these for distances up to 50 meters along a trail. This can result in a number of casualties.

Here is an example of a manufactured booby trap (Chart 7). It contains a Chinese Communist grenade. However, they reverse the alignment of the pin, pivot pin, and the safety pin. This particular grenade is very seldom found in our area.

The Viet Cong seldom leaves anything on the battlefield unless it suits his purpose. This (Chart 8) is his pressure release type booby trap. It is normally a grenade of some type. We found that the enemy would take an old SKS or other object that was damaged beyond use, leave it booby trapped on the ground, and an inquisitive GI would pick it up as a souvenir.

There is another homemade booby trap that I would like to mention (Chart 9). This device has a French fuze in it, a 3 to 4 second friction type fuze and the Viet Cong use it like the first one I showed you. You just stake it in the ground, place a trip wire across the trail, and the activation of the friction fuze will cause the detonation.

Now I would like to discuss the heavier ordnance. Since we fire a large amount of artillery, we naturally have some duds. If there is a dud in the area, the enemy will find it. The Viet Cong likes to tie an artillery dud to a tree (Chart 10) in order to obtain the greatest effect. He uses either an 81mm mortar round or a 105mm 155mm artillery round. This device was encountered at the Song O Ho River. The artillery round was tied to a branch overhanging the stream. A wire, leading from the dud, was tied to a branch which lay across the stream with a trip wire mechanism attached. Therefore, if you crossed the stream and grabbed the branch to steady yourself, it would break. This would pull the trip wire which would cause an explosion. As a side note, we often use the National Police to assist us in search operations and we recently lost one of these gentlemen due to such a device.

As far as electrical devices are concerned, here is a very simple one made out of pieces of bamboo with tin striker plates (Chart 11). A weakened piece of board is located on the top. When pressure is applied to the board, contact will be established by the striker plate and a detonation will result.

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Here is another one that we ran across near the An Lo Bridge. It consists of a thin piece of bamboo with two electrical contact points established near the top (Chart 12). The stick is placed into the ground and can be buried to a point just below the electrical contact points. The trip wires can then be connected to run in any direction. This particular one was linked to a 105mm artillery shell in a tree. Pressure against either side of the top of the bamboo stake causes electrical contact. The electrical charge, for this device, appears to be a handful of bamboo and string. However, if you look at it very closely you can detect that it is made of the components of an AN/PRC 25 radio battery (Chart 13). In the field we throw away these batteries every day.

What can we do about this. We've discussed the booby traps that we've encountered. In reality, our actions were many and varied. I think the first thing we should mention is a little technique called the "little eye". It is a 155mm nose plug with 35 meters of string or nylonous material or is attached to it (Chart 14). It is thrown ahead of the advancing element and then pulled back towards the thrower in order to detonate any trip wires or use a pressure release type booby trap to explode. I will briefly mention a few of the techniques involved with using this device. Most of the users have learned the hard way. When you throw this device, you need to have the troops well behind you. They must be kept dispersed because, enroute to its destination, it might detonate something in the heavy underbrush. Also when you throw this device, it should be thrown from the prone position like a grenade. Always instruct your men to take some cover when using this device. When you begin pulling the device towards you, be sure you are in the prone position. One of our sergeants, while on his knees, started to pull the device. An explosion resulted which caught the upper half of his body. As you pull it back, be sure the people behind you stay behind you. A further hint is not to pull the device like a fishing line. Just hold on to it and creep backward, maintaining the 35 meters distance. This device is 35 meters long because that's just about as far as a trooper can throw it. It can be carried in an ammunition pouch. Our SOP requires one per squad operating in a booby trap area. I assure you that, if you follow this advice, you'll sustain not more than one casualty - the man who actually hits the device. In this respect, we prescribe 20 meters as the minimum distance between personnel.

On 16 January, while moving into this same booby trap area, a platoon was walking through a break in the hedgerow. Four men had passed over a booby trap which was, in fact, a 105mm shell buried in the ground with a point sticking up with a pressure type fuze attached. Pressure is required on top of the device to cause detonation. The squad leader, who was the fourth man back, stepped on it, and became KIA. However, the men forward and to the rear of the victim received no shrapnel. This is a strong argument for dispersion.

Let me cite an example that happened yesterday. While running a combined operation with PF elements south of the An Lo Bridge, an area continuously inhabited by friendly farmers, a PF soldier moved through a hedgerow followed by the entire platoon. The district chief, police chief, district advisor and 3 PF soldiers were also moving through the hedgerow behind the platoon. An explosion occurred. It was a 105mm artillery booby trapped round. The results: 3 KIA and 3 WIA. Why? All participants were only a few feet apart. If you've ever walked around after a booby trap has gone off, there's a little sensitivity in the area. Of course you want to try and get the men moving quickly into the attack in order to eliminate this feeling.

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## FIELD EXPEDIENT

Something which we have found very useful is a field expedient which consists of a uniform for the point man. It's made up of a very large pair of fatigues. Inside the fatigues are seven hunks of this armored vest, both trousers and jacket. It does provide shrapnel protection. It does have one disadvantage - it weighs 45 pounds. You'd obviously wear out a point man rapidly especially in weather such as we have today, however, if you rotate your point every 20 minutes it can be used effectively in the field. If units want to try this idea all you have to do is take an old salvaged flak vest, convert it into fatigues. The number you can obtain is dependent upon your supply system; we have four of these outfits in the battalion and usually provide them to the company that is operating in the booby trap area. We have not hit a booby trap since 13 February. We obtained these flak vests about a week later.

### TRAINING

We felt that a critical need for training in anti-mining and booby trapping techniques existed. Even though we were operating in the field in the real situation we still had to get vital information down to the soldier who was living through all of this on a daily basis. We felt a very critical need for training because we encountered something every day that we wanted everyone in all the companies to know about. In the field, it is very difficult to say "Ok Platoon Leader, conduct your training". In order to afford a satisfactory solution, the Division Engineers sent a Mobile Training Team to deliver the message. This team would displace by helicopter, land at a company position, and present a two hour class. The team eventually covered all company size combat units in the division within two and one-half months.

It might be interesting to digress for a moment and observe how this engineer mobile training team prepared itself for its mission. The team went to the Third Marine Division's Land Mine Warfare/Demolitions School and attended their courses. We also sent our MTT's down to the Land Mine Warfare School of the 25th Infantry Division. As a last preparatory measure, we requested that elements of the First ARVN Division, who had operated in our battalion area of operations, share their experiences with us. Training is an important thing and it can be done in the field.

### HARDWARE

I would now like to discuss some of the "hardware" that we use in booby trap situations. We approached the Division Chemical Officer on the subject. We thought, perhaps, that we could burn these booby traps up. We loaded a Chinook with 55 gallon drums of fougasse, became airborne, and eventually over an area that was suspected to be filled with the enemy mines and booby traps. We dropped the fougasse and ignited it. The only significant results were a few secondary explosions. Although it was effective, the dispersion was not as great as we would have liked to have seen. In other words, you would probably burn an area not much larger than this room.

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Since the terrain is as flat as the surface of a pool table, there was no way for it to run and gain distance. Perhaps the best way would be to drop a barrel at a time and just clear a path.

## USE OF ARTILLERY

Another device that we have used to detonate mines and booby traps is artillery in the area using a VT fuze. We have found this to be very effective. The use of H&I fires in the area has resulted in some detonations. We have used artillery fire in front of the platoons as they have moved out. However, due to safety reasons the distance between friendly troops and the artillery impact area provides a sizeable buffer zone covered by small arms fire. We normally use the M-79 grenade launcher to cover this buffer zone, firing at suspected targets as friendly forces moved into the area. There are disadvantages to this technique. The use of small arms fire can give away your position immediately and assist the enemy in identifying your direction of movement.

## SCOUT DOGS

We have also used scout dogs. These animals are very good for detecting things that are unusual in the area. They have effectively assisted us in detecting tripwires and pressure devices. However, dogs tire within 3 to 4 hours and must be rotated. If you keep a scout dog on the alert very long fatigue usually results. To offset this condition we normally have two or three scout dog teams with a company and usually rotate them during the day. A scout dog team is an asset in a field situation such as this.

## COMBINED ARMS

The 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment (minus Troop D) often operates in our area of operation. We grew tired of our infantrymen losing limbs so we combined our cavalry-infantry assets. We formed a combined arms task force, walking the infantry behind the armored personnel carriers and tanks. This was very effective because we were able to detonate anti-personnel mines very easily and clear the path for the infantry in an area devoid of AT mines. The infantry in turn found 105mm and 155mm booby trapped shells and various types of mines. The combined arms team was most effective in the kind of operation.

## ROME PLOW

At this point in time (January 1969), we analyzed the area and determined that it should be "Rome plowed". We thought of the concept of just "planing" the surface and getting rid of all the mines and booby traps once and for all. We submitted a request and the area was cleared by Rome plows. The stretch of land we are working on is as outlined (Chart 15). The area represents the "hotspot" of booby trap activity. We planned to move straight from the foothills all the way to the Song Bo River. Thus far, we have plowed 1800 acres of land. This technique has been very effective because we have located the enemy's tunnels, spider holes, and detonated his booby traps with very little damage to the Rome plow. We have used it many times and detonated 105mm artillery rounds with no damage to the

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RAINING

What have we achieved in four months of combating mines and **booby** traps in our area of operations? First, we have learned and experienced **many** things. We have made our area one that is no longer Viet Cong controlled. We **have** **sig-**  
**nificantly** reduced our casualties. We have **learned**, and put into **practice**, **tech-**  
**niques** to deny the enemy the ability to use booby traps against us. We entered a very frustrating situation and have moved to the point **now where** we can hold our heads **up high**.

Perhaps, our very best activity has been producing the **well-trained** soldier. A soldier knowing what to look for, being able to find the mine and booby trap on the ground, is indispensable.

Let us look at a few figures (Chart 16). I have previously mentioned that there were some **fortifications** in the **area**. There were tunnels, spider holes, and caves. **Let's** November we were in this area with bare hands and infantrymen. At that **time** we found 15 fortifications and destroyed them. During December we found **more** enemy fortifications and requested the use of the Rome plow to clean out **the scrub** brush on the surface of the ground in order to uncover the tunnel **complexes**. In January, we began to use the Rome plow. On the very first day **we discovered** fifteen tunnels. During the entire month we uncovered over a hundred tunnels and other fortifications. We have uncovered four tunnels during the first twenty-seven days of **March**. We **have**, in fact, stripped the "Rome plow" cleared area of the protective fortifications utilized by the Viet **Cong**. We **have** also put a crimp in his booby trap activities and learned how to deal with the booby trap environment to reduce our **casualties**.

I showed you **Area A** and **Area B** on a previous chart. In November, we lost many people due to booby traps. However, in **March**, booby trap incident rate dropped to **zero**. In **Area B** we reduced our own casualties. We also, in that area, reduced the number of booby trap incidents to zero in **February**. We feel that we can point with some pride to the fact that **we've** learned to deal with the booby trap situation and also, frustrate the enemy **in** his ability to use them against **us**. There was the psychological impact of denying an area to the Viet Cong. This was a large area which the enemy had used for cover and concealment and which afforded him a route into Camp Evans **and** the An Lo **Bridge**. I will also mention that very few Hoi **Chanhs** were discovered in our earlier operations. However, **within** the last several weeks, nine Hoi Chanhs have entered the **program**. We have learned, via **interrogations**, what the **enemy's** thoughts are. These concern such things as "There are too many **Americans**", "There are too many tanks out **there**", "There's too much artillery out there" or "We **don't** have a place to store our **rice**". In effect, we have denied him the area which he previously had denied us. For a wrap up, I'd like the Brigade **S2**, Captain **Frederick**, to give us his view of our operational experience over the past four **months**.

As you **can** see from LTC **Sherron's** comments, the enemy has made extensive use of the **area**. However, he has been forced to change his tactics drastically. He lost approximately one-third of his personnel due to friendly activity. Earlier, I mentioned communication **routes**. I discussed two. One route runs to Thoung An. The **second** route **runs** from Hien An, via Hien **Si**, to Dong Lam. The **enemy** has been

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forced to come out of the mountains, cross the Song Bo River, and seek rice in this area. It is our opinion that the enemy has lost his foothold in this area even though small segments of the enemy still exist. He has relinquished his hold mainly due to the relentless pressure and perseverance of our forces.

## LESSONS LEARNED

When a unit hits its first booby trap it should slow down. This should be followed by a slow meticulous search of the area. Do not let the enemy observe you establishing a pattern. Move short distances and move at night. Develop patience. Train the soldier to be patient as he moves through the area. Be sure that it is SOP that 20 meters is maintained between soldiers. Use body armor, armored vehicles, Rome plows.

Use all the ordnance you can obtain. Your artillery, tactical air, fougasse, 14-79's. Use the bangalore torpedo. Always brief your incoming units since AO's are frequently swapped. Teach your men to police the battlefield.

D-9

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
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# *101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AM)*

## *CHARTS*

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# INfiltration ROUTES

3d BRIGADE AO  
CHART 1

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PHONG DIEN DISTRICT




CHART 2

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MEAL, COMBAT, INDIVIDUAL  
BEEF SLICES & POTATOES

W/G 'AVY'

B-2 UNIT

ĐỨNG BƯỚC VÀO  
CONT DƯỚI NÀY  
NGUY HIỂM


C-RATION BOX LID

CHAI 3

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PHONG DIEN DISTRICT




AREAS A AND B

CHART 4

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M26 FRAGMENTATION  
GRENADE




M-26 FRAGMENTATION GRENADE BOOBY TRAP  
CHART 5

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


M-26 FRAGMENTATION GRENADE BOOBY TRAP

CHART 6


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
CHI COM GRENADE BOOBY TRAP  
CHART 7

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PRESSURE RELEASE TYPE BOOBY TRAP  
 CHART 8 UNCLASSIFIED

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


FRENCH FUZED GRENADE BOOBY TRAP

CHART 9  
UNCLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED CHART 10


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ELECTRICAL HOMEMADE BOOBY TRAP  
CHART 11

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UNCLASSIFIED




BAMBOO  
STICK

BAMBOO STAKE BOOBY TRAP  
CHART 12

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
COMPONENTS OF  
ANIPRC 25 RADIO  
BATTERY

BAMBOO STRIP BOOBY TRAP WITH COMPONENTS, AN-PRC 25  
BATTERY ENCLOSED

CHART 13  
UNCLASSIFIED

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
155 ARTILLERY FUZE PLUG WITH  
35 METERS OF NYLON CORD USED  
AS A DEVICE TO DETONATE BOOBY  
TRAPS

"KILLER EYE"

CHART 14

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P. OWEI AREA  
CHART 15  
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BOOBY TRAPS AND CASUALTIES

MONTH	U.S. KIA	U.S. WIA	TOTAL CAS	TOTAL BBT ENGAGED
NOVEMBER	3	24	27	23
DECEMBER	4	28	32	29
JANUARY	1	22	23	22
FEBRUARY	0	3	3	14
MARCH	0	0	0	0
CUM TOTAL	8	77	85	88

ENEMY POSITIONS DESTROYED

MONTH	MONTHLY TOTALS
NOVEMBER	16
DECEMBER	29
JANUARY	52
FEBRUARY	64
MARCH	
CUM TOTALS	165

CHART 16

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## PRESENTATION

MACV J2 CMEC

### MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

General Drake, General Carney, Gentlemen: I'm from the Counterintelligence Exploitation Center (CIEC) MACV J2 Section. This is the organization that takes a considerable length of time to provide you with pertinent information. However, we are taking steps to remedy this situation as it pertains to mines and booby traps.

My purpose is to discuss the SECOM program. SECOM is an acronym for Study and Evaluation of Countermine Operations. The purpose of SECOM is to provide a means of analyzing mine and booby trap activities and exploiting the information gained. The desired end result is to minimize, in-country, the number of enemy mine and booby trap incidents.

In early 1967, the Army Concept Team in Vietnam, (ACTV) made a study of enemy mines and booby trap incidents in-country. It determined that 4300 friendly casualties resulted from enemy mines and booby traps. Seventy (70) percent of friendly tank and armored personnel carrier losses were due to mines and booby traps. As a result of its analysis, ACTV produced a seven volume study on this subject. One of the recommendations of this study was that a central staff agency be designed to exploit the system, reporting on enemy mines and booby traps. CMEC has been delegated the responsibility to conduct the SECOM program. CMEC will be assisted in this endeavor by the Mine Warfare Center of the USARV Engineer Section. The latter agency will conduct an analysis on mines and booby traps as well as countermine research and development.

In front of each of you is a form (Handout 1) entitled "Mine/Booby Trap Report". This form contains the format for the reporting of enemy mine and booby trap incidents. A CV directive will be published highlighting how this form is to be filled out, who is responsible for filling it out, and method of submission of this report to higher headquarters.

The second handout (Handout 2) contains a brief summary about the SECOM project.

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upgraded at 3 year

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## MINE/BOOBY TRAP REPORT

Mine

Booby Trap

UNIT (BDE/DIV)

Mo

Location f  
30

## HOW DETECTED

1. Detonation
2. Visual
3. Civ Informat
4. Dtr PRS-4
5. Dtr PRS-3 or 153
6. Probe
7. Other\*

\*(Explain in remarks)

## TYPE XPLOS V

1. Mine
2. Claymore
3. Grenade
4. Arty/Mortar Rd
5. Bomb
6. TNT
7. Other\*
8. Unknown

## ORIGIN OF MANUFACTURE

1. US
2. USSR
3. CHICOM
4. VC Local
5. Other\*

\*\*If possible report in remarks:  
type fuse, type ammo (HE, WP,  
etc) caliber and lot number if US.

## SIZE OF CHARGE

1. 0-10 lbs
2. 11-20 lbs
3. 21-40 lbs
4. Over 40 lbs

## CIV IN AREA

1. None
2. Hostile
3. Friendly
4. Indifferent

## TYPE FIRING DEVIC

1. Pressure
2. Pressure Release
3. Pull
4. Pull Release
5. Cmd Electric
6. Cmd Pull
7. Press/Electric
8. Tripwire
9. Other\*
10. Unknown

## LAST FRIENDLY PASSAGE

1. 0-1/2hrs
2. 1/2-3hrs
3. 3-6 hrs
4. 6-12 hrs
5. 12-24 hrs
6. 1-2 days
7. Over 2 days
- Unknown

## TYPE VEHICLE

1. 1/4 T
2. 3/4 T
3. 2 1/2 T
4. 5 T
5. APC
6. Tank
7. Other\*
8. N/A

## TEN OF DAMAG

1. Light(operational)
2. Moderate(org maint)
3. Heavy(spt maint)
4. Destroyed

## TOTAL CASUALTIES

KIA  
39  
WIA

## MAJOR INJURY LOCATIO

1. Head/Neck
2. Upper Torso
3. Abdomen/Groin
4. Feet/Legs
5. Hands/Arms
6. Yes
7. No

Man #1

Man #3

MACV-CICV (CMC) ATTN: ENGR, APC 96307

HAND OUT 1

**FIDETIAL**

Study and Evaluation of Countermining Activities (SECMA)

14 Feb 69

1. In early 1968 the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) headquartered at USARV Hqs, Long Binh, RVN conducted a SECMA project. The project involved, for the most part, selected Army and Marine Units throughout
2. The major effort of the study centered around the report format attached here as Inclosure #1. The report was filled out for all mine and booby trap incidents. The reports were very accurately and neatly completed by everyone from squad leaders to company commanders to battalion S2's.
3. The reports were forwarded to ACTIV on a monthly basis. At ACTIV, they were put into a computer program and monthly/bimonthly printouts were obtained. These summarized mine and booby trap incidents for each reporting unit. Since the study was aimed towards technical rather than combat intelligence, plotouts (map overlays) were apparently not made.
4. The project, as it is being reinstituted command wide by MACV, will be aimed mainly at technical intelligence. We feel that the monthly or bimonthly (not decided upon yet) analyses will be of interest to the tactical field commander. Hopefully, after a period of 3-6 months, trends will be identified that will be of great use to the field commander. These might include locations, employment, types of firing devices, and types of mines or booby traps predominant in a given area. The goal here is to enable field commanders to better utilize their resources and, most importantly, to help reduce friendly casualties. Analyses, in report form, will be disseminated by MACV J2 as soon as possible after the close of each reporting period. Significant information of urgent tactical use will be disseminated by electrical message.
5. To make this project work, it is imperative that G2/S2 officers understand it, appreciate its potential results, sell it to their commanders, and insure that all responsible personnel throughout the unit appreciate the importance of rapidly and accurately completing and forwarding the report format.
6. If questions arise about the forthcoming MACV Directives on this project, the quickest response will be obtained by directly contacting the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center.

Phone: TSN-3373/2309  
 MACV-4218  
 EAC-168

HQ MACV-CICV (CMEC)  
 ATTN: Engr Sec  
 APO 96307

Handout 2

E-3

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ID BOO?

General Drake, General Carney, Gentlemen. I am Major Skinner, a representative of the USARV Engineer Mine Warfare Center. After having listened to your comments through this I feel I should be able to offer you a quick solution to many of your problems. Unfortunately, I cannot do it, nor will the magic of my USARV patch allow it. But I can give you one inD solution to a booby trap problem.

A traveling salesman who, a few years ago, rather than travel around in a car and stay at farmhouses used to fly from place to place which required him to fly a great deal. This occurred in the period about a decade ago when a lot of bombs were being placed in aircraft. This man was quite worried that someday he might get on the wrong plane. He conducted a very thorough analysis and ascertained that the odds of a bomb being carried onto a single plane were about 1 in 50,000. This fact, temporarily, pleased him. After he had had dozens of additional trips he began to think about how much he was flying and what his odds were of getting that one plane in 50,000. After making a second study he determined that the odds of carrying two bombs on the same plane were one in a billion. This really pleased him so he thought he would play the odds. From that time on, whenever he flew, he carried a bomb with him.

I am the Analysis Officer in the Engineer Mine Warfare Center. You can see what sort of things are going through my mind by that story. I am prepared to briefly discuss what the Mine Warfare Center is doing and what we're interested in. The Mine Warfare Center was organized last January and is under the Engineer Section, Military Operations Division, USARV G3. The Center is composed of three officers and three enlisted men.

Our mission is to serve as a point of contact between Research and Development activities in CONUS and units in the field. We also have an interest in conducting analyses of all the data we can gather from the field.

Let me first discuss some of our activities in the countermining area and what's being done in R&D. There is an ENSURE program which stands for "Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment". The USARV G-3 is the action officer on this particular program. It is a system whereby if you have an idea for a piece of equipment you need which is not in the current inventory and you can formulate the requirement, the item can be built in CONUS and shipped to the user in an expeditious fashion. This is assuming that the item is not too technically complicated. It does, however, save some time from the normal 10 year lag but probably not a whole lot.

There have been some mine rollers brought into country and tested. For example, there is ENSURE Item 201. This is a mine roller that can be pushed by either an APC (one mode) or by a tank (a second mode). These items work on an air transfer bellows system which picks up air pressure from the vehicle on to the rollers themselves. The roller consists of two banks of wheels, one bank in front of each track. The bank of wheels (6 wheels in all) are individually articulate. This means they can move individually when one moves into a rut; the other wheels remaining level. There was a system which had the pressure to be redistributed so that you obtain good pressure in the hole. However, nothing covered the gap in between the two banks of tracks. That's one of the major problems because you can tow anything. Towing is always much easier than trying to push something.

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JUP 4.  
Do not release at 3 year  
interval

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These rollers were by tested at 26th Engineers in the American Division (APC model) and the 65th Engineers in the 25th Infantry Division (tank model). The tank model had a promise. Both models ably demonstrated their ability to not fail. The technique developed is that when they detonate a mine, the wheel goes up (it's expendable) and there's a shear device whereby it will be pulled from the bay roller assembly which is not expendable. The wheel assembly costs several hundred dollars but it's quite a bit cheaper than a life, a casualty, a lost tank, or APC.

These experiments proved worthwhile. There were several mechanical failures in the structures, i.e., the main frame. The APC roller was found to adversely influence the performances of the APC. It drained too much power from the engine. The roller attachment is now being redesigned for the tank pushed ENSURE II. I've also learned that it is eighteen months away from issue which is rather discouraging.

There are three or four mine rollers now in-country. One is located with an engineer battalion in the Delta. The 34th Engineer Battalion is preparing to build one. In addition, the 65th Engineer Battalion and the USARV Mine Warfare Center each have one. The latter was designed by Major Kleb and constructed by an engineer battalion located at Long Binh (Chart 1). The roller was built in January and tested a month later. The roller was tested with a 20 pound mine and the latter blew up the frame. Another one has been built and is being tested today. In several weeks, we should hopefully be able to show you some films of a successful test that has taken place. Several days ago, the Chief of Engineers saw the device and was very pleased. He offered to have the main frame built in the States. If this occurs and our tests are successful, what we hope to do is provide any unit which is charged with a road clearing responsibility with one of these devices.

In order to adapt the mine roller to a usable Army vehicle, it will take a modification to a 5 ton truck which is the vehicle we're using to push the test roller. A 5 ton truck or any larger vehicle is what is required to push this roller. It requires a tow device to cover the center lane of the road which is not covered by the tow banks of wheels in the front. Thus far, this device offers real promise. I wish I could give you the results of the test today.

Mine detectors are found to be entirely unsatisfactory in many parts of the country, particularly in the Delta and some parts of III Corps. In lieu of finding manufactured mines or ordnance in the road, they are finding recast TNT wrapped in burlap, or plastic container of some configuration. If a very small amount of metal is available in a pressure electric system, the mine detector will not pick it up. One reason for this is the presence of too much background noise on the road from H&I fires. In order to define what the mine detector is capable of doing, we have just completed several tests and are presently attempting to relate our results in terms of what the average background noises are. What, in fact, can a detector pick up in the course of operations?

This test was conducted at Long Binh. It will, when you see the report, have some benefit to you and you can adapt it to your area and determine what a well-trained operator can achieve with a P-153 mine detector. Believe me, not everybody can use a P-153 mine detector. Various units have vigorous programs for training their personnel. The Australian Task Force, for example, makes it a very prestigious position to be a mine detector operator.

The other mine detector that exists is the non-metallic detector, the PRS-4. It works on the principle. Whenever there is a change of density in the soil such as a tree root, tin can, or similar item, it will provide a signal. It has shown that there are too many false signals with this

detector. If you use it religiously <sup>you</sup> you a stopping, in most cases, every 6 inches, a foot, or yard. Most units don't use it. This summer we're obtaining PRS-7's in-country to replace all PRS-4's. However, it's the same detector, transistorized and lighter.

We have been working on a couple of mine detectors that are just in a conceptual stage. One is a neutralization device which will neutralize all explosive devices in the ground. This will be a great accomplishment. The objective guide sounds beautiful but, again, it's a long way off. Also, there are such things as jeep mine detectors which have been around for some time. There are also some remote control jeep mine detectors just coming over. These, however, work on the metallic principle and they will only enjoy limited success. In the areas that primarily have metallic mines, they should work quite well. Otherwise, they're going to be destroyed quickly and are very expensive.

Another area I want to touch on is scout dogs. I'm very pleased to mention that the 101st Abn Div likes scout dogs and uses them very much. I don't believe any of the scout dogs in-country have received any special or extensive training in mine or booby trap detection. There is, however, a platoon being formed in the states due in-country in April which has 30 dogs - 12 trained in mine and booby trap detection, 12 trained in mines, tunnels and caches, and 6 spare dogs. There's going to be a sixty day training period. These dogs, I believe, are going to the 25th and Americal Divisions.

Some analysis work that is being initiated at USARV is SECMA's reporting system. We're trying to encourage our engineer battalions to begin it at once.

It's going to take a sizeable data bank to get significant findings out of it. Again, I'm sure that a lot of conclusions are going to be fairly obvious. It's going to be a good technique for gathering information.

There are many different areas of search. This could include, for example, a province area or a unit AO, examined and scrutinized and perhaps conclusions drawn from the resultant analysis. Another is the effects of paving or oiling or penpriming roads. I'm sure all of you would agree that paving a road has a great effect on the prevention of mine incidents.

To show exactly what we're talking about, I've picked a few roads on which we're attempting to obtain data. Unfortunately, none are in I Corps. We're working on QL-19, between An Khe and Pleiku, two roads in III Corps near the Cu Chi area and QL-4 in the Delta, which is being upgraded now. The resultant statistics are quite favorable. For example, on one stretch of QL-13, Chu Chi to Tra Bang, there were over 100 incidents in 1968. So far this year, there's only been a fraction of that and the paving of the road surface is just about complete. At the present time the incident rate is almost non-existent. There are almost no incidents at all on that section of road.

I see you are running into different things in different areas. When you're traveling cross-country, it's grenades and booby traps. On the roads, it's manufactured ordnance and some captured 105 and 155mm artillery duds. IV Corps, for some reason, has a lot of recast TNT mines. II Corps, in the northern part, has a lot of manufactured mines. The southern part has 105's and 155's. These are only trends.

In the Delta, they are getting a lot of grenades. Grenades, under the water with trip wires; some Chicom grenades and a lot of M-26's. You mentioned lot numbers. I am attempting right now. There are many other


**CONFIDEN**

general conclusion.

Basically, I would like for you to know that the USARV Land Mine Warfare Center exists. We're expanding **our functions**. We are trying to develop an effective mine roller and conduct experimentation in mine detection equipment. We would appreciate any problems you desire to present to us as well as any information you would like to exchange with **us**. Our phone numbers are LONG BINH 4925 or 3734. Thank you.

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# M2A1 EXPEDIENT MINE CLEARING ROLLER

CHART 1

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## III MAF G2

## MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

Good afternoon General. I'm Major Sydenham, III MAF G2 **Section**. We are running a continual study of the mine and booby trap threat existent throughout **ICTZ**. We've noticed as **part** of our record keeping that the ROK Marine brigade, which operates in the southeastern portion of **Quang** Nam province, has an outstanding ratio of booby traps and mines discovered and neutralized as opposed to those that **are unintentionally** detonated. We thought, perhaps, that there is a reason for this success so we sent an officer down recently to talk with them to find out why. We **also** heard that the Australian Task Force, **which** operates in III Corps, has had similar success. They were also visited by the **same officer**. Unfortunately, we did not come up with a magical **solution**. We found that their success is based on the same sound tactical principles and command emphasis that you would **suspect**.

I would like to confine my remarks to a visit with the 3rd ROK Marines since they are operating in I **Corps**. Probably the basic reason for their success is the extreme emphasis that the ROK Brigade **Commander** places on **the mine** and booby trap threat. To illustrate this emphasis, I would like to relate to you what the ROK Bde G3 told our visiting officer when he **went** down there to get General Lee's reaction. He said that prior to every operation General Leesendsa message to the unit involved and always closes with the same words, "Spread Out". Then he goes down to the **COG** and monitors the operation. The G3 said that if there is one booby trap detonated and a casualty results, General **Lee** gets mad but he just sits **there**. If there is one booby trap detonated and two casualties result, he gets on the radio to the battalion commander and raises "ned" with **him**. If there is one **booby** trap detonated with three casualties General Lee gets very **unhappy**. The G3 then runs and hides someplace and **General** Lee gets in his chopper and **flies out** to the **field**. What happens there was not **related**.

The ROK brigade keeps very detailed records of their mine and booby trap **experience**. Any battalion that has a ratio of those discovered and neutralized to those discovered and unintentionally detonated less than 1 to 1 is in big trouble for that month.

Now to specific countermeasures that the brigade employs to reduce the threat in their **area**. There is an intensive training program that starts in **Korea** **After** new troops arrive in South Vietnam, another intensive 5 day training program is conducted in which mines and booby traps are **discussed**. They also have a 3 day mine and booby trap school which is based on the one **established** by the 1st Marine Division. This school is attended by **all** platoon leaders, squad leaders, **fire** team leaders, and point men. Other personnel of the brigade attend as time permits. In addition, every squad carries a 3 prong grappling hook to clear mines **in** the same way described by LTC Sherron. They try to hold their operations to a 7-10 day time **frame**. They've also learned that as the length of an operation increases, the troops become careless and an increase in mines and booby trap incidents will result. When they run across a heavily mined area, they bypass **it**. They **stress** careful movement and dispersal - a minimum of 15 yards between men,

In summary, their success can be attributed to training and strenuously applied principles; their degree of success is directly **proportional** to the emphasis placed on it by **all** leaders from the brigade commander down to the fire team leaders. For the second part of the III MAF **presentation**, LTC Bunnell, who has very recently joined

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year

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the III MAF G2 Section from the 7th Marine Regiment where he spent 7 months, will discuss the problems that arise in Quang Nam Province in which our records show that over 50% of all casualties occur because of mine and booby trap incidents.

I'm a recent addition to your program, I came up here mostly just to visit with your G2 but I did spend 7 months with the 7th Marines. More than 50% of the casualties in the First Marine Division are caused by booby traps. There are two major areas: (1) Where the 1st Marines are operating south of Da Nang along the coast; (2) The other along the western approach to Da Nang and, in particular, they are known as the "Rocket Belt" - an area from which the rockets are fired on Da Nang. We have the "Rocket Belt" area. Booby traps are a daily occurrence, I'm sorry to say, in that area everyday; the only problem is the number that they will have and what they will do about it.

There is a vast and intensive program within the First Marine Division concerning this problem. For example, the ADC has been assigned by CG, 1st Mar Div, to conduct a series of seminars on this very subject. There was a meeting of all regimental commanders to discuss it last Tuesday. We've had a series of division seminars always looking, as people mentioned earlier today, for some logical solution. We've come up with none.

The division does conduct a school, an intensive school and everyone from the private up goes through the Land Mine Warfare School. There's indoctrination at battalion, company, and platoon level. No marine in the First Marine Division is allowed to go out on any patrol until he's been down at the company level for at least 5 days and during those 5 days he gets a minimum of 4 hours of instruction on mines and booby traps.

We have an intensive program of road preparation and this, perhaps, will be my only reference to the mine as a road mine or a land mine as opposed to the surprise firing device problem. We found that we can do a great deal in the First Marine Division TAOR with a program of paving where possible and we have only one or two of the roads that are of sandy surface. We oil the surface when we can't pave. The best single way to spot mines, despite the metal detector, for both engineers and the infantry, is a sharp pair of eyes and a change in the surface condition of the road. The patrol that goes over the road daily, if it's a road that has been oiled, will spot a change in the road and this picks up 85-90% of our mines.

We keep very intensive book in the 7th Marines right down to battalion. Battalion commanders keep book on the company commanders and, I'm sure, it moves all the way down to the fire team. We maintain records on what percentage of the casualties are caused by surprise firing devices. What percentage of the surprise firing devices are detonated as opposed to discovered. How many casualties per detonation - the same problem the ROK Brigade had. What percentage of our surprise firing devices are discovered as a result of the Voluntary Informant Program. We maintain these records weekly at the regimental level. The indications are very clear that the best outfit in the regiment, the best company in the battalion, and the best platoon in the company has the best percentages right down the line - it's the same problem LTC Sherron mentioned.

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When you get good training and good leadership, good direction right down to the platoon, we come very close to whipping our problem.

In our First Marine Division seminar, the 7th Marine's contribution was a second lieutenant whose platoon in the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, had been in Operation Dodge City, through the "Rocket Belt", and had discovered 50 mines in the past three months and never detonated one of them. This fellow told the division command group this story, "I just don't allow them in my platoon". He personally briefed every patrol before it departed on a mission. No man was a point man in his platoon, ever, unless he had been in-country for three months. He trained his point men individually to watch for people who were especially good at detecting mines and booby traps and when it came time to relieve a point man in one of his fire teams, he knew which man was the next man in that fire team and he moved the selected individual up to it. Every time they discovered a mine or booby trap in the field, he had a standard SOP. When someone shouted "Booby Trap", everyone froze in place. There was none of this running to the side where you'd catch the second booby trap. They all froze. His squads carried their grappling hooks. Every night when they came back from patrol to discuss the booby trap problem and it was just a matter of pride in that platoon that they just "do not detonate booby traps" and they haven't. I think example is there and is a valid one.

The experienced fire team point man will spot the booby trap nine times out of ten. When the percentage of booby traps exploded goes above 50% you've got a bum point man out there. That's all there is to it. If troops are stumbling over them, they are not adequately trained. A well trained Marine, who has gone through these schools, just doesn't kick the things.

What conclusions can I offer? In the case of road mining, we believe that a great deal can be done by clearing the shoulders of the road and by paving the surface of the road. The cheapest way is dumping diesel fuel on the road or oiling the road. This will provide a surface that will show signs of tampering. We believe that there should be an intensive training program. This means that it should have priority over other training programs since more than 50% of our casualties are produced by booby traps. It's our number one training objective in the First Marine Division.

We train every man on his way in to a unit. We insist on training every man before he is allowed to go on a patrol. We have a contact team, similar to what the Third Marine Division has, which flies out on short notice and hits each company once a month. We demand command attention right down through the platoon leader, squad leader and fire team leader. If I haven't offered you any real secrets I'm sorry. However, we think this is the right way to attack it.

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 SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

After each representative ~~has~~ stated his presentation a short discussion ensued on the salient points addressed. The **content of** these discussions are summarized in question and answer form.

### THIRD MARINE DIVISION

Q. How frequently does the Viet Cong mark the location of a mine?

A. The answer is quite **frequently**. We have discovered several types of marking devices. One that is frequently used is the broken stick. Another marker that we found quite recently was a vine with rocks tied to it and placed in a circle. Another type of marker is the familiar outline of an arrowhead formed by rocks. We've also noted that sometimes the mines are piled at right angles to the mine marker.

Q. In your **countersweep** operations, what particular techniques do your people follow when attempting to locate enemy claymores and ambushes?

A. We put our "trust" in our security force. This is a sweep team in staggered formation. Of course, with the mine detector and the prober behind him, we have a repeated pattern of detector - prober, detector - prober. In front of this team, of course, is a point man. We hope that, through their vigilance, the team will locate some of the enemy claymores and ambushes. Our sweep personnel are primarily concerned with observing the road and its shoulders.

Q. How does the enemy camouflage these claymore mines?

A. The enemy normally identifies a narrow portion of a high cut on each side of the road where there's dense vegetation and the likelihood exists that friendly forces will send out flank security. The enemy also secures the claymores up in the trees and brush. The mines are not actually located on the surface of the ground. In this respect, the mines are partially camouflaged. There is another **tactic** that they've developed. As you know, we have **responsibility** for Route 9. Lately, we have been receiving quite a bit of enemy activity with respect to enemy mine incidents. Of course, when you blow these mines, the detonation leaves a crater which causes an obstruction in the road. This requires that the hole caused by **the detonation**, be filled. The Seabees have countered this by piling rocks along the road at "logical" mining locations in an **attempt** to expedite the filling of the hole. However, the enemy is now inserting his **claymores** into these piles of rock. I might also add that as improvements are made on the road, such as grading, it really complicates our road mine sweeps. As I pointed out earlier, 90% of our mines are discovered visually. This is because Route 9 is a **hard-surface** road. Anytime you attempt to dig up the surface of such a road and attempt to bury a mine beneath, it's difficult to camouflage it. When the Marine grader grades the road for maintenance purposes, a sizeable quantity of **loose dirt** is left on the surface of the road. This affords the **necessary** materials for camouflaging the emplacement of a mine. This is basically accomplished by burying the mine and **spreading** rocks over the top of it to ensure that the mine is well camouflaged.

Q. What is the normal size of your security force in the directed sweep?

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
 declassified after 12 years

# CONFIDENTIAL

A. On routine sweeps, we use two squads of infantry and a couple of armored vehicles.

Q. With respect to these two squads that serve as security on the mine sweep, do you rotate the squads or do you use a couple of dedicated squads?

A. Unfortunately sir, it depends on who's in the area. Our battalions move through out the are very frequently. Our sweep teams are established at various locations and maintain the same sweep pattern.

However, as the various infantry battalions or companies move into an area, a representative would just say 1st Plat, Co A, you have the sweep tomorrow morning". The following morning, this platoon would show up at the designated start point at 0630 hours. Our sweep team would attempt to brief them on what they might find and what the route formation would be. There is no continuous use of the same infantry personnel.

Q. How far do you sweep down the road?

A. The average sweep is about 4000 to 5000 meters and we're usually finished about 1000 hours. This representative of a very slow sweep.

Q. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the mine detector?

A. It is the best device that we have available for detecting mines. You can use a substitute item such as a pick. However, you have to patch the road back up again.

Q. What is your opinion concerning the techniques of asphaltting the surface of the road as an anti-mining technique?

A. Asphaltting is a very effective anti-mining technique. The Viet Cong will often dig a hole, bury a mine, and patch the hole with asphalt. Then, they will take a tire and run it back and forth several times to ensure that road will appear to have been used.

Q. To what extent do you find anti-personnel mines connected to booby traps or other mines (excluding the claymore)?

A. No extent whatsoever. Only the enemy claymore mine has been the real bugaboo.

Q. Are you bothered with small metallic objects such as nails, nuts, and bolts being thrown on the surface of a road either innocently by friendly troops or by the enemy?

A. The P153/158 mine detector picks up metallic objects of any size. This emphasizes one of the purposes of the enemy's false mining routines and that is to wear down the patience of the friendly sweep team.

Q. Is there any reward system for indigenous personnel who report pertinent information on enemy mines and booby trap activity to friendly forces?

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A. Yes, the Voluntary Informant Program. We've achieved some degree of success with this particular program. Indigenous personnel in our area are generally ~~pcor.~~ They are usually glad to receive the piaster reward after trading off information.

Q. What is the difference between the Soviet TM 46 and TMN 46 mines?

A. The one displayed earlier before you was a TM 46. The TMN 46 has a supplementary fuze well in the bottom for booby trap purposes.

QC You stated that you get most of your action during a seven day period each month. Do you have any method which gives you an indication when this period might occur such as the "dark of the moon" or anything like that?

A. No sir. This trend is just something I've noticed in the past few months. The enemy selects one particular week each month and really "puts" it to use. The odd thing about it is that it's always in the same place. On Route 9, there is a strip of road 2000 to 4000 meters in length that's mined. This is our only place. During the particular week in question, it is mined everyday. This puts terrific pressure on the sweepsteam. This is where the enemy also established its ambushes. I have no magic answer why or how the enemy picks a particular week. It just so happens that once it starts, you're going to find mines during the remainder of the week. There's another trend that we've noted in connection with this week of mining. There appears to be a definite trend with respect to areas. The enemy selects an area, saturates it with mines for a period of time, then departs. Last November and early December, we found Route 5-61 going north from Cam Lo to Con Thien as their favorite spot.

Q. (MG Drake) I'd like to ask the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) about their experiences in minesweeps and ambushes?

A. Sir, we've had one incident in the 3d Brigade AO where the enemy has sniped at a mine sweep team. We have found dummy ambush positions with some steel rods for rifle barrels and 50 caliber casing placed to resemble a M-60 MG barrel.

### TASK ORCE CLEARWATER

Q. Have you had any problems with your PACV's concerning mines?

A. No. In our area, we've had little mining,

Q. (Posed by element, 101st Abn Div (AM) team) As an infantryman, I'm interested in bridges. I've got to protect one down at An Lo. Have you any "Lessons Learned" with regards to floating type mines that might bounce into the structures that hold up the bridge or, any idea of standoff protection devices that might keep them from getting around the pilings?

A. I have been involved in this subject. I've found that the question of water front and base defense is very similar to the bridge defense business. I've been involved in this, regrettably, for about three weeks, courtesy of III MAF and XXIV Corps. It's a real problem. It's a function of how much money people want to spend on it to start with. I know that the question of bridge defense and the associated topic, boat defense/ship defense, has been one of MACV's major problems for the past two years. This is listed as one of COMUSMACV's twenty five major problems every year. Are you talking sophisticated or nonsophisticated approaches to this problem?

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We've found that the best defense against any of these drifting devices is a concussion grenade. It'll set them off. But, then, the problem is "do you have enough concussion grenades?" There is a great shortage of these things now. We've found that this is a very useful device against practically all mines, particularly if there's anything floating. If we see anything floating below the surface of the Cua Viet River, we throw a grenade at it because it's liable to be a mine. We have had many detonations. A great number of these thirty eight explosions were brought about by tossing a concussion grenade at a little pile of debris which is standard routine. Now, if you're talking about swimmer as well as mines, we have a different problem. We don't have any perimeter lighting. We're an outpost. A swimmer, who attacked the base on the 21st of February, had Russian SCUBA gear with recycles. The swimmer can stay down three to four hours, walk around at a depth of twenty five feet of water, and the question is "how do you combat a guy like-that?" If the enemy's got this kind of gear, you've got troubles.

COMMENT: (101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)) We have responsibility for securing several bridges. First, we put an APC on a sand bar in the river. This vehicle and its occupants are oriented down stream. We've taken two assault boats, built a platform on them and placed them beneath the bridge and put four infantrymen on them with starlight scopes. These guards look upstream. Then, there is a bridge that runs parallel to the one that we built there which is guarded by the ARVN. We walk our patrol through it and they drop concussion grenades on the side which is upstream. However, this is always a fluctuating problem. These are some of the measures that we have taken which may be of value to the people here.

COMMENT: (3d Marine Division) We have found that firing the M-16 rifle into the river at debris is not as effective as the concussion grenade.

COMMENT: (3d Marine Division) With respect to these floating mines in the Cam Lo River, a waterpoint, and a bridge, we use a flotsam dam which is nothing more than a one inch cable, about 15 or 16 fifty-five gallon drums banded together, and concertina wire underneath the bottom of it. It catches anything that floats down the river.

COMMENT: (Task Force Clearwater) We have a peculiar problem at our outpost. We have a very-small base with a large number of multi-size boats. These include patrol craft, logistic craft, etc. About the time we established big barricades to protect our-boats from the swimmers, Charlie sends in some 122mm rocket rounds and you've got to scramble-the boats. You can imagine such a drill is anything but fun. We're damned if we do and damned if we don't.

Q. Sir, are you going to receive Project Deuce?

A. I understand that there is only one model of Project Deuce in existence in-country. It consists of a fire hose which shoots a high muzzle velocity at the rate of 200 pounds/square inch. We figure we can go driving down the Cua Viet with this hose out in front of us, blow all of the water out of the riverbed, and practically detonate every mine therein. I'm told that the pressure caused by this stream of water will penetrate two feet of concrete at 200 feet. Just think what it would do to a mine at the bottom. It might be a good way of taking out some of these people at night. Anyway, we're going to get the first model over here. The powers that be in the States probably thought that nobody in their right mind would want one of these things. It sounds like a beautiful idea. If you think you've got a mine

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threat just go on down the river and blow the mine out of the riverbed. I don't know if the local VC in the resettlement villages would like it very much. It would probably hew up some of their sampans in the process - sounds like a great "gadget" anyway.

1015 2BORN DIVISION (AM)

Q. Do you have any engineers in direct support of your battalion? If so, how do you employ them?

A. We do not usually have a near direct support of engineers on a daily basis. However, we have an engineer in the rear especially when we started the Rome plow business. We used an engineer element to sweep the way for the plow. We did, unfortunately, lose more engineers due to their encountering frequent trip wires while probing for booby traps and mines with their mine detectors. We primarily use the infantryman with a sharp visual eye to move him ahead of the armored vehicles in the operational area. This does not purport to say that engineers are non-effective.

Q. From the grenades you have discovered or exploded, have you tried to trace any of the lot numbers to see if they originated from our troops or ARVN logistical resources?

A. From experience, I would say it's the grenade that falls off the belt of the troopers. In this case, the troopers are probably mine. However, you have brought up a good point. Trace by lot numbers, could be most revealing.

It is interesting to note that the enemy seems to employ a mine with a pressure-electric device or pressure-type anti-tank mines?

A. I think it's because of the level of operations. The Viet Cong use simple devices such as trip wires. They rarely use an NVA manufactured booby trap.

Has anybody dreamed up a device that could be fired from the M79 grenade launcher that could be used to drag through prospective trip wire locations and set them off.

A. No. We, in our case, attempt to keep this technique very simple. We try to keep it down to something that you would expect every squad or platoon to have. The device, which we showed earlier, has worked quite effectively in our area of operations. If you're using bangalore torpedoes in this respect, you have to put some type of dummy portion in it. If you detonate a mine using just the bangalore torpedo, you will also ignite the bangalore itself and it will also blow up the user. The dummy portion could be made up of bamboo or empty filler portions in front so that when contact is made with an enemy mine or booby trap, it will blow up the dummy portion of the bangalore torpedo.

Q. What about booby trapping the trails the enemy uses to enter your operational area?

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A: Generally, we don't mine an area and leave the mine in place. It's only to the fact that we move our units about so rapidly that in fact, we have little time to exchange information as detailed as the mine location and trace of mines. We're trying to indoctrinate our people, however, with the fact that in contact is a reaction force. One of the things we want to be in that area right now and, fifteen minutes from now, lifted out and not be there another week. We may have to put another unit in there in the meantime. We start seeding an area with our own mines, to be creating an unmanageable problem for the next unit that comes in. We've found it impossible to control the location of these minefields. We pass the mine from unit to unit.

USARV ENGINEER

Q: During my entire tenure of twenty years in the service, the Army has been totally developing a jeep mounted mine detector. I even wonder about the use of the jeep as a vehicle. It has been so totally unsuccessful. Why don't we use a mine detector on a truck so that we'll have some confidence. I think a truck would be a satisfactory vehicle. We have few casualties in five years. At least, as it's driven down the road, it should offer some protection confidence to the operator.

A: That's very true. The 5 ton truck is a great vehicle for actually running a road. You've got several feet of stand-off distance and if you detonate. For instance, strictly a blast mine, you're three or four feet away and you're not in good condition. It's hard on the gears and, no doubt about it, going to be tough on the wheels, axle, and engine. It can, of course, drive other material back into the cab but casualties are really reduced by using 5 ton trucks or anything larger. AIC's are terrible, mainly because they are too close to the ground. By being too close to the ground, the floor is often driven up into the cab. Unfortunately, whether it's a pure blast mine or a fragmentation mine, the jeep is, perhaps, the most unsafe vehicle on the road from a standpoint of mines. A 5 ton truck, or anything larger, is the safest. We're geared towards our engineer battalions or the tank where it will work fine.

Q: What is the status of "Astrolite"?

A: This is a liquid explosive. Last year, we had a team here with a tunnel construction kit. It was using nitromethane in lay-flat tubing. The nitromethane is pumped into this tubing and it works as the volume expanded the tube. Accompanying the team was an individual from the Explosive Corporation of America, who was trying to sell liquid explosive called "Astrolite". This is a two-part explosive. When the two parts are mixed, they are inert. They can be mixed together to make an explosive. The mixture is pumped up to a pressure of 26 K. without detonating. It seems to me that this would be a real valuable commodity for counter-booby trap activity similar to LTC Sherron's fougasse experiment. If this stuff was dumped into an area in plastic bags and allowed to spread out over an area and then one detonation occurred, you could obtain large area overpressure that could possibly purify the area of boobytraps.

Q: Can you give us a little information concerning the mine roller project you previously discussed?

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A. The project officer is Major George ~~Leb~~, also of the USARV Engineer's Mine Warfare Section. The M2A1 expedient mine ~~clearing~~ roller is so designed that when a mine is hit the wheel assembly blows free and the main frame does not absorb any of the blast effects. It was tested on a 20 pound mine and it worked beautifully. The wheels and tires are of the 5-ton capacity. Each wheel carries more than 650 pounds. It is being transported to the 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, and will be ~~used~~ on two roads near Cu Chi with heavy enemy mining densities. We are also building another model which will include wheels in the mid-section and a wide flange steel frame. Our idea is to put one ~~of~~ these rollers with every unit in the field that conducts extensive minesweeping.

**III MAF G2**

Q. How much does it cost us on the VIP program to find out about one of these surprise firing devices.

A. Our present rate, it seems to me is \$7.00. This, of course, is dependent upon the size of the ordnance they discover. There is no separate scale for something as distinct as a surprise firing device. Perhaps it should be recommended that the scale for voluntary information have a factor built into it.

**COMMENT:** Might I suggest that we're pumping millions of dollars into this country. A marine or a soldier is a lot more valuable than \$7.00. I suggest we quadruple it. If there's a price tag on it, let's find what it is and pay it.

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CLOSING REMARKS

1. Clifford Drake, USMC

Deputy CG, XXIV Corps

I would like to thank our major presenters today, the Third Marine Division for your very interesting and lucid explanat on of ne warfare that you're encountering. I was particularly interested in what Charlie is doing to counter your sweep operations and things you're doing to counter-counter him.

Commodore Jewett, we thank you for bringing the "monster of the deep" down here and letting us in on his intricacies. I thought the presentation that you gave, sir, was highly professional and shows that, in the end, professionalism is the answer for reducing casualties from any type of hostile action we encounter.

General Carney, would you like to offer any comments at this time before we wrap up.

Colonel Smith!

Commodore!

Anybody want to throw out a last thought or two here. We advertise on keeping close to the schedule. However, we'd be glad to entertain any last-minute ideas here and, if you do come up with any in the middle of the night, don't forget about them. Instead, write them down.

I'm sure that our experts will be available a few minutes longer for anyone who would like to talk to them individually.

Gentlemen, my thanks to all of you for your participation, the questions that were asked and answered, and the thoughts you've volunteered. We look forward to seeing you, we hope again, at our next seminar. Thank you very much,

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FMN CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG III MAF  
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 I CORPS ADV GRU  
 AMERICAL DIV  
 FIRST AIR CAV  
 101ST AB DIV  
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF

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POSSIBLE COMPROMISE OF KAC PAG AND QAL (U)

1 FOR INITIAL RPT IS SUB:

A. KAC PAG 15 REG NR 1142 DAYS 23 MAR-1 Apr 69. KAC QAL 506  
 REG NR 1925 DAYS 23-31 MAR 69. LAST SIGHTED ON 25 MAR 69.

B. RADIO OPR CO E SECOND BN NINTH MAR HAD POSSESSION OF ABOVE  
 PUBS IN BREAST POCKET WHILE CO WAS CONDUCTING SEARCH AND DESTROY

OPN WEST OF CAM LO RVN, AT 1330 CO RECD HEAVY BN MORTAR FIRE. RADIO  
 OPR BLOWN OFF RIDGS AND ROLLED DOWN SIDE OF MOUNTAIN. PRIOR TO

BEING MED EVACED HE INSTRUCTED MARINES NEAR HIM TO CONDUCT SEARCH  
 FOR MATL. CO COMDR INITIATED SEARCH WITH NEGAT RESULTS.

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SECURITY 2, 150 MAR69

FM: CO THIRD MARINE

TO: CO XXIV CORPS

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ACCUMULATIVE TOTALS OPTODEWEY CANYON

A. 111111 MAR 11 TR 6/RHB/TAS OV: 1650 OF 26 MAR69 (NOTAL)

B. II W/A2516452 MAR69 (C)

BY CONSOLIDATED TOTALS FOR THE SUBJECT OPN3 AS PROVIDED THIS HQS  
 BY REF A IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION IN ANSWERING INQUIRY MADE  
 TO REF B.

OPERATION DEWEY CANYON  
 22 JANUARY 69-18 MARCH 69

KIA	1617	MIXED VEGETABLES	46 LBS
POW	5	SOY BEAN OIL	8 GAL
DETAINEES	8	RADIOS	5
CHU HOI	2	MULTIPLEXES	2
BUNK RS	1000	SWITCH BOARD	1
STRUCTURES	373	FIELD PHONES	2
IWCs	1223	COMM. WIRE	600 FT
CSWC	243		
S/A AIRFO	607874	FIGS	<u>ALIVE</u> 13 <u>DEAD</u> 75
50 CAL	17598	CHICKEN	67 83
12.7	65126	GOATS	1
20MM AA	920	H2O BUFF	6
23MM AA	3636		
37MM AA	23,730	MISCELLANEOUS GEAR	
75 PAC. HO-	10		
60MM MORTAR	34,683	MOVI PROJECTOR	1
82MM MORTAR	23,281	REELS OF FILM	20
120MM MORTAR	4,983	ILLUD SPEAKERS	2
ULK RDS	65	AMPLIFIER	1
85MM ARTY	556		
57MM RR	2,004	ARTY	
75MM RR	994	CAPT	
122MM ARTY	7,287	122MM	6
122MM ROCKET	770	85MM	4
140MM ROCKET	257	UNK	1
RFG RDS	14,808	75MM RR	1
AT MINES	1,621	57MM RR	23
AT MINES	855		
CLA MINES	4,114	MORTARS	
EXPLOSIVES	1,910		
BLASTING CAPS	476		
FUZES	1,212		
DET CORD	1,950 FT		

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GRENADES	50,203					
R GRENADES	10,226		AA GUNS	CAT	DEST	DMB TOTAL
SATCHEL	36	.50 CAL		1	1	5
RICE	220,800	12.7		24	9	34
WHEAT	705 LBS	20MM		19	2	21
HERBS	200"	23MM			4	4
LARD	34 "	37MM			1	1
SUGAR	12 "	40MM		2		2
CORN	863 "					
<del>TOMATOES</del>	210 "					
FLOUR	50 "					
POTATOES	3,690 "					
SALT	4,045 "					

**MOTOR TRANSPORT**

	CAPT	DEST	DAMB	TOTAL
TRUCKS	31	28	7	66
TRACTORS	4	10	1	15
APC		3		3
JEEP	1			1
PRIME MOVERS	6			6
FRONT LOADER	1			1
ENGINES	3			3
GENERATORS	3			3
TRACTOR CAB	1			1
HYD PUMP	2			2
TIRES	18			18
FUEL	2,750 GAL			
GREASE	370 "			
FUEL DRUMS EMPTY	397 "			
TOOL KIT	1			
BICYCLE PARTS:	108 FRAMES			
	228 RIMS			
	2176 TIRES			
	52 PUMPS			
	18 COMPLETE BICYCLES			
AIR COMPRESSOR	1			

**BREAK DOWN OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED**

PISTOLS, LUGERS	2
SKS'S	950
AK-47'S	161
PPSH-43	41
MAUSERS	6
RPG'S	18
M-1	1
M-16	1
MACHINE PISTOL	43

GCHQ

COPIES 4536 RELEASED BY

TIME 270945H MAR 59

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

DRAFTED BY: WWB/RKR  
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION  
CWO

PRIORITY: 202

Z AR69

COPY TO: G-2  
CIC

FROM: CO THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN  
TO: CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN  
INFO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN  
CG III IAF, DNG, RVN

SECRET 2E

A. IACV DIR 525-27

I. IAW REF A FOL REQUEST SUBMITTED:

A. FOURTEEN MINIHANDSIDS, 6 MAGIDS, FIVE ACOUBUCYS, TEN  
ACOUUCY BATTERIES, TEN EXTERNAL GSID BATTERY PACKS AND TWO  
PORTATALES.

B. CHANNEL 31

C. TONE CODES:

	INT	EXT
CH 31:	02	
	03	21
	04	
	05	
	06	22
	07	
	08	
	09	23
	11	
	12	
	13	24
	16	
	16	A17
	17	
CH 23:	02	
	03	
	04	
	05	
	06	

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

D. ULTIME

E. CHARLIE

F. END BATT LIFE

G. YD25107620; YD23857560; YD20287670; YD19307570; YD21887520;  
YD17957385.

H. HAND EMPLACED BY ARVN EMPLACEMENT PERSONNEL.

I. LTCOL M.A. SOPER JR.  
TEL NO. 3279/3301; DONG HA AIRFIELD, GROUND SURVEILLANCE  
SECTION, THIRD MARDIV.

J. TEN ACOUBUOY BATTERIES, TEN INHANDSID BATTERIES AND  
TEN EXTERNAL GSID BATTERY PACKS. TWO PORTATALES.

K. SHIP MINIHANDSIDS AND ACOUBUOYS WITH BATTERIES DISCONNECTED.

L. SENSORS WILL BE REQUIRED ON OR ABOUT 10 APRIL AS REPLACEMENTS  
FOR SENSORS PRESENTLY EMPLACED IN ARVN AO. ADDITIONAL BATTERIES

ARE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO REUSE ASSETS WHOSE RECOVERY MAY BE  
PERMITTED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION. ADDITIONAL PORTATALES ARE

REQUESTED TO PROVIDE A BACKUP FOR PORTATALES PRESENTLY BEING  
EMPLOYED ON SEVEN SENSOR READOUT SITES.

GP-4

CCN 2 RELEASED BY

H MAR69

SECRET

SECRET

3

100 IDMA DV00  
 / SSSSS

UUMSK/XXIV CORP TOG PNB

WICLIGHT

A. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 261730Z MAR 969

1. IAW REF A THIS HEADQUARTERS G TS CLEARANCE CONCUR  
 ON TGT IT 9592 UNTIL 102400H AP

2. THERE ARE NO OPT NO FRIENDLY TROOPS OR RECON PATROLS IN OR  
 WITHIN THREE(3) KILOMETERS OF THE TGT BOX.

P-44

BL

1380

SECRET

**SECRET****(331)**D. A. 32/TH/THP  
S. U. DIV. THP. MI 3132  
CNOPRIORITY ~~2 112324~~ MAR 69COPY TO:  
OSJA THIRD IARDIV QTR

FROM: CG THIRD IARDIV QTR (SC-32)  
 TO: CG III IAF DIR  
 CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
 INFO: SECOND BN, FOURTH MARINES  
 THIRD RECON BN

SECRET

III IAF PASS TO INSPECTOR  
 XXIV CORPS PASS TO AVII-ATC

SIR 1-14 (III IAF SIR 2-1-69)

- A. CG THIRD IARDIV MSG 120517Z MAR 69  
 B. CG THIRD IARDIV MSG 311015Z JAN 69  
 C. CG THIRD IARDIV MSG 060522Z FEB 69  
 D. CG THIRD IARDIV MSG 071027Z FEB 69

1. CFTT (AIR)

2. 301458H JAN 69

3. YD 082751

11. C. VICTIMS REC'D INJURIES WHEN MISTAKEN FOR ENEMY TROOPS AND WERE  
 FIRED UPON BY FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT AND FRIENDLY ARTILLERY USING 2.75 ROCKETS  
 AND "FIRECRACKER" ROUNDS.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY/FINAL REPORT

GP-4

CCN H610 INCL BY T. MAYER

105P

OSJA P

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

REF: CG THIRD MAR DIV  
 TO: CG 3TH  
 OIC VANDERLIFT DASC

(332)

INFO: COMNAV CORPS PHU BAI RVN  
 CG 1ST MAJ DANANG

//SECRET//

SUBJ: REIL SUPPORT COORDINATION 3-69

A. HORN DASC MSG 190045Z MAR 69 (NO TAL)  
 B. CG THIRD MAR DIV 111240Z MAR 69

- 1.(S) REFERENCE A ADJUSTS BUFFER ZONES ESTABLISHED REFERENCE B.
- 2.(U) REFERENCE B IS HEREBY CANCELLED.
- 3.(S) THE FOLLOWING BUFFER ZONES ARE NOW IN EFFECT.

A. FOR PUMPLE MARTIN AND MAINE CRAG. FROM LAOS/RVN BORDER AT XD 656679  
 WESTWARD ALONG THE HOUAY NAMKE RIVER TO XD 610655; THENCE SOUTHWARD PARALLEL-  
 THE THE LAOS/SVN BORDER AT A DISTANCE OF FIVE (5) KILOMETERS TO XD 980130  
 AND THENCE TO THE LAOS/SVN BORDER AT YD 010165.

4.(S) WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CG 1ST MAJ THE FOLLOWING COORDINATION  
 MEASURES WILL APPLY WITHIN THE BUFFER ZONE.

A. ALL AIRCRAFT WILL REPORT IN AND OUT WITH VANDERLIFT DASC.

B. ALL ARTILLERY MISSIONS EXCEPT THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST ACTIVE BATTERY  
 ARTILLERY, ROCKET, OR MORTAR POSITIONS WILL BE REPORTED TO VANDERLIFT DASC  
 PRIOR TO FIRING BY TASK FORCE HOTEL. EXCEPTED COUNTERBATTERY FIRES WILL BE  
 REPORTED WITHOUT DELAY.

C. VANDERLIFT DASC WILL PROVIDE ALL AIRCRAFT WITH ARTILLERY AIR WARNINGS.

D. TASK FORCE HOTEL WILL COORDINATE ALL AIRSTRIKES AND ARTILLERY FIRES  
 IN THE BUFFER ZONE WITH APPROPRIATE COM NAV REPRESENTATIVE.

5.(S) ALL AIRSTRIKES AND ARTILLERY FIRES INTO LAOS OTHER THAN IN THE BUFFER  
 ZONE MUST BE CARRIED BY ABCC/SYGATOR AS FOLLOWS.

RSC

G-3

1120  
 2A

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**SECRET**

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5. CLEARANCE FOR ALL ARTILLERY FIRS WILL BE OBTAINED BY DIV FSCC FROM THE APPROPRIATE AIR FORCE CONTROL AGENCY. COUNTERBATTERY FIRS DO NOT REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE. HOWEVER, VANDERGRIFT DASC WILL WARN AIRCRAFT ON GROUND IMMEDIATELY AND TASK FORCE HOTEL FSCC WILL NOTIFY DIV FSCC ASAP.

B. ALL AIRCRAFT REQUIRED TO WORK BEYOND THE BUFFER ZONE WILL REPORT IN AND OUT AND REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR ALL STRIKES FROM ABCCC/SYCAMORE.

6. (S) CURRENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR LAOS APPLY.

GP-4

CCN 4663

REL BY

*J. R. / minor***SECRET**



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771 E. 12<sup>th</sup> St.

1-APC	LZ SHARON	1/9/20
1-APC	TF RENAGEN	6/3/16
1-APC	LZ SHARON	1/9/22
1-APC	TF RENAGEN	6/3/16
2-APC	TF WESTWARD	1/9/17
	HO	

	1-GEN	TF REMAGEN	8/6/74
	1-AADM.	TF REMAGEN	9/8/74
	1-APC	TF REMAGEN	1/6/76
	1-IRAB	REF DEVI	5/1/73

UNLOADED  
LOADERS  
SCOTTERS 3-7E M  
SCOOP LOADERS  
6-5 TON PUMP  
8-5 TON SLING TRUCKS

IN	RECEIVED	RED DEVIL	19/8/43
IN	SIGNAL CO	RED DEVIL	3/6/31
		DONG HA	2/5/7

REF ID: A66700 1341 670 0.9 - INTERNAL

REF GATES 0/0/3  
HAI LANG 7/5/2  
LZ SHARON 0/0/2  
LZ NANCY 0/0/3  
RED DEVIL 1/7/5  
RED DEVIL 3/0/65  
LZ SHARON 7/0/2  
FNU BAI 0/0/1

[illegible]

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12-0113  
 12-0114  
 12-0115  
 12-0116A1  
 12-0117  
 12-0118  
 12-0119A1  
 12-0120  
 12-0121  
 12-0122  
 12-0123

[illegible]

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2000 SUPER RUMBLE

1501 7/C O N F I D E N T I A L

1-4153

1-435A2

1-43571

LZ NANCY

0/0/12

1-4151

1-435A2

N

6/41519

LZ NANCY

1/1/78

1-435A2

1-43571

1-435A2

1-43715

1-438L-460

1-449A3

1-4545A2

1-4545A2

N

1-45113A1

1-435A2

LZ SKARON

0/0/10

1-454A2

1-4545A2

1-45113A1

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**SECRET**

340VE CUC	
OP CHIEF	<i>Meo</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>S</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>V</i>

ZNY SSSSS  
 U 270825Z MAR 69  
 FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
 TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES  
 ZE N/FOURTH MARINES  
 INFU CG THIRD MARD IV  
 CG FIRST MAW  
 ZEN/NINTH MARINES  
 WELF H MARINES  
 MAG ONE SIX  
 MAG THREE SIX  
 MAG THREE NINE  
 FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 ECUND BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 ZEN/VANDERGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR  
 BT

**SECRET**

FRAG URDER 84-69

A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 201850Z MAR 69

270825Z

C-2

*112*PAGE TWO RUMHVP 0583 **SECRET**

1. THIRD AND FOURTH MARINES: NO CHANGE FROM REF A.
2. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: HELICOPTER MOVEMENTS FOR  
 TASK FORCE HOTEL AND SUPPORTING FORCES FOR

28 MAR 69 WILL BE PASEP

GP-4

IsNr

NNNN

28

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1 HUMSK  
 1 DUNSQD 1396 0360910  
 1 CCCCC  
 1 270910Z MAR 69  
 1 THIRD MARDIV COC  
 1 HUMSK/XXIV CORPS COC

1 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 1 ULJI MAINE ORAG CUMULATIVE CACHE REPORT NR 3  
 1 CUMULATIVE CACHE STATISTICS AS OF 270200H MAR 69  
 1 RICE 1000 TONS  
 1 ALT 7000 LBS  
 1 CAR 7500 LBS  
 1 AND 100 LBS  
 1 CANNED FOOD 1 TON  
 1 CORDERED MILK 1 TON  
 1 TNT 125,250 LB  
 1 COMM WIRE 600 METERS  
 1 MINES 1  
 1 40MM GRENADES 8  
 1 40MM MAGAZINES 409  
 1 40MM MORTARS 11  
 1 RIFLES 75  
 1 CLOTHES 40 SMALL BUNDLES  
 1 PLASTIC WRAPPING 2 ROLLS  
 1 JACKS 25  
 1 GAS MASKS 3

1 ONE TWO DUNSQD 1396 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 1 TRUCKS 3  
 1 122MM RKT 44 RDS  
 1 81MM MORTAR 6841 RDS  
 1 60MM MORTAR 537 RDS  
 1 PG-2 3503 RDS  
 1 2.7MM AMMO 7500 RDS  
 1 40MM 8 RDS  
 1 27MM 100 RDS  
 1 75MM 55 RDS  
 1 SMALL ARMS AMMO 354,230 RDS  
 1 100 IVC 330  
 1 100 IVC 12  
 1 100 IVC 12

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1306 3/ CO N F I D E N T I A L

CONTACT:

1306 3/ CO N F I D E N T I A L, UIC YD 639632, VIC YD 642643- ELEMENTS OF 1-11  
MAINTAINED CONTACT THROUGH THE LAST REPORTING PERIOD WITH NO  
SUSPICION AS YET THE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES PICKED UP AT 1200 HRS  
WILL BE ADDED TO THE TOTALS BUT BY NO MEANS REPRESENT THE  
TOTAL FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. THERE HAVE BEEN 2 RPD'S AND 5-6 AK-47'S  
RECOVERED AND APPROXIMATELY 30 NVA KIA (20 BY AIR), BUT THESE WILL NOT  
BE ADDED UP ON THIS REPORT DUE TO LACK OF DETAILS AT THIS TIME.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

1306 3/ CO N F I D E N T I A L, UIC YD 639632, VIC YD 642643- WHILE SWEEPING AREA  
IN WHICH RPD FIRE WAS RECD, FOUND 1 AK-47, 2 RPD-7, 2B-40  
ROCKET, 1 B-41 ROCKET, SOME UNICOM GRENADES AND A WALLET.

1306 3/ CO N F I D E N T I A L, UIC YD 639632, VIC YD 642643- 1-77 FOUND 1 BUNKER WITH  
A TRIP MIN, 1 .50 CAL AMMO CAN OF POLISHED RICE, ASSORTED FOOD,  
KITCHEN WARE.

STATUS:

1306 3/ CO N F I D E N T I A L, UIC YD 639632, VIC YD 642643- 1-11: A, B, & C CO'S CONT TO ATTACK NORTH FROM PRESENT POS.  
1-11: A, B, & C CO'S CONT TO ATTACK NORTH FROM PRESENT POS. 2 PLATS OF 1-11  
ELK ON WEST AND NE RESPECTIVELY.

1306 4/ CO N F I D E N T I A L

1306 4/ CO N F I D E N T I A L, UIC YD 639632, VIC YD 642643-

1306 4/ CO N F I D E N T I A L, UIC YD 639632, VIC YD 642643- 1-11: A, B, &amp; C CO'S CONT TO ATTACK NORTH FROM PRESENT POS.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE **AMPHIBIOUS** FORCE  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, **VIETNAM**  
FPO. **SAN** FRANCISCO **96602**

IN REPLY REFER TO:

28 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: **COMMANDING** GENERAL, **III MAF**

ATTENTION OF: G-3 PLANS

SUBJECT: Refugee Installations and Resettlement  
Areas Security

Ref: **(a)** CG **III** MAP 0513462 July 68 (S)Ref: (b) Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas Security  
6 Aug 68

Encl: **(1)** Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Quang Tri  
**(2)** Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Thua Thien  
**(3)** Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Quang Nam  
**(4)** Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Quang Ngai  
**(5)** Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Quang Tin

1. Reference (a) outlines US Forces' responsibility for security of Refugee installations and resettlement areas in I CTZ.
2. Enclosures (1) through (5) represent an update listing of the Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in I CTZ.
3. It is requested that this updated material be disseminated to the distribution list outlined in reference (b). Further that reference (a) be restated to all major military unit commanders.
4. It is our current plan to furnish an update each quarter.

L. A. **McLendon, Jr**  
Chief, Refugee ision  
CORDS, **III MAF** Danang

## QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>No.</u>	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	<u>CAMP</u>	COORD.	POPULATION
R-1	DONG HA	NGA TU SONG	NGA TU SONG	228624	2,538
R-2	DONG HA	MOC BAI	MOC BAI	231621	<b>2,446</b>
R-3	CAM LO	CAM THAI	NAM THUAN	133590	762
R-4	CAM LO	CAM HIEU	VINH DAI	178590	1,831
R-5	CAM LO	CAM HUNG	TAN DINH	118588	1,947
R-6	CAM LO	TRUNG <b>HAI</b>	TRUNG GIO	106567	12,210
R-7	CAM LO	CAM HUNG	HUNG PHU KINH	119567	681
R-8	CAM LO	CAM HUNG	HUNG PHU THUONG	121593	1,685
R-9	CAM LO	CAM HIEU	THIET TRANG	097525	343
<b>R-10</b>	CAM LO	CAM CHINH	DOC KINH	098523	3,036
R-11	CAM LO	CAM CHINH	CUA THUONG	084515	5,489
R-12	GIO LINH	HA <b>THANH</b>	HA THANH	220675	21,236
R-13	GIO LINH	<b>XUAN</b> KHANH	XUAN KHANH	338698	3,221
R-14	TRIEU PHONG	TRIEU <b>AIL</b>	HAXA	276577	1,445
R-15	TRIEU PHONG	TRIEU <b>AIL</b>	TIEN KIEN	298569	915
R-16	TRIEU PHONG	TRIEU AI	BA BEN	348541	2,665
R-17	TRIEU PHONG	TRIEU THANH	AN TIEN	341541	1,560
<b>R-18</b>	MAI LINH	TRIEU THUONG	<b>NHAN</b> BIEU	320539	347
R-19	MAI LINH	QUANG TRI	HANH HOA	342535	521
R-20	MAI LINH	HAI TRI	THACH HAN A-B-C	333522	4,139
R-21	MAI LINH	TRIEU THUONG	XOM CHUOI	327513	1,421
R-22	MAI LINH	<b>HAI</b> TRI	THACH MON	344502	876

## QUANG TRI PROVINCE - Continued

<u>No.</u>	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	<u>COORD.</u>	POPULATION
R-23	MAI LINH	HAI PHU	LA VANG TA	348496	1,616
R-24	<del>HAI</del> LANG	<del>HAI</del> KHE	TRUNG AN	521538	2,663
R-25	<del>HAI</del> LANG	<del>HAI</del> THO	TAN DIEN	418483	122
R-26	<del>HAI</del> LANG	HAI THO	TAN SANH	420475	194
R-27	<del>HAI</del> LANG	<del>HAI</del> LAM	XUAN LAM	393468	1,690
R-28	<del>HAI</del> LANG	<del>HAI</del> TRUONG	CIAP TRUNG	448429	317
R-29	<del>HAI</del> LANG	<del>HAI</del> SON	LUONG DIEN	462406	267
R-30	<del>HAI</del> LANG	<del>HAI</del> CHANH	GA MY CHANH	464401	813
R-31	<del>HAI</del> LANG	HAI CHANH	TAN VAN	462392	143
<del>R-32</del>	HAI LANG	<del>HAI</del> CHANH	TRUNG CHANH	462392	778

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## THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>No.</u>	DISTRICT	<u>VILLAGE</u>	CAMP	<u>COORD.</u>	POPULATION
R-1	HUONG DIEN	DIEN <b>THANH</b>	TAM DIEN	730376	3,362
R-2	PHONG DIEN	<b>PHONG</b> NGUYEN	PHONG NGUYEN	536352	240
R-3	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	QUANG PHONG	531334	3,297
R-4	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	TAN NGUYEN	531334	368
R-5	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	GIA LONG A-B	528348	1,054
R-6	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	KHANH MY	531334	1,352
R-7	PHONG DIEN	PHONG AN	THUONG AN	613295	2,135
R-8	QUANG DIEN	QUANG PHUOC	PHUOC LOI A	684335	2,836
R-9	QUANG DIEN	QUANG PHUOC	PHUOC LOI B	693340	1,712
R-10	QUANG DIEN	QUANG LOC	AN THANH	737294	2,612
R-11	HUONG TRA	HUONG CAN	HUONG CAN	714275	1,191
R-12	HUONG TRA	HUONG LONG	XUAN LONG	740217	865
R-13	NAM HOA	THUONG BANH	CU CHANH A-B-C-D-E	748165	2,118
R-14	NAM HOA	THUONG BANG	BANG LANG A-B	759139	1,856
R-15	PHU VANG	PHU DIEN	PHUONG DIEN	942248	1,606
R-16	PHU VANG	PHU THUAN	THUAN AN	829322	4,779
R-17	HUONG THUY	THUY PHUOC	THUY PHUOC	770200	860
R-18	HUONG THUY	THUY TRUONG	NAM GIAO	767192	383
R-19	HUONG THUY	THUY LUONG	THUY LUONG A-B	873179	3,524
R-20	HUONG THUY	THUY CHAU	THUY CHAU	853167	2,981
R-21	HUONG THUY	THUY PHU	<b>THUY</b> PHU	933139	523
R-22	PHU LOC	LOC SON	TAN THAT XA A-B	932087	1,000

## THUA THIEN PROVINCE - Continued

<u>No.</u>	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	<u>COORD.</u>	POPULATION
R-23	PHU LOC	LOC AN	NAM THANH	965070	607
R-24	PHU LOC	LOI <b>HAI</b>	LANG CO	884972	<b>639</b>
R-25	PHU LOC	LOC THUY	LOC THUY	146998	3,023
R-26	PHU LOC	LOC TU	THUA LOU	192009	2,869
R-27	PHU THU	PHU DA	HOA DA TAY A-B	900190	176

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## QUANG NAM PROVINCE

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	<u>CAMP</u>	COORD.	POPULATION
R-1	HOA <b>VANG</b>	HOA LOC	NAM MY	860855	1,101
R-2	HOA <b>VANG</b>	HOA LOC	AN DINH	887832	<b>305</b>
R-3	HOA <b>VANG</b>	HOA THANH	AN NGAI TAY	907783	105
R-4	HOA <b>VANG</b>	<b>HAO KHANH</b>	PHUOC <b>THANH</b>	957787	3,210
R-5	HOA <b>VANG</b>	HOA KHANH	PHUOC QUANG	954787	2,146
R-6	HOA <b>VANG</b>	HOA <b>KHANH</b>	HOA KHANH	954787	4,522
R-7	HOA <b>VANG</b>	HOA KHANH	CHON TAM	957782	4,191
R-8	HOA <b>VANG</b>	HOA KHANH	PHUOC TAN	950793	<b>2,158</b>
R-9	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	PHUOC NGHIA	961784	3,676
R-10	HOA VANG	<b>HOA KHANH</b>	TRUNG PHUOC	952791	1,743
R-11	HOA VANG	HOA MINH	PHUOC XUAN	968760	2,341
R-12	HOA VANG	HOA CUONG	KHUE TRUNG I	015728	1,280
R-13	HOA VANG	HOA DA	CON DAU	035725	207
<b>R-14</b>	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	DA <b>PHUOC</b>	948787	2,757
R-15	HOA VANG	HOA LONG	KIM SON	074704	1,891
R-16	HOA VANG	HOA THAI	XEN NE	982682	1,433
R-17	HOA VANG	HOA LOI	LE SON	972662	646
<b>R-18</b>	HIEU DUC	HOA NINH	TUNG SON	886760	652
R-19	HIEU DUC	HOA THUONG	AN TAN	926705	455
R-20	DIEN BAN	VINH XUONG	NGUYEN DUY HIEU	058580	1,054
R-21	DIEN BAN	VINH XUONG	BEN DA	058580	3,840
R-22	DIEN BAN	VINH XUONG	VINH DIEN	058580	577

## QUANG NAM PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	<u>COORD.</u>	POPULATION
R-23	DIEN BAN	VINH XUONG	LAM SON	065588	3,752
R-24	DIEN BAN	VINH PHUOC	TAM TANG	060565	<b>968</b>
R-25	DIEN BAN	VINH PHUOC	KIM THANH	060565	769
R-26	DIEN BAN	VINH THO	PHU CU	074560	3,494
R-27	DIEN BAN	VINH THO	THANH CHIM	074560	1,818
R-28	DAI LOC	LOC HUNG	HOAN MY	938578	2,931
R-29	DAI LOC	LOC HUNG	KY TAN	927572	2,870
R-30	DAI LOC	LOC PHONG	AI MY DONG	921570	2,846
R-31	DAI LOC	LOC CHANH	PHU <b>BAC</b>	926608	652
R-32	DAI LOC	LOC CHANH	PHU TRUNG	919597	331
R-33	DAI LOC	LOC CHANH	PHU DONG	923583	1,611
R-34	DAI LOC	LOC AN	<b>NGHIA</b> DONG-I-II	910580	2,060
R-35	DAI LOC	LOC AN	GO CAM	910580	884
R-36	DAI LOC	LOC MY	TAM HOA	863573	3,692
R-37	DUC DUC	XUYEN THU	GO CHUA	863480	446
R-38	DUC DUC	SON NINH	BAN SON	875474	1,129
R-39	DUC DUC	SON KHUONG	THANH MY	830390	4,073
R-40	DUC DUC	SON KHUONG	NONG SON	825385	2,133
R-41	DUC DUC	SON <b>KHUONG</b>	QUAN LY	861394	4,664
R-42	QUE SON	PHU HIEP	XUAN LU	032345	512
R-43	QUE SON	SON THANH	CANG TAY	042345	18,693
R-44	QUE SON	PHU THO	BA REN	104402	648

## QUANG NAM PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-45	QUE SON	PHU KHUONG	HUONG AN	141465	506
R-46	DUY XUYEN	XUYEN HIEP	KIEU SON	033507	3,794
E-47	DUY XUYEN	XUYEN KIEU	TRA KIEU	037510	2,509
E-48	DUY XUYEN	XUYEN TRA	TRUNG DONG	058508	2,315
E-49	HIEU NHON	CAM HA	<b>THANH</b> DONG	122577	4,218
R-50	HIEU NHON	CAM HA	THANH TRUNG	122577	1,609
R-51	HIEU NHON	CAM HA	THANH TAY	122577	8,126
R-52	HIEU NHON	CAM AN	DOI	205573	2,988
R-53	HIEU NHON	HOI AN	XUAN MY	137571	2,225
R-54	HIEU NHON	HOI AN	KHONG MIEU	145570	1,347
R-55	HIEU NHON	HOI <b>AN</b>	LIEN GIA V	145570	217
R-56	HI EU NHON	CAM CHAU	CUN <b>CHAI</b>	163573	286
R-57	HIEU NHON	CAM <b>CHAU</b>	CAM CHAU	163573	2,874
E-58	HI EU NHON	CAM KIM	NGOC THANH	k34567	3,562
R-59	THUONG DUC	LOC BINH	TRUC HA	145548	862
R-60	THUONG DUC	LOC BINH	HA TAN	150534	2,661
R-61	THUONG DUC	LOC BINH	LOC VINH	150534	2,554
R-62	THUONG DUC	LOC NINH	LOC NINH	100503	1,521
R-63	THUONG DUC	LOC NINH	TAM HOA	137524	829

No.	DISTRICT	<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>CAMP</u> <sup>2</sup>	<u>COORD.</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
R-1	<b>BINH SON</b>	BINH GIANG	SON TRA	624015	3,879
R-2	BINH SON	BINH <b>THIEN</b>	PHUOC <b>THIEN</b>	712972	2,409
R-3	BINH SON	BINH THANH	PHU LE	577938	232
R-4	BINH SON	BINH VAN	AN CHAU	607930	596
R-5	BINH SON	<b>BINH</b> VAN	CHAU	599925	902
R-6	BINH SON	BINH VAN	TU VAN	599925	1,008
R-7	BINH SON	BINH <b>THANH</b>	THIEU DAO	595927	4,493
R-8	BINH SON	BINH <b>PHONG</b>	VINH XUAN A-B-C	599918	3,987
R-9	BINH SON	BINH PHUONG	MY YEN	608914	302
R-10	BINH SON	SON LONG,	PHU HOA A-B	605865	1,043
R-11	BINH SON	BINH LIEN	BINH LIEN	622870	1,548
R-12	TRA BONG	TRA <b>KHUONG</b>	QUANG LY	335880	699
R-13	SON HA	HA TRUNG	LIEN SON	385638	1,511
R-14	SON HA	HA TRUNG	HA HIEP	385638	480
R-15	SON HA	HA BAC	HA BAC	390706	709
R-16	SON HA	HA BAC	HA GIA	398718	125
R-17	TU <b>NGHIA</b>	TU HIEN	GO PHU	735735	559
R-18	TU NGHIA	TU LO	PHAT GIAO	636725	2,883
R-19	TU NGHIA	TU BINH	CATHOLIC	675724	732
R-20	TU NGHIA	TU QUANG	TU MY	620720	1,088
R-21	TU NGHIA	TU QUANG	RUNG LANG	615717	4,044
R-22	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	BAC GIANG	662698	2,215

## QUANG NGAI PROVINCE - Continued

<u>No.</u>	<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>CAMP</u>	COORD.	POPULATION
R-23	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	CAO DAI - A	670694	6,553
R-24	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	CAO DAI - B	666693	3,386
R-25	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	CAO DAI - C	666694	4,046
R-26	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	<b>DUK HAI</b>	667689	1,358
R-27	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	DAO DUC DOAN	668688	859
R-28	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	CAO DAY TAY NINH	772687	1,038
R-29	TU NGHIA	TU AN	TIN LANH	684685	3,334
R-30	TU NGHIA	TU AN	<b>LAHA</b>	684685	3,078
R-31	NGHIA HANH	NGHIA KHUONG	NGHIA KHUONG	620680	990
R-32	NGHIA HANH	NGHIA KHUONG	PHUC MINH	621668	798
R-33	NGHIA HANH	SON LONG	SON TAY	627660	394
R-34	NGHIA HANH	NGHIA CHANH	PHU BINH A-B-C	612652	1,659
R-35	<b>NGHIA HANH</b>	NGHIA CHANH	XUAN VINH	620620	1,540
R-36	MO DUC	DUC QUANG	DUC HOAI	715602	2,268
<b>R-37</b>	MO DUC	DUC VINH	THI PHO	723571	776
R-38	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DUC SON	736542	1,694
R-39	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DIA SO	732542	331
R-40	MO DUC	DUC VINH	THANH THAT	731541	333
R-41	MO DUC	DUC QUANG	DUC QUANG	725540	735
R-42	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DUC THACH	725543	1,029
R-43	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DUC THUAN	735530	466
R-44	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DUC THUAN - A	735530	911

## QUANG NGAI PROVINCE - Continued

<u>No.</u>	DISTRICT	<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>CAMP</u>	<u>COORD.</u>	POPULATION
R-45	MO DUC	DUC MY	DUC MY	767471	2,077
R-46	BA TO	BA LANG	DINH NHI	576357	274
R-47	BA TO	BA LOI	QUANG LY	555322	230
R-48	DUC PHO	<b>PHO</b> BINH	LA VAN DUYET	801395	892
R-49	DUC PHO	PHO THACH	PHO PHUOC - B	805379	809
R-50	DUC <b>PHO</b>	<b>PHO</b> BINH	PHO PHUOC - C	795379	1,010
R-51	DUC PHO	<b>PHO</b> BINH	PHO PHUOC - A	925255	284
R-52	DUC PHO	PHO DAI	THO LAC - B	809378	1,063
R-53	DUC PHO	PHO BINH	TIN LANH	810377	<b>151</b>
R-54	DUC PHO	<b>PHO</b> DAI	THO LAC - C	809377	525
R-55	DUC PHO	PHO DAI	THO LAC - A	806378	276
R-56	DUC PHO	PHO BINH	PHAT GIAO	806574	375
R-57	DUC PHO	PHO DAI	HOA THANH	858663	859
R-58	DUC PHO	PHO HIEP	THUY THACH A-B	864318	587
R-59	DUC PHO	PHO <b>THACH</b>	SA HUYNH	925255	674
R-60	DUC PHO	PHO THACH	VINH LOC	925224	820
R-61	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON TRA I & II	639753	1,941
R-62	SON <b>TINH</b>	SON LONG	SON CHAU - B	614575	445
R-63	SON TINH	SON LONG	AN <b>LAC</b>	638765	683
R-64	SON <b>TINH</b>	SON LONG	PHU NHON A-B	638765	<b>2,506</b>
R-65	SON <b>TINH</b>	SON LONG	SON CHOU - A	638765	2,432
R-66	SON TINH	SON LONG	TAN LOC A-B	614762	1,444

## QUANG NGAI PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	<u>VILLAGE</u>	CAMP	<b><u>COORD.</u></b>	POPULATION
R-67	SON TINH	SON LONG	HA TAY	627762	876
R-68	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON BAC A-B	625761	3,379
R-69	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON DONG	625760	2,085
R-70	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON LOC	625754	3,204
R-71	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON PHUONG	627759	2,434
R-72	SON TINH	SON LONG	DONG PHUONG NAM	639759	1,767
R-73	SON TINH	SON LONG	NUI SUA	634750	<b>1,206</b>
R-74	SON TINH	SON LONG	SICA	638749	1,030
R-75	SON TINH	SON LONG	SONG QUANG	645747	1,110
R-76	SON TINH	SON LONG	TRAI HE	645747	1,277
R-77	SON TINH	SON LONG	TONG HOC DUONG	645747	537

## QUANG TIN PROVINCE

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
<b>R-1</b>	THANH BINH	BINH NGUYEN	HA LAM	170416	5,858
R-2	THANH BINH	BINH NGUYEN	DON THOI A-B	148409	11,723
R-3	THANH BINH	BINH AN	AN THANH	247298	<b>7,872</b>
R-4	THANH BINH	TIEN PHUOC	VIET AN	022274	730
R-5	TIEN PHUOC	PHUOC THANH	AN TRUNG	109133	4,571
R-6	TIEN PHUOC	PHUOC KY	HUU LAM	130128	832
R-7	TIEN PHUOC	PHUOC LAM	TIEN CHANH	082065	<b>1,098</b>
R-8	TIEN PHUOC	PHUOC LAM	TIEN CHAU	063063	<b>1,100</b>
R-9	TAM KY	KY HOUNG	TU HIEP	300228	<b>19,442</b>
R-10	TAM KY	TAM KY	VOUN LAI	322209	8,045
R-11	TAM KY	TAM KY	HOUNG SON	378218	1,683
R-12	TAM KY	KY HUNG	KY HUONG	329203	6,441
R-13	TAM KY	KY BICH	BICH NGO	342170	1,492
R-14	TAM KY	KY HUONG	RECEPTION CENTER	299300	3,476
R-15	LY TIN	KY LIEN	CHU LAI	500069	3,051
R-16	LY TIN	KY CHANH	LY TRA	397162	297
R-17	LY TIN	KY HOA	KY HOA	499134	1,713
R-18	LY TIN	KY SANH	KY SANH	450066	360
R-19	LY TIN	KY THANH	KY THANH	350087	647
R-20	LY TIN	KY KHUONG	KY KHUONG	470080	1,237

SECRET

UNCLAS

12280430Z MAR 69  
 MICT TASK FORCE HOTEL

ZEN/FOURTH MARINE  
 INFO CG THIR MARD V  
 CG FIRST  
 ZEN/NINTH MARINES

NO. ONE SIX  
 MAG THREE SIX  
 MAG THREE NINE  
 ZEN/VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR(VIC)  
 FIRST BN TWELFTH MAR ---  
 ZEN/SECOND BN TWELFTH MAR  
 OSY

NBXTIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 BT  
 S E C R E T  
 FRAG ORDERP86-69  
 1. THIRD MARINES

12280430Z MAR 69 S E C R E T  
 , CO, 2 ARVN WILL ASSUME SECIN

MISSION FOR RICE CACHE ON 29 MAR 69 ON  
 ORDER.

B. CONTINUE OPERATIONS DTM FSB CATEY  
 AND HILLS 691 AND 950.

. CONTINUE OPERATION MAINE CRAG,  
 D. MAINTAIN ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN)  
 AT VCB AS SPARROW HAWK/BALD EAGLE.

2. FOURTH MARINES

A. CONTINUE OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN.

B. CONTINUE CONSTRUCTION OF FSB GREEN.

C. CONTINUE OPERATIONS FROM FL ARGONNE,  
 ALPINE, NEVILLE AND RIRHSLWPQUE AND 1.2 CATAPULT,  
 D. PREPARE TO CLOSE FSB ARGONNE ON  
 ACTIVATION OF FSB GREENE.

3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. HELO MOVEMENTS  
 SCHEDULED FOR TF HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING  
 FORCES FOR 29 MARCH 69 WILL BE PASEP. J

GP-4

BT

3  
SECRET

SECRET

000000Z UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 1428 0870530

ZNY SSSSS

Z 280530Z MAR 69 Ted 1070 00

FM THIRD MARDIV COV

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC

INFO TASK FORCEHOTEL COC

TWELFTH MARINES FDC

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 4TH MARINES RECON PATROLS

A. TM DESERT SANDS 2 09151 FR 934658 EN 938661 OBS 4 NVA MOVING  
ALONG SIDE OF HILL. ATTEMPTED TO CALL 81 MM MSN. BUT WAS  
WAS UNSUCCESSFUL DUE TO POOR COMM.B. IM MAGIN SPELL 280815 H 926658 FND TRAIL, FRUNNING NW TO SW  
USED WITH LAST 2 HRS TRAIL RUNS TOWARD I 3/ POSI AT 911642.C. IM MAGIC SPELL 281000H 92865 PATROL REC'D SAF FROM EST 3-4  
NVA PATROL RET'D FIRE W/ ORGANIC WEAPONS. REC: 2 NVA KIA(C)D. IM MAGIC SPELL 281100H EXTRACTION FORCE FROM 2-K3/4 TO LINK UP  
WITH MAGIC YPELL. EXTRACTION FORCE WILL RETURN TO K CP AS  
SOON AS EN SITUATION PERMITS.

E. UNIT LOCATIONS:

MAGIC SPELL XD 928661

DESERT SANDS XD 934663

GP-4

BTBT

1428

SECRET

2010244044

TO: UMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHN RUN

UMS07/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN

UMS07/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN

UMS07/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN

UMS07/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN

UMS07/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN

UMS07/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN

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UMS07/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN

UMS07/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN

PT

SECRET ISING ARRAMS SENDS

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE NO. 3 (U)

1. (S) THE USUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF RECENT SAPPER ATTACKS POINTS UP A CONTINUING VC CAPABILITY THAT REPRESENTS A SERIOUS THREAT TO FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS. VC EMPHASIS ON SAPPER ATTACKS IS INDICATED BY AN INCREASE IN SAPPER UNITS REPORTED IN EACH C Z. MOREOVER, THE SUCCESSFUL SAPPER ATTACKS AGAINST INSTALLATIONS AT QUI NHON AND KONIUM DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SMALL, HIGHLY TRAINED SAPPER UNITS.

PAGE 2 UMS 9930 SECRET ARRAMS SENDS

2. (S) IN THE 21 MARCH ATTACK ON QUI NHON POL DEPOT, A 3-MAN SAPPER UNIT INFILTRATED THE INSTALLATION WITHOUT BEING DETECTED AND SET SATCHEL CHARGES TO 3 POL TANKS. THE RESULTING EXPLOSION AND FIRE IGNITED TWO MORE POL TANKS AND THE PACKAGE POL AREA. ESTIMATED LOSS OF POL STOCKS EXCEEDS 700,000 GALLONS.

3. (S) ON 22 MARCH, ANOTHER SUCCESSFUL SAPPER ATTACK WAS CONDUCTED AGAINST THE ROCK CRUSHER COMPLEX AT KONTUM. IN THIS ATTACK, THE ASSAULT WAS PRECEDED BY A ROCKET, MORTAR AND B40 CHARGE, AND WAS CONDUCTED BY A 30-MAN SAPPER UNITS WHICH PENETRATED THE PERIMETER AND CAUSED THE PRINCIPLE LOSSES. RESULTS OF THIS ATTACK WERE DESTRUCTION OF LARGE QUANTITIES OF ROCK CRUSHER AND MOTOR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT PLUS DAMAGE TO PLANT FACILITIES.

4. (S) SAPPER ATTACKS HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE INFILTRATION OF INSTALLATIONS BY SMALL HIGHLY TRAINED UNITS. THE SIZE OF SAPPER UNITS HAS VARIED FROM BASIC 3-MAN CELLS TO UNITS OF 25 TO 30 MEN. SAPPER UNITS ARE COMPOSED OF TOUGH, WELL-TRAINED AND HIGHLY MOTIVATED SOLDIERS. THE INDIVIDUAL SAPPER IS COMBAT EXPERIENCED, HAS RECEIVED EXTENSIVE SPECIALIZED TRAINING, AND IS A POLY-WEAPON. HIS PRIMARY WEAPON IN THE EXPLO-

SECRET

**SECRET**

PAGE 3 UUMSO 998V S E C R E T ABRAMS SENDS  
 SIVE CHARGE. SAPPER ATTACKS FOLLOW A STANDARD PATTERN AND CAN  
 BE PREVENTED THROUGH THE USE OF IMAGINATIVE TECHNIQUES DESIGNED  
 TO DETECT SAPPER UNITS BEFORE THEY BEGIN THE ASSAULT. SAPPER  
 ATTACKS ARE THE RESULTS OF DETAILED PLANNING AND THROUGH RECON-  
 NAISSANCE FOLLOWED BY PATIENT, DELIBERATE EXECUTION USUALLY UNDER  
 COVER OF DARKNESS. COUNTER-SAPPER PLANS SHOULD PROVIDE FOR DAY  
 AND NIGHT PATROLLING, INTEGRATION OF DECEPTION AND COUNTER-  
 INTELLIGENCE PLANS, ANTI-INTRUSION DEVICE SYSTEMS, TROOP ALER-  
 TNESS, ILLUMINATION OF DEFENDED AREAS, USE OF SIGNALS, AND PROPER  
 UTILIZATION OF A REACTION FORCE.

2. (S) OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE IN THIS AREA IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS FOR INSTALLATIONS WILL BE REVIEWED,  
 UPDATED, AND STRENGTHENED WHEREVER NECESSARY AS A MATTER OF PRIOR-  
 ITY. CARE WILL BE TAKEN AT EVERY LEVEL OF COMMAND TO PROVIDE A  
 DEFENSE AGAINST THESE SAPPER ATTACKS. POSITIVE COORDINATION  
 AND COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE INS AL-  
 LATIONS WITH A DEFENSE IN DEPTH.

B. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENDING INSTAL-  
 LATIONS AGAINST SAPPER ATTACKS WILL BE STRESSED. INTELLIGENCE  
 AVAILABLE ON SAPPER OPERATIONS AS WELL AS PREVIOUS TACTICS USED

PAGE 4 UUMS 998V S E C R E T ABRAMS SENDS  
 LOCALLY SHOULD BE COVERED.

6. (U) JGS AND ROKA HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO ISSUE SIMILAR  
 INSTRUCTION THROUGH ALLIED CHANNELS.

7. (S) COMMANDERS ARE REQUESTED TO INFORM THIS HEADQUARTERS OF  
 TRAINING PROGRAMS AND RESPONSIVE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES DESIGNED  
 TO COUNTER THE SAPPER THREAT TO CRITICAL INS ALLATIONS.

8. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE MAIL EAC 384 07 3834.

BB-4

BT

993V

NNNN

**SECRET**

SECRET

UB

00 UUMSQ  
DE UUMSQW 314W 0870845  
ZNY SSSSS

O 280845Z MAR 69  
FM FIRST MAW COC  
TO III MA COC  
THIRD MARDIV COC  
NINTH MARINES  
BT

SECRET  
THIRD MARDIV PASS TF HOTEL  
A6 MISSION REPORTING  
A. MISSION 6308  
B. AIR-ABORT

*5:14 PM 1 MAR 69*

A6 MISSION REPORTING  
A. MISSION 6382  
B. TOT 0645  
C. CONDITION OF SYSTEM: UP  
G. BEACON  
(1) XD 812643  
(2) AW PSN  
(3) 22 D2  
(4) UNK BDA

PAGE TWO UUMSQW 314W SECRET  
(5) CONTROLLER: JACKSONVILLE II

A6 MISSION REPORTING  
A. MISSION 6265  
B. TOT: 281010  
C. CONDITION OF SYSTEM UP  
G. BEACON  
(1) ZC164727  
(2) IN. POINT  
(3) 271  
(4) NO BDA  
(5) CONTROLLER: COFFE TIME 14

A6 MISSION  
A. MISSION 6553  
B. TOTs 1144, 1152, 1159, 1207.  
C. CONDITION OF SYSTEM: DOWN

14 AT 1692 585668 AT 8565

SECRET

SECRET



PAGE FREE UUMSQW 314W S E C R E T  
 (4) NO BDA  
 (5) CONTROLLER AN HOA ASRAT 37

## A6 MISSION REPORTING

A. MISSION 6369

B. TOT 1, NONE

C. DOWN

G. BEACON

(5) CONTROLLER - S B - 14

Ho CANX

## A6 MISSION REPORTING

A. MISSION 6559


B. TOT ABORT

H. AIR ABOUT A/C UIC RER DOWN.

GP-4

SECRET

SECRET



HOVE  
O. CHIEF *MD*  
G

IJA  
ACTION

UUMSQ  
DE UUMSQD 1434 0870950  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 280950Z MAR 69  
FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC  
BT  
SECRET

(ATT: MAJ. NORDBERG  
RZ DESERT SANDS UL 9268 LR 9466 DATES IN 27 MARCH UNTIL 29 MARCH  
RZ AMAND UL 9669 LR 9466 ON 28 TEAM WAS SHOOT OUT AND COULDN'T  
BE INSERTED.

2-4  
1434

29

COP 2?+3

SECRET

SECRET



SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF *MD*G-3 W.O. *Jep*G-2 W.O. *Jep*

DOPO

APO

ACTION

DE DIV AND MATE HERE WITH MY CH NU 99 4..... 994.....994.....

000000ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 1445 0871200

ZNY SSSSS

ZP 281200Z MAR 69

FM THIRD MARDIV COC

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

TWELFTH MARINES FDC

BT 1

SECRET

SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT

\_lo ARVN RECON

A. TM HOTEL EXITED DMZ 281700H HAR 69

GP-4

1445

0.7  
29

SECRET

SECRET

COC WIRENOTE

DATE 81 0 2 MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
 INFO: FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR  
 CG III MA  
 THIRD MARDIV

COPY TO: GENERAL

BT

//SECRET//

OPERATION MONTANA MAULER (U)

1. (S) WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 3/5 CAV AND 1/11  
 RECONNAISSANCE-IN-FORCE NORTH OF DONG HA MOUNTAIN INTO  
 A MAJOR OPERATION, THIS OPERATION IS DESIGNATED MONTANA  
 MAULER AS OF 23MAR69.

GP-4

GCNCalGil

7/7  
 COC

TIME

H.A. 69

STAN 2-




START

ACTION

N<sub>S</sub>

MA 7: R.  
 39



SECRET

**SECRET****SHOVE CUC**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APO

ACTION

ZNY SSSSS

DIV-I-CUC

CUC-T-MAG THREE NINE

ZNY SSSSS

P 290130Z MAR 69

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES

ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

ZEN/NINTH MARINES

MAG ONE SIX

MAG THREE SIX

MAG THREE NINE

TWELFTH MARINES

FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR (VIC)

THIRD RECON BN

BT

SECRET

CHANGE TO FRAG ORDER 86-69

A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 230730Z MAR 69

290130Z MAR 69

C-3

PAGE TWO RUMWP 06211 SECRET

1. CHANGE PARA 2D TO READ AS FOLLOWS: PREPARE

TO CLOSE FSB ARGONNE ASAP. CLOSURE

SHOULD BE INITIATED BY DISPLACEMENT OF

CP/ONE/FOUR AND GOLF-KRAY/THREE/TWELVE

ON 30 MAR 69.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

SECRET

GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION  
CWO

PRIORITY 290226 MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RV  
 TO: CQ USMACV, SGN, RVN  
 INFO: AG III MAF, DNG, RVN  
 CC XXI CORPS, PHB, RNE  
 CG USASUPCO, CRB, VN  
 CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN  
 QUANTITY 1000 TONS 1000 TONS  
 FOURTH MARDIV, VCB, RV  
 T 1000 TONS 1000 TONS  
 FIRST BDE, FIFTH LF DIV (1.5CH), QT, RVN

SECRET

FOR CODE J3-04

SENSOR ACTIVATION/DEACTIVATION REPORT (C)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

1. (S) FOL SUBMITTED IAW R A FOR STRI 1,2:
  - A. ONE INHANDSID, ONE MAGID, ONE GSID
  - B. 29/04-21, INHANDSID/MAGID  
29/02, GSID
  - C. XD 05804300  
XD 05904300
  - D. 271500 H MAR 69
  - E. ALL SET FOR END OF BATTERY LIFE
  - F. DESTRUCT ACTIVATED IN RECOVERABLE MODE
  - G. TEN (DUEL BAG)
2. (S) DELETE STRING 125
  - A. TWO HANDSIDS, ONE MAGID
  - B. 29/07, HANDSID  
29/08-22, HANDSID/MAGID
  - C. XD 87656205  
XD 87756220
  - D. 4 JAN 69
  - E. 28 MAR 69
  - F. SIXTEEN (DUEL BLADE)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

**SECRET**

3. (S) DELETE STRING 124  
 A. THREE HANDSIDS, ONE MAGIDD  
 B. 29/11, HANDSID  
 29/12-23, HANDSID/MAGID  
 29/13, HANDSID  
 C. XD 92156497  
 XD 92006481  
 XD 91766478  
 D. 12 JAN 69  
 E. 28 MAR 69  
 F. FIFTEEN (DUEL BLADE)

4. (S) DELETE STRING 121  
 A. ONE HANDSID  
 B. 29/03, HANDSID  
 C. XD 02156595  
 D. 25 DEC 69  
 E. 28 MAR 69  
 F. FOURTEEN (DUEL BLADE)

GP-4

CONF

RELEASED

2

ME

21 MAR 69

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(334)

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1A044

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

335

DRAFTED BY: MRE:PRE  
SEC 8-2 PH 3D RECON  
CWOPRIORITY 29055/22MAR69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG III MAF DMO  
 CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
 INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV  
 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)  
 THIRD MARINES  
 FOURTH MARINES  
 NINTH MARINES  
 TWELFTH MARINES  
 MAG THREE NINE  
 SR ADV QUANG TRI PROVINCE  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 THIRD FORCE RECON CO

3 HIST

**SECRET**

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS FOR 01MAR69 TO 05APR69 (U)

1. MISSION: TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OF  
 ASSIGNED AREA TO DETERMINE ENEMY INFILTRATION AND/OR POSSIBLE

ENEMY BASE CAMPS OR STAGING AREAS. PLOT WATER SOURCES, TRAILS,  
 AND ALL AREAS SUITABLE FOR HLZ'S. EMPLOY SUPPORTING ARMS ON

APPROPRIATE TABLETS, BE ESPECIALLY WATCHFUL FOR SIGNS THAT MIGHT  
 CONFIRM REPORTS THAT ENEMY MAY USE THIS AREA FOR ROCKET/MORTAR

POSITIONS.

## 2. PATROL PLAN

RZ		DATE
UL XD 7057	LR XD 7265	31-01
7465	7663	31-01
7851	8048	30-03
7541	7739	29-01
8242	8440	28-30
9167	9265	29-31
9766	9964	29-01
YD 0040	YD 0238	28-01

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

2

34  
**SECRET**

**SECRET****SECRET**

RZ		DATE
UL YD 0338	UR YD 0536	30-03
0334	0532	30-03
0632	0830	30-03
0541	0739	30-03
1044	1242	30-03
1042	1241	30-03
1232	1430	30-03
1656	1854	30-03
ID 7251	7449	30-03
7944	8142	30-02
6755	6953	30-03
ID 1548	ID 1746	30-03

3. IN ADDITION THERE ARE SEVEN TEAMS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF 1ST AMTRACS WITH THE MISSION OF PERFORMING NIGHT AMBUSHES, AND

TWO TEAMS DEPLOYED AT A-2 IN SUPPORT OF THE 2ND ARVN REGIMENT. THERE ARE THREE TEAMS LOCATED AT INDIA RELAY, ONE TEAM AT SERRIA RELAY AND ONE TEAM AT HOTEL RELAY.

GP-4

**SECRET**

CCN 4953

RELEASED BY

*A.C. Babin*

TIME 29/01/3 HMAR69

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(336)

DRAFTED BY: LRG:IRC  
SEC 8-2 PH 3D RECON 2  
CWOIMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 29055 22 MAR 69FM: CG THIRD MARINE DIV  
CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
CG III MAF DMOINFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV  
CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)  
THIRD MARINES  
FOURTH MARINES  
NINTH MARINES  
TWELFTH MARINES  
MAC THREE NINE  
SR. PROVINCE ADVISOR QUANG TRI  
THIRD RECON BN  
THIRD FORCE RECON COCOPY TO:  
G-2  
G-3  
GSV**SECRET**~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECON DEBRIEFING REPORT (U)

SPOT REPORT MADE IN LIEU OF PATROL REPORT.

RECON TEAM: AMANDA 102 (8 MEN)

OPO-1540-69

281100 H, TEAM WHILE BEING INSERTED AT (XD 978685) OBSERVED A LARGE BUNKER BUILT INTO THE SIDE OF A HILL AT (XD 975685) APPEARED TO BE NEW,

AT THE SAME GRID THERE WERE NUMEROUS SMALL BUNKERS, BUILT IN A SEMI-CIRCULAR PATTERN. TEAM WAS ABOUT 20 FT. OFF THE GROUND, WHEN THEY BEGAN

RECEIVING A/W FIRE, FROM (XD 975685) TEAM OBSERVED ONE ENEMY, BUT WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE UNIFORM.

GP-4  
BTOPO-1540-69  
**SECRET**CCN 49510 RELEASED BY G. H. Perry TIME 29 0755 H MAR 69

2


3/454

**SECRET**

SECRET



\*\*\*\*\*ZZ UMSK  
DE UUMSQD 1482 0880612  
NY SSSSS  
Z 2906 22 MAR 69 T6A/09  
FM THIRDMARDIV CO  
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TO PHB



SECRET

OPERATION MONTANA MAUTER (U)

1. () FOLLOWING INFORMATION SUBMITTED ON SUBJECT OPERATION.

A. MONTANA MAULER, 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV(MECH).

B. AREA BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ, ON THE WEST BY A LINE DRAWN FROM YD 000658, THEN FOLLOWING THE KHE KHI RIVER SOUTH AND WEST TO YD 986640, THEN SOUTHEAST TO YD 992627, THEN SOUTHWEST TO YD 990623 THEN SOUTHEAST TO YD 012597 ON THE SOUTH CONTINUE FROM YD GPQWTOU TO YD 20600, THEN E

ST TO YD 029603, THEN EAST TO YD 033600, THEN EAST TO YD 050607, THEN TO YD 060604 TEN TO TRAIL JUNCTION AT YD 076604, ON THE EAST, CONTINUE TO YD 080608, THEN UP THE H GRID LINE TO DMZ.

C. 23 MAR-DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY.

D. IT N, 11TH INF; 3 SQ. (-), 5TH CAV; AND I CO 3D BN, 9TH MAR AND D CO 1ST BN, 2D ARVN REGT.

E. CONDUCT ARCH AND TEST OPS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FOR ES.

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1482 C O N F I D E N T I A L

F. 3/5(-) CONDUCTED RIF ALONG VALLEY BETWEEN DONG HA MTN AND MUTTER'S RIDGE, WERE ENGAGED BY ENEMY MORTARS FROM VIC HILL 208. 1/11(-) EMPLOYED WITH I 3/9 TO LOCATE

ND DESTROY N FORCES, 3/(-) REDE PLOYED 0 BLOCK EASTERN AVES OF ESCAPE. 1ST BN, 2D ARVN HELICOPTER ASSAULTS TO BLOCK NORTHERN ESCAPE. 1/14 CONTINUES ATTACK TO NORTH.

BT

1482

76

SECRET

**SECRET**

00 00ZZ UUMSK  
 DE UUMSQD 1476 0880630  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 Z 290630Z MAR 69  
 FM HTIRD MARIV TOC DGH.  
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

SECRETLIMD I S  
 ARC LIGHTA. C. XXIV CORPS MSG 281440Z MAR 69  
 B. 3D MAR DIV ISG 270900Z MAR 69  
 C. 3D MARDIV MSG 171435Z MAR 69  
 D. 3D MARDIV MSG 172300Z MAR 69  
 D 3D MAR DIV MSG 270930Z FEB 69

1. IA REF (A) THIS HEADQUARTERS GRANT CLEARANCE/ CONCURRENCE  
 UNTIL 012400H MAR 69. TGTS ARE CLEARED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY.

(A) DMZ INFORMATIONS IS AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) QT 8428 FRIENDLIES 17,000 METERS AT XD 758610(B1/4)  
 NONCOMBATANTS 43,000 METERS AT CAM LO
- (2) QT 8445 FRIENDLIES 22,000 METERS AT XD 758610(B1/4)  
 NONCOMBATANTS 44,700 METERS AT CAM LO
- (3) QT 8446 FRIENDLIES 19,200 METERS AT XD 758610(B1/4)  
 NONCOMBATANTS 44,200 METERS AT CAM LO -
- (4) QT 8478 FRIENDLIES 1,000 METERS AT XD 943630(3/4 CP)  
 NONCOMBATANTS 20,300 METERS AT CAM LO
- (5) QT 8425 FRIENDLIES 1,000 METERS AT XD 683582(C1/4 )  
 NONCOMBATANTS 47,300 METERS AT CAM LO

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1476 SE C . E T L I M D. I S

(6) QT 8379 FRIENDLIES 2,200 METERS AT YD 080630(I3/9)  
 NONCOMBATANTS 12,500 METERS AT CAM LO

2. THE DMZ INFORMATION FOR OTHER TGTS REMAINS THE SAME AS IN REF  
 C, D AND E.

3. THERE ARE RPT ARE FRIENDLY TROOPS WITHIN THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF  
 TGT BOXES IN SOUTHERN DMZ AREA. TGTS ARE CLEARED FOR PLANNING  
 PURPOSES ONLY.

GP-4

BT

1476

NNCM

**A-1**  
**SECRET**

SECRET

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ UUMSK  
 DE UUMSQD 1483 0880845  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 Z P 290845Z MAR 69;  
 MqTHIRD MARDIV COC  
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB  
 INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC  
 TWELFTH M  
 RINES  
 BT  
 SE CR E T  
 SUBJ: SNECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT  
 1 3RD MAR DIV RECON TMS  
 A. TM CLOUDY SKIES ENTERED DMZ  
 291510H MAR 69  
 B. TM LUCK PUNCH 291430H XD 898665 TM MADE CONTACT W/ EST 4 NVA  
 TM ASSAULTED THROUGH EN POSIT RES 1 FR KIA 1 WIA(E) ARTY AND 81MM  
 MSN CALLED  
 C. AT 291450H EXTRACTION FORCE FROM 2-13/4 COMMITTED OUERLAND  
 D. TM LUCKY PUNCH 291210H XD 903657 FND 7 INDIVIDUAL GRAVES  
 YIELDING 7 NVA BODIES KILLED BY SAF. FURTHER SEARCH OF AREA PRODUCED  
 NEG RES RES 7 NVA KIA  
 GP-4  
 BT  
 1485

SECRET

**SECRET****SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APO

ACTION

ZNY SSSSS

OEV-T-COC

-I- 12 MARINES

OCC-T-MAG 39

ZNY SSSSS

O 290945Z MAR 69

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES

ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

OF FIRST MAW

ZEN/NINTH MARINES

TWELFTH MARINES

MAG ONE SIX

MAG THREE SIX

MAG THREE NINE

FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES

THIRD RECON BN

ZEN/VANDERSCHIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG ORDER 87-69

A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 280730Z MAR 69

B. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 290103Z MAR 69

290945 Zmar

C-3

PKS  
2/COC

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 6625 S E C R E T

1. THIRD MARINES: NO CHANGE FROM REF A.

2. FOURTH MARINES: NO CHANGE FROM REF A AS  
MODIFIED BY REF B.3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: HELO MOVEMENTS  
FOR TASK FORCE HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING FORCES  
FOR 30 MAR 69 WILL BE PAGED

PAGE 6

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

22 UUMSQ UUMSENA UUMSQD UUMSJEA  
 DE UUMSK 1582 083144Z  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 Z 0291430Z MAR 69 ZFF-6  
 TO XIV CORPS TOC CP HOCHMUTH  
 FM UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG  
 INFO UUMSENA/SR US ADVISOR 1ST ARVN DIV HUE  
 UUMSQD/3D MAR DIV COC DNG  
 UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV DTCC CEE  
 RONGUIN/CTG 70.8

**SECRET** AVII-CC

SUBJ: OPERATION MONTANA MAULER (U)

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG DTG 160606Z JUN 68 (C).

B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUN 68 (C).

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES A AND B:

A. FORCE MOVEMENTS: NONE.

B. FORECAST OF MAJOR OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY 3D MAR DIV.

(1) NAME: MONTANA MAULER-1ST BDE, 5TH INF (MECH) CONTROL HQS.

(2) LOCATION: AO BOUNDED ON N BY SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF DMZ, ON THE N BY LINE FROM YD000658, THEN FOLLOWING THE KHE KHI RIVER S AND W TO YD 986640, THEN SE TO YD 992627, THEN SW TO YD990623, THEN SE TO YD012597 THEN NE TO YD 020600, E TO YD 029603, E TO YD 035600, E TO 050607, TO YD060604, TO TRAIL JUNCTION AT YD 076604, NE TO YD 080603 THEN NORTH ALONG 08N-S LINE TO DMZ.

(3) DATES: 23 MAR- DESTRUCTION OF EN FORCES.

(4) FORCES: 1 US BN, 2 USMC CO'S, 2 US ARMY CAV TRPS, 1 ARVN BN.

(5) MISSION: TO CONDUCT RIF OPS AND TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES.

(6) CONCEPT: ON 23 MAR 3/5 CAV(-) INITIATED RIF OPS ALONG VALLEY

PAGE TWO UUMSK 1582 **SECRET**

BETWEEN DONG HA MTN AND MUTTER'S RIDGE AND WAS ENGAGED BY ENEMY MORTAR FIRE FROM VIC HILL 208 (YD043644). 1/11 INF(-) DEPLOYED WITH 1/3/9 MAR TO LOCATE AND DESTROY EN, 3/5 CAV (-) REDEPLOYED TO BLOCK EN AVENUES OF ESCAPE. 1ST BN 2ND ARVN CA ON 29 MARCH VIC YD0664AND YD0665 AND MOVES TO BLOCKING PSN VIC YD0467. 1/11 INF CONTINUES TO ATTACK N.

(7) RATIONALE: 1/11 INF IS IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE 27TH NVA REGT

GP-4

BT

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76

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

051

DRAFTER	ISO/CAR/RMB
SEC	ISO PHONE 3211
CWO	

63-17

IMMEDIATE

300240

Z MAR 69

FROM: CG, THIRD MAR DIV  
 TO: CG, XXIV CORPS  
 INFO: CG, III MAF

//SECRET//

RELEASE OF EMBARGOED NEWS MATERIAL.

A. COMUSMACV MSG 221515 Z AUG 68

1. AS PRESCRIBED IN REF A THE INITIAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO ANY TACTICAL OPERATION WILL BE MADE BY MACV WHEN IN THE OPINION OF THE COMMANDER CONCERNED THE RELEASE OF SUCH INFORMATION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THIS COMMAND.

2. ACCORDINGLY IT IS REQUESTED THE EMBARGO BE LIFTED IMMEDIATELY ON RELEASE OF NEWS STORIES CONCERNING OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN WHICH COMMENCED 27 FEBRUARY 1969.

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**SECRET**

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DE UUMSQD 1517 0890355

ZNY SSSSS

Z P 300355Z MAR 69

FM THIRD MARDIV CUC

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS 10C

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL CUC

TWELFTH MARINES CDC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPECIAL DNE OPMS REPORT

1 3RD MARDIV RECON

A. TM PEACH GATE 300950H X D 932661 WHILE CHECKING DANGER AREA, SUSTAINED CASUALTIES FROM COMMAND DETONATED NVA CLAYMORE. TM FIRED QM1 FLEEING NVA U/NEG RES MOVED TO LZ FOR MEDIVAC AND FIRED 81MM MSN AND ARTY. RES 4 WIA(E)

B. TM DESERT SAND 291400H X D 934656. FND 6 A FRAME BNKRS, 251 CHICOM CRENS, 61/82MM RDS, 70/60MM RDS, 232 MORTAR PRIMERS, 68 FUZES, 6 BAGS RICE, 8LBS INCREMENTS. WHILE CHECKING AREA, REC'D SAF FROM SQD SIZED ENEMY FORCE RET'D SAF RES 1 NVA KIA

C. TM DESERT SAND 291510H X D 934659 TM FOUND 9 BNKRS APPROX 6MOS OLD 23 FIGHTING HOLES, 7/ RPG RDS, 2 CANS/82MM FUZES, 2 CANS/60MM FUZES, 2/10" CLAYMORES, 100/50 CAL RDS, 2000/30 CAL RDS SIGNS OF REC ACT IN AREA DEST'D ALL GEAR.

GP-4

BT

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1 A of 4

**SECRET**

SECRET

TO UUMSK  
 DE UUMSQD 1523 0890720  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 0 300720Z MAR 69 To  
 FM THIRD MAR DIV COC  
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC

W.V.  
 AISTOR  
 COC  
 PLANS

SECRET  
 SECRET

SUBJ: OPERATION MONTANA MAULER(U)

REF (A) THIRD MARDIV WIRENOTE 281420Z MAR 69

(B) THIRD MARDIV WIRENOTE 290612Z MAR 69

1 (S) PURSUANT TO REF A AND B OPERATION MONTANA MAULER IS REDEFINED AS A CO-ORDINATED MAJOR OPERATION AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN AN AREA BOUNDED BY THE DMZ ON THE NORTH, THE 08 N/S GRID LINE ON THE EAST, ROUTE 9 ON THE SOUTH, AND THE 99N/S GRID LINE ON THE WEST. THIS AREA IS RETROACTIVE, FOR REPORTING PURPOSES, TO 23 MARCH. REALIGNMENT OF CASUALTY FIGURES WILL BE REFLECTED IN FUTURE MONTANA MAULER AND THIRD MARDIV SITREPS

2 (S) PRINCIPAL CONTROL HEADQUARTERS FOR OPERATION MONTANA MAULER IS 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) WHICH IS OPERATING IN CO-ORDINATION AND CO-OPERATION WITH 2ND ARVN REGIMENT AND ELEMENTS OF 9TH MARINE REGT

GP-4  
 GP-4

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DE UUMSQD 1526 0890810

Z P 300810Z MAR 69 0  
FM THIRDMARDIV COC  
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PH  
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC  
TWELFTH MARINES FDC  
BT

SECR E  
SUBJ SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT  
I 3RD MARDI ECON  
A K-3

ND MAGIC SPELL EXITED DMZ AT 301130H MAR 69  
QO I -2, EXTRACTION FORCE FOR LUCKY PUNCH EXITED DMZ AT 301350H  
MAR CH 69 LUCKY PUNCH CONTINUES MSN.  
C. TM PEACH STATE 301210H XD 933658 TM REC'D 5 CHICOMS. PULLED BACK  
TO CALL IN ARTY AND 81MSN AND REC'D 9/82MM RND. RND. COMING FROM VIC  
XD 933662. TM STILL REC SPORADIC 82MM RND. AT 301445H. TRYING TO  
DETERMINE GRID OF EN MORTAR SITE. RES I WIA(M) I NVA KIA  
P HAS REQUESTED ARTY 81MM AND F/W  
D. UNIT LOCATIONS, CLOUDY SKIES XD 918658  
LUCKY PUNCH XD 900645  
PEARCH STATE XD 933658  
E. TM LUCKY PUNCH XD 905644 301355H FND 52/82MM RND. AND 4 BNKRS.  
NO DEMO MARKED FOR LATER DEST  
GP-4  
BT  
1526

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UUMSE UUMSEMA

UUMSJEA RUNGWIN

10 101412Z MAR 69  
 FM XXIV CORPS TOC GP HOCHMUTH  
 TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG  
 INFO UUMSEMA/SR US ADVISOR IST ARVN DIV HUE  
 UUMSQD/3RD MAR DIV OC DGH  
 UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV DTOC CEE  
 UIN/CT 70.8

SECRET AVII-GC

SUBJ: MONTANA MAULER (U)

F. A. XXIV CORPS TOC MSG DTG 291430Z (S)

CG II MAF, ME DTG 160 C)

CG THE 3RD MSG DTG 120910Z X IN REF PARA 1 2 3 ARE AMENDED  
 TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF AO IS RTE 9; E AND W  
 BOUNDARIES REMAINS THE SAME".

2 TW USMC COYS CITED IN RE PARAT B, -(4) ARE ELEMENTS OF  
 THE 9TH MAR REGT. ONE ARVN BN IS FROM THE 2ND ARVN REGT.  
 GROUP-4.

1 10

SECRET



5014 S.W. 22' 30"

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{4}$$

# SHOVE OUT

OP CHIEF

G-2 W O

G. 100

DC#0

APG OK

## ACTIONS

506

9-5

6-2/000

5096

ON COMPLEXION  
401 ALFA

ON COMPLETION  
401 BRAVO

82

27

# SECRET

**SECRET**

DRAFTER J.E. KUSSEMAN  
SEC DUEL BLADE PHONE 3361  
CWO

PRIORITY 310156 Z MAR69

FM: CG, THIRD MARDIV BQH  
TO: CG, III MAF DMC

INFO: CG, XXIV CORPS PHB  
CG, FIRST ARVN DIV  
ELEVENTH REGT BN DMC  
SECOND ARVN REGT

**SECRET/ DUEL BLADE**

DUEL BLADE CONSTRUCTION CY 69

A. CG, III MAF 160542Z MAR69

1. JAW REF A, A RE-EVALUATION OF CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR DUEL BLADE SITES WAS MADE AND IS SUBMITTED AS FOLLOWS FOR THE CY 69

CONSTRUCTION SEASON.

SITE	ITEM	DATE	NO/PLNS
A-4	2-20° TOWERS	1-6 MAY	1
C-2	2-20° TOWERS 6 HEAVY GUN PADS	1-15 MAY	2
C-1	2 HEAVY GUN PADS 12 LIGHT GUN PADS	17-31 MAY	3
C-4	1-50° TOWER 2-20° TOWERS	1-4 JUNE	3
ECB	4-20° TOWERS 4 STEEL ARCH BUNKERS	6-21 JUNE	3
VCB	6-20° TOWERS 10 STEEL ARCH BUNKERS	23 JUN-19 JULY	3

2. LIAISON HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE SECOND ARVN REGT AND THEIR CONSTRUCTION GOALS ARE LISTED BELOW. TO DATE ONE COMPANY OF ARVN ENGINEERS

HAVE BEEN TASKED FOR CONSTRUCTION AND IT IS ESTIMATED IT WOULD TAKE 23 MONTHS TO COMPLETE THE DESIRED CONSTRUCTION. AS ADDITIONAL FORCES

DUEL

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

ARE ASSIGNED THIS TIME FIGURE WOULD BE ADJUSTED ACCORDINGLY.

SITE  
A-2

ITEMS  
55 BUNKERS  
2-20' TOWERS

2 HEAVY GUN PADS  
2 LIGHT GUN PADS

C-1

87 BUNKERS  
2-20' TOWERS

1-50' TOWER  
4 HEAVY GUN PADS

10 LIGHT GUN PADS

A-2

49 BUNKERS  
2-20' TOWERS

1-50' TOWER

GP4

CGN

5176

REL BY

*JR Lilley*

TIME

H MAR69

**SECRET**

SECRET

056

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IIIIIFRZ\*\*\*\*\*ZZ UUMSK  
DE UUMSQD 1552 0900600

ZNY SSSSS

Z P 310600Z MAR 69

FM THIRD MARDIV COC

TO UMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

TWELFTH MARINES FDC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT

I 4TH MARINES RECON TMS

A. CLUDY SKIES EXITED DMZ OVERLAND AT 310850H MAR 69

B. K-3 311100H XD 932662. UNIT RETURNING FROM LINKUP W/ PEACH  
STATE FND 2/50CAL POSITS, 4/A-FRAME BNKRS, 1/ MORTAR PIT, 20/82MM  
MORTAR RND, 63/50 CAL RND. GEAR AND POSITIONS APPROX 2 WEEKS OLD  
DESTROYED ALL.

GP-4

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1552

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\*\*\*\*\*ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 1562 0900

ZNY SSSSS

Z 310730Z MAR 69

FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

BT

SECRET L I M D I S

ARC LIGHT

A. XXIV CORPS MSG 311030Z MAR 69

1. IAW REFERENCE A THIS HEADQUARTERS GRANTS CLEARANCE TO 012400H  
MAY 69FOR ARC LIGHT SECONDARY IGIS LISTED BELOW. ACKNOWLEDGE TGTS MAY BE  
STRUCK ON 15 MINUTE NOTICE.

A. QT 8465

B. QT 8464

C. IT 9563

D. IT 9587

E. IT 9593

2. THERE ARE NO RPT NO USMC FORCES OR IRCON TEAMS WITHIN THREE (3)  
KILOMETERS OF IGI BOXES.

GP-4

562

A-1

SECRET

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OO UUMSK UUMSQ  
DE UUMSQD 1583 0901800  
ZNY CCCCC  
O 311800Z MAR 69  
FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TDC  
INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC  
TASK FORCE HOTEL  
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
SPARK. 1/3 OPERATES SOUTH OF RT 926. 2/3 CP AND 1 CO)  
OPERATES FROM FSB WHISMAN XD 973334. K/3/3 OPERATES FROM  
FSB CATES AND 1/3/3 CONDUCT RIF. VIC OF FSB CATES. IF  
REMAINS OPERATES IN WESTERN PORTION OF AO ALONG RT 926  
C. MONTANA MAULER 1/11 COMMENCES ATTACK TO THE EAST  
TOWARD C-2 & C-3 BRIDGE. 1/2 ARVN CONT. OFFENSIVE OPNS IN  
NORTHERN PORTION OF AO NEAR DMZ. 3/5 CAV OCCUPY BLOCKING  
POSITION TO NORTHEAST. 163/9 MOVE OVERLAND TO THE SANH  
VALLEY AND RECON TO CAU VIET.  
E/F 2/9 PREPARE TO MOVE TO VCB RECON DM 2A HQ SITREP  
E/S SPECIAL OPERATIONS. SEE 200  
11 UNIT OPERATIONS IAKFR

- (A) 1/3 MAINE CRAG  
(B) 2/3 MAINE CRAG  
(C) 3/3(-) MAINE CRAG

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO UUMSQD  
PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1583

- (2) 4TH MARINES  
(A) 1/4 PURPLE MARTIN  
(B) 2/4 NO CONTACT  
(C) 3/4

AT 311245H 1/3/4 VIC XD 910630. HEARD MOVEMENT  
ON TRAIL. SET UP AMB. MADE CONTACT. 1 NVA KIA(C).

B. 9TH MARINES

- (1) 1/9 NO CONTACT  
(2) 2/9

AT 301900H E/2/9 VIC YD 055599. FOUND TWO  
NVA BODIES 2 HOURS OLD. CAUSE OF DEATH UNK.

- (3) 3/9 NO CONTACT  
C. 1ST BDE 5TH INF MECH

- (1) 1/11 MONTANA MAULER  
(2) 1/61 NO CONTACT  
(3) 1/77 NO CONTACT  
(4) 3/5 CAV MONTANA M  
(5) A/4/12 CAV NO CONTACT  
(6) 1ST AMTRAC BN NO CONTACT

ACT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 1583

3RD RECON BN SEE 3RD RECON BN 24 HR SITREP  
 ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. SEE 12TH MAR 24HR SITREP  
 GENERAL. LOW CLOUD COVER, FOG AND RAIN GREATLY  
 HAMPERED AO SORTIES. EMERGENCY RESUPPLY ONLY

WEATHER DID NOT AFFECT GROUND OPERATIONS IN 3RD  
 MAR DIV AO.

D. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

PATROL AMBUSH S&amp;D LIST SCOUT

UNIT FT SQD PLI FT SQD PLT CO POST SNIPER

3RD MAR

1/3 MAINE CRAG

2/3 MAINE CRAG

1/3 MAINE CRAG

4TH MAR

1/4 PURPLE MARTIN

2/4	D	0	4	2	0	0	0	1	0
	N	0	0	0	0	7	0	5	0
3/4	D	0	5	3	0	0	0	2	3
	N	0	0	0	0	6	1	5	0

9TH MAR

1/9	D	0	3	2	0	0	5	0	3
	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0

2/9 MONTANA MAULER

UNCLAS

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 1583

3/9	D	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	11
	N	0	5	0	0	0	0	4	0

IST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)

1/11 MONTANA MAULER

1/61	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	N	0	5	0	18	0	0	5	0
1/77	D	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	3	2	0	0	1	0	0

3/5 CAV MONTANA MAULER

IST AMTRAC BN

	D	12	0	0	0	0	0	5	11
	N	0	0	0	12	0	0	11	0
QTCB	D	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	N	0	0	0	0	2	0	5	0
	D	12	13	11	0	0	7	8	9
	N	0	13	2	18	27	2	56	0
	T	12	26	13	18	27	9	44	9

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PAGE FIVE UUMSQD 1583  
E. SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROVINCE	DATE	ACTION	FR UNIT/ LOSSES	EN UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY US/VC
YD) 055599	301900H	PLT S/C	E/2/9 NONE	UNK 2 NVA KIA	US
Q 910630	311245H	SQD AMB	I/3/4	UNK 1 NVA KIA	US

## F. PACIFICATION SUPPORT

## 1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.

A. A/1/9 CONDUCT COMBINED OPSN WITH RF/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOC TOAR.

B. B/1/9 CONDUCT COMBINED OPNS IN CAM LO DISTRICT.

C. TWO SQUADS OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.

D. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN REGTS THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL AREA.

2. DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PIOCC) BY 9TH MARINES, DHCB, OTCB AND 1ST BDE 5TH IN (MECH)

3. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/HAMLET C&amp;S DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE

121  
85